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Abstract. 
 
Previous historiography on propaganda has focussed on particular themes or time 
periods; this thesis provides a comprehensive and inclusive analysis drawing on a 
multidisciplinary approach to encompass the period c.1377-1485. The main conclusion is that 
propaganda was more prevalent and involved a larger proportion of the polity than previously 
thought. A conceptual framework based upon certain criteria used in Jacques Ellul’s, 
Propaganda the Formation of Men’s Attitudes, has been adopted to help define and identify 
propaganda.  
One of the dominant themes is the prerequisite of communication to enable the 
propagandist to reach his audience and the opportunities available to do so. An examination of 
the various methods available, from official sources to rebel manifestoes, together with the 
physical communication network required demonstrates that there existed a nationwide 
environment where this was possible. The literary media used for propaganda include 
proclamations, poetry, letters, and bills. The political audience was broad in terms of 
understanding of literary and visual forms of communication and their ability to use the 
available mechanisms to convey their opinions. Whether it was a disgruntled magnate, 
merchant or yeoman farmer, there was a method of communication suited to their 
circumstances. 
Visual propaganda was particularly important in politically influencing an audience, 
particularly for a largely illiterate population. This is an area that is often overlooked in terms 
of political influence until the Tudor period. The use of the human body will be a particular 
focus along with the more traditional aspects of art, such as heraldry.  
The thesis considers the relationship between kings’ personality, policy and 
propaganda. What emerges is that the personality of the monarch was essentially more 
influential than the use of propaganda.  
Finally, incorporating the analysis of the previous chapters, the North, is examined as 
a regional example of the presence and impact of propaganda. The North was a subject of 
propaganda itself and there was a two-way flow of communication and propaganda between 
the North and Westminster revealing the political consciousness of the region and its role as an 
audience. 
The overall argument of the thesis is that communication within the late medieval polity 
was essential and extensive. Propaganda was frequently used through a variety of media that 
could reach the whole polity, whether literate or not and not only in times of crisis. 
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Introduction. 
 
The intention of this thesis is to expand on existing work on propaganda during the late 
medieval period, by adopting a multidisciplinary approach in order to encompass areas that 
have not been incorporated into the discussion. The aim will be to show that conditions existed 
in which propaganda could be produced, communicated, interpreted and cause a reaction. In 
turn this will allow a wider insight into the political community of the later medieval period, in 
terms of its members’ ability to understand messages and act upon them and to show that 
politics was no longer the reserve of the elite. Mark Ormrod refers to this awareness of the 
political state by the majority of the population as ‘political consciousness’ and it is with this 
in mind that the thesis will be developed.1 It is also important to remember that the production 
of propaganda was not limited to just the government, as the evidence will show that anybody 
with a message or complaint had the means and methods to make themselves heard. There was 
an increasing political consciousness amongst groups such as the mercantile community, the 
yeomanry and town dwellers which will be seen from the variety of genres of propaganda used 
together with the different spaces into which the propaganda was projected. K. B. McFarlane 
stated that the paucity of material leads the historian to the conclusion that ‘men have to be 
judged from their actions alone’ and that political success depended on ‘powers of persuasion, 
a sense of audience’, themes that concur with Ellul’s study.2 The success or failure of the 
propaganda is in some ways not that important, it is the fact that it existed that is more 
illuminating about political culture at this time. As Charles Ross argued it provides evidence 
of ‘the growing awareness of the ruler’s need to influence popular opinion’.3 
While the term propaganda has diverged from its religious origins and become 
associated with politics in an unfavourable way, notably through its links with the regimes of 
the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and more recently, North Korea, along the way in many 
people’s minds becoming synonymous with manipulation and untruth, it remains a useful 
concept for forms of political communication. There has been much written about the subject 
                                                 
1 W. M. Ormrod, Political Life in Medieval England, 1300-1450 (Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Press, 1995), p. 1. 
2 K. B. McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 
p. 281. 
3 C. Ross, ‘Rumour, Propaganda & Popular Opinion during the Wars of the Roses’, in R. A. 
Griffiths (ed.), Patronage, the Crown & the Provinces (Gloucester: Sutton, 1981), pp. 15-32 
(p. 29). 
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over many years by various authors.4 Jacques Ellul’s work on propaganda in the modern 
industrial age, although not immediately applicable in all its details, does provide a framework 
around which it is possible to examine the later medieval period.5 Naturally there were 
limitations associated with adopting a modern twentieth-century definition and applying this 
to late medieval politics. Ellul’s thesis was based on the existence of a modern communication 
system within a technologically-advanced and more highly-educated society, neither of which 
was extant during the period under discussion. Methodologically, his work drew on evidence 
produced through research, such as opinion polls and the availability of huge amounts of 
contemporary material. Historians of the late medieval period must recognise that they are 
examining a very different society and they have scant resources to draw on by comparison, 
many of which, such as, the chronicles, are inherently biased so providing accurate or informed 
evidence is much harder. What Ellul’s approach does allow for, however, is the application of 
a broader set of hypotheses about the nature and potential of political persuasion and a greater 
appreciation of the extent of the role of all methods of communication. Previous historiography 
has focussed on the specific, whether by genre, time period or social class, whereas the adoption 
of Ellul’s sociological method enables the historian to take a wider perspective of the extent 
and variety of medieval communication and examine it through the response of the polity. 
From his theory the thesis will draw on the themes of agitation and integration 
propaganda as a methodology to survey the evidence for political propaganda. Agitation 
propaganda according to Ellul is explosive and works within or even creates a crisis situation.6 
Integration propaganda, on the other hand, seeks conformity and has a long term-goal and 
requires a more comprehensive and complex approach.7 Using these two concepts provides an 
opportunity to remove the usual negative connotations associated with the word propaganda, 
often associated with regimes where political discourse was not extant, and enables the 
historian to gain a fuller perspective about the way in which the late medieval polity 
communicated and indeed participated in political dialogue.  
Communication is integral to the success of propaganda, according to Ellul, and this 
too will be examined through evidence of the physical movement of information from primary 
                                                 
4 Ellul; J. A. C. Brown, Techniques of Persuasion from Propaganda to Brainwashing 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963). 
5 Ellul. 
6 Ibid., p. 72. 
7 Ibid., p. 77. 
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sources such as city records, letters and wills.8 It will become evident that the country was well 
connected by transport networks, both internally and externally, either over land or by sea, so 
providing the necessary environment for propaganda opportunities. 
The thesis will consider the work of not only political historians but also cultural and 
art historians to encompass a more complete historiography of the period in terms of 
propaganda. The interplay of economic, religious and literary developments is also taken into 
consideration and the whole of the medieval polity will be included in the analysis and not just 
the king and nobility. 
Historiography. 
The period 1377-1485 is not often studied as a whole, the reign of Richard II ending 
fourteenth-century study and only occasionally being incorporated with Henry IV and Henry 
V, and the Wars of the Roses is usually treated as a subject on its own. The reign of Richard II 
heralded the beginning of an attempt at a new style of kingship, and the death of Richard III 
marked the end of a long period of dynastic rivalry, domestic conflict and the middle ages. This 
period was defined, first, by foreign war with the Hundred Years War and second, by the 
domestic unrest of the Wars of the Roses. It saw three usurpations, three minorities and one 
readeption and provided a challenging political climate for the king and government – an 
environment in which propaganda was able to flourish.  
The historiography of the period of the Wars of the Roses was dominated by the work 
of the Victorian historians William Stubbs, William Denton and Charles Plummer and their 
view that the wars originated with the barons and their affinities, leading to the phrase ‘bastard 
feudalism’ conceived by Plummer.9 K. B. McFarlane countered their argument, that rather than 
being an issue of social instability it was actually a failure of kingship.10 The current debate is 
still varied in opinion with Christine Carpenter and John Watts regarding the wars as a result 
                                                 
8 For the purposes of the thesis ‘information’ will refer to any official sources, news, gossip, 
facts - which when it becomes ‘active’ may be ‘propaganda’ with the intention to agitate or 
integrate. 
9 William Stubbs, The Constitutional History of England in its Origin and Development, 2 
vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1874-78); W. Denton, England in the Fifteenth Century 
(London: G. Bell, 1888); John Fortescue, The Governance of England: Otherwise Called the 
Difference between an Absolute and a Limited Monarchy, ed. Charles Plummer (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1885). 
10 K. B. McFarlane, England in the Fifteenth Century (London: Hambledon Press, 1981). 
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of constitutional shortcomings rather than those of the king, Henry VI in particular.11 The 
debate on this particular period led to a discussion on the role of propaganda and the need for 
persuasive communication but these studies have tended to focus on either a limited time-span 
or genre, for example, proclamations.12 James Doig’s work on late medieval proclamations 
highlighted the effort put into the circulation of proclamations as a means of reaching a large 
audience. However, until the arrival of the Yorkists these proclamations were not always 
accurate in their translation into the oral and often any propagandist message was lost.13 Colin 
Richmond’s definition of propaganda as solely the manipulation of information by the 
government is too restricted and also provides for too sharp a distinction between propaganda 
and communication as it excludes other political groups.14  
It is the intention of this thesis is to draw together the various areas of royal and non-
royal propaganda previously discussed for the whole period to produce a more complete picture 
of the styles of propaganda that were utilised by late medieval society and their impact on 
politics. Kevin Sharpe’s book on the Tudors has provided many ideas for approaching the 
subject using a multidisciplinary approach which will broaden the research to include a cultural 
as well as political emphasis to advance a more comprehensive examination of the role of 
propaganda.15 The rationale behind Sharpe’s research was to see ‘to what extent the rhetoric 
and style of each ruler shaped the politics of the reign; how different monarchs appropriated, 
revised and redeployed vocabularies and symbols that conveyed authority’.16 His approach, 
                                                 
11 Christine Carpenter, The Wars of the Roses: Politics and the Constitution in England, 
c.1437-1509 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; John Watts, Henry VI and the 
Politics of Kingship (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
12 A. Gransden, ‘Propaganda in English Medieval Historiography’, JMH, 1 (1975), 363-81; 
Ross, ‘Rumour’, pp.15-32; James A. Doig, ‘Propaganda, Public Opinion and the Siege of 
Calais in 1436’, in Rowena E. Archer (ed.), Crown, Government and People in the Fifteenth 
Century, The Fifteenth Century, 2 (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1995), pp. 79-106 (pp. 80-81); A. 
Allan, ‘Royal Propaganda and the Proclamations of Edward IV’, BIHR, 59 (1986), 146-154; 
A. Allan, ‘Yorkist Propaganda: Pedigree, Prophecy and the “British History” in the reign of 
Edward IV’, in R. A. Griffiths (ed.), Patronage, Pedigree and Power in Later Medieval 
England (Gloucester: Alan Sutton, 1979), pp. 171-192; C. Richmond, ‘Propaganda in the 
Wars of the Roses’, History Today, 42 (1992), 12-18; P. S. Lewis, ‘War Propaganda and 
Historiography in Fifteenth Century France and England’, TRHS, fifth series, 15 (1965), 1-
21. 
13 James A. Doig, ‘Political Propaganda and Royal Proclamations in Late Medieval England’, 
HR, LXXI (1998), 253-280. 
14 Richmond, ‘Propaganda’, pp. 12-18. 
15 Kevin Sharpe, Selling the Tudor Monarchy: Authority and Image in Sixteenth-Century 
England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
16 Sharpe, Selling the Tudor Monarchy, p. 8. 
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essentially an examination of the methods of representation used by the king to his subjects to 
express his authority, is one that can usefully be applied to the fifteenth century, while 
recognising that others were also in a position to deploy at least some of these modes of 
representation. 
Literary sources. 
The majority of the propaganda types considered in this thesis will therefore be those 
produced by the crown and those working for it; but others in society also expressed views on 
politics. This is evident in the case of propaganda expressed in literary forms. C. L. Kingsford 
and Antonia Gransden have both produced seminal works on the literature of the late medieval 
period which provide an invaluable basis from which to proceed.17 The sources include 
chronicles; letters – official and private; poetry; genealogies and ‘official histories’. Each has 
its own specific purpose; for example, ‘official histories’ such as the ‘Record and Process’, 
were produced with the aim to integrate an insecure dynasty often combined with genealogies 
to justify an usurping monarch. The private letters of families such as the Pastons, Stonors, 
Plumptons and Celys provide rich material for understanding the thoughts and concerns of the 
gentry as well as contemporary comment on events.18 
Royal proclamations although written were usually communicated orally to an audience 
and therefore bridge both the literary and oral genre. Historians such as Alison Allan and James 
Doig have emphasised the propagandist use of proclamations, particularly during the Wars of 
the Roses.19 Like proclamations, poetry provided a both written and oral medium through 
which political complaint and satire was expressed, sometimes on behalf of the government, 
often by those in opposition.20  
Newsletters and bills were often the only means of communication for the general 
populace once the official avenues were perceived as biased.21 These were usually posted in 
                                                 
17 C. L. Kingsford, English Historical Literature in the Fifteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1913); A. Gransden, Historical Writing in England, c.1307 to the early sixteenth 
century, 2 vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982). 
18 Cely Letters; PL; Stonor; Plumpton. 
19 Allan, ‘Royal Propaganda’; ‘Yorkist Propaganda’; Doig, ‘Propaganda’, pp. 80-81; 
‘Political Propaganda’, pp. 253-280. 
20 V. J. Scattergood, Politics and Poetry in the Fifteenth century (London: Blandford Press, 
1971), provides a comprehensive survey. 
21 Wendy Scase, ‘“Strange and Wonderful Bills”: Bill-Casting and Political Discourse in Late 
Medieval England’, in Rita Copeland, David Lawton and Wendy Scase (eds), New Medieval 
Literatures 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 225-247 (p. 237).  
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public spaces such as doors and windows and were even scattered along highways to be picked 
up and disseminated by travellers.22 The recent work of Clementine Oliver suggests that the 
use of political pamphlets indicated their use was a reflection of the growth of public opinion 
as politically significant in the period before the printing press.23 These literary sources provide 
contemporaneous information not only for events but also provide evidence of an extensive 
communication network which in turn informs the nature and extent of the audience. 
The role of the visual genre . 
The visual genre is of particular interest: it has not received as much interest from 
political historians of the period as it merits, often being regarded as the poor relation to the 
great art of the Tudors and the renaissance. In an age of poor literacy the use of the pictorial 
was of great importance in communicating, and medieval society was used to visual images, 
whether from church paintings, well established processions or the use of heraldry. As a 
consequence of such traditions, the medieval polity had an established visual vocabulary with 
which to decipher and interpret the symbolism. As Keen stated ‘the experience of earlier 
generations had attuned minds to looking for significance in the visual, and to its importance 
as a means of communication’.24 Keen also emphasised the importance that the increase in 
literacy had on the visual genre and how together messages, either social or political, were 
more effectively communicated.25 This suggests that the literary genre and the visual genre 
benefitted from a symbiotic relationship, underpinning the notion that communication was 
important during the period along with increasing political consciousness.  
Art historians such as Theodore Rabb and Sidney Anglo have argued that art was 
merely for entertainment and had no subliminal political agenda.26 Their work perhaps relies 
on the fact that during the Tudor period the audience was more literate and that art had indeed 
become less of a medium for communication with the illiterate. During the later medieval 
period it becomes apparent that the visual genre was of great importance in communicating 
with large parts of the population and the work of art historians, such as Erwin Panofsky and 
                                                 
22 Scase, ‘“Strange and Wonderful Bills”’, p. 238. 
23 Clementine Oliver, Parliament and Political Pamphleteering in Fourteenth-Century 
England (Woodbridge: York Medieval Press, 2010). 
24 Maurice Keen, ‘Introduction’, in Peter Coss and Maurice Keen (eds), Heraldry, Pageantry 
and Social Display in Medieval England (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2003), pp. 1-16 (p. 8). 
25 Keen, Heraldry, p. 6. 
26 Theodore K. Rabb, ‘Play, not Politics’, Times Literary Supplement, 10 November 1995, 
18-20; Sidney Anglo, Images of Tudor Kingship (Guildford: Seaby, 1992). 
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Paul Binski, helped to reveal this role of art in politics and society.27 Panofsky stated that ‘the 
historian of political life, poetry, religion, philosophy, and social situations should make 
analogous use of works of art’ and Binski saw the connection of the use of art as a means of 
political legitimisation, particularly by the court.28 Both argued for the use of art as relevant for 
interpreting political communication, and this thesis will seek to confirm their premise through 
an interpretation of a broad range of visual media; as before with literary material it will be 
both royal and non-royal propaganda, which will be considered here.  
Further discussion of this approach to art will refer to the works of Richard Marks, 
Nigel Saul and David Starkey who provide detailed insights into how the visual genre was 
often appropriated for political purposes.29 The work of Marks and Saul concentrates on the 
large-scale memorial art of architecture, effigies and stained glass – usually found in churches 
but with a political rather than religious message. Marks believed that only this scale of art 
would have had any influence on public opinion.30 Starkey’s interest in the need to promote 
kingship through physical and artistic sources broadens the discussion on the role of the arts in 
influencing the polity. 
 
 
                                                 
27 Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts ([Reprint] Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1993); 
David Starkey, ‘Representation through Intimacy’, in I. Lewis (ed.) Symbols and Sentiments: 
Cross-Cultural Studies in Symbolism (London: Academic Press, 1977), pp.187-224; Paul 
Binski, Westminster Abbey and the Plantagenets: Kingship and the Representation of Power 
1200-1400 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); ‘Hierarchies and Orders in English 
Royal Images of Power’, in Jeffrey Denton (ed.), Orders and Hierarchies in Late Medieval 
and Renaissance Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999), pp. 74-93. 
28 Panofsky, Meaning, p. 65; Binski, ‘Hierarchies’, pp. 82, 93. 
29 Richard Marks, Studies in the Art and Imagery of the Middle Ages (London: Pindar Press, 
2012); Image and Devotion in late medieval England (Stroud: Sutton, 2004); ‘Images of 
Henry VI’, in Jenny Stratford (ed.), The Lancastrian Court: Proceedings of the 2001 
Harlaxton Symposium (Donington: Shaun Tyas, 2003), pp. 111-24; Nigel Saul, ‘Bold as 
Brass: Secular Display in English Medieval Brasses’, in Peter Coss and Maurice Keen (eds), 
Heraldry, Pageantry and Social Display in Medieval England (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 
2002), pp. 169-194; Death, Art and Memory in Medieval England: The Cobham Family and 
Their Monuments 1300-1500 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); ‘The Commons and 
the Abolition of Badges’, Parliamentary History, 9 (1990), 302-15; David Starkey, ‘Ightham 
Mote: Politics and Architecture in Early Tudor England’, Archaeologia, CVII (1982), 153-
61; ‘Representation through Intimacy’; ‘Henry VI’s Old Blue Gown’, The Court Historian, 4 
(1999), 1-28. 
30 Marks, Studies in the Art and Imagery, p. 106. 
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The importance of the audience and ‘space’. 
Throughout this process the importance of the audience will be examined to assess the 
impact of the propaganda, whether integration or agitation, on the viewer. Mark Ormrod states 
how the political audience had expanded by the end of the fourteenth century to include the 
landed gentry and the mercantile community.31 This naturally had an impact the use of 
propaganda for these new audiences who needed to be communicated with. This is no easy 
task; as Michael Hicks stated, ‘we can do little more than guess how widely appreciated were 
the rhetorical devices, Latin refrains, heraldic badges, or constitutional principles that were 
employed, and hence how “good” the propaganda was’.32 Hicks argued that there is often scant 
evidence of who the target audience might have been although he does concede that messages 
were often altered if they were deemed not to have been effective.33 Paul Strohm stated, in 
relation to textual sources, ‘rather than win over a monolithic “audience” all at once, these texts 
must content themselves with partial or provisional gains in a fluid or indeterminate 
situation’.34 
It is important to remember that the audience was not only the commonwealth; the king 
himself and his advisors were often the audience for propaganda at times of discontent. 
Propaganda was therefore a two-way communication that used a variety of genres depending 
on the audience, for example, large visual displays in the public arena were suited to a large 
proportion of the population with low levels of literacy and could be effective at either 
integration or agitation. Dissenters amongst the urban elite, however, would find hand-bills a 
more appropriate means by which to reach their audience. To judge whether this was successful 
it will be necessary to assess any reaction that was recorded, within the parameters of 
integration or agitation.  
The ‘space’ where these events took place – whether public or private, sacred or secular 
– will be taken considered. Steven Justice emphasises the importance of both the church and 
shire court as venues where ‘news of parliamentary deliberations and major events, the 
                                                 
31 Ormrod, Political Life, pp. 37-38. 
32 Michael Hicks, ‘Propaganda and the First Battle of St. Albans, 1455’, Nottingham 
Medieval Studies, XLIV (2000), 167-183 (p. 168). 
33 Hicks, ‘Propaganda’, pp. 168, 181. 
34 Paul Strohm, Politique: Languages of Statecraft between Chaucer and Shakespeare 
(Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2005), p.10. 
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proclamation and display of royal writs’ took place.35 Did propaganda used in a sacred space 
have more gravitas and success than that used in a market square? Rebels had more restricted 
means with which to communicate their message, that is, they did not have sheriffs to read 
proclamations or large retinues to parade through a town. However, this did not prevent 
political dissent from taking place and being effective, often appropriating a ‘space’ usually 
reserved for official announcements such as a market place.36 
Chapter I will explore questions of the nature of propaganda, its authorship and 
audience in general terms as outlined in the pages above. Other areas of discussion will include 
the role of literary and visual sources; and the nature of politics in the late medieval period. 
This chapter will seek to identify the range of types and methods of propaganda available to 
the medieval propagandist. It will consider those behind the production of propaganda, 
considering particularly the established regime but also assessing the involvement of its 
opponents. From this it should be possible to see how far political awareness filtered through 
late medieval society. Next it will be necessary to discern why propaganda was being used - 
had the normal channels of communication broken down or were there new concerns being 
expressed? Finally, the timing of the propaganda was also important, often being associated 
with times of political crisis.  
Chapter II will provide a broad-ranging analysis of the role and significance of visual 
propaganda during the period. The late medieval period has not benefitted from an extensive 
study such as that for the Tudor period by historians such as Starkey, Anglo and Sharpe.37 
However, their work on visual spectacle informs the investigation for this chapter and reveals 
the importance of this period in enlightening the Tudors to the political importance of the visual 
genre in political life. As John Watts suggests ‘the sphere of the visual clearly deserves equal 
or greater attention [than literate modes of communication]: it too possessed means and 
languages, and – hard as they are to decode - their impact may have been particularly significant 
in a society which was only partly literate’.38 
                                                 
35 Steven Justice, Writing and Rebellion: England in 1381 (Berkeley & London: University 
of California Press, 1994), p. 58. 
36 James Masschaele, ‘The Public Space of the Marketplace in Medieval England’, Speculum, 
77 (2002), 383-421 (p. 416) 
37 Above, pp. 11, 13, 14. 
38 John Watts, ‘Looking for the State in Later Medieval England’, in Coss and Keen (eds), 
Heraldry, pp. 243-267 (p. 244). 
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Visual images of this period have been regarded as free from inference, essentially pure 
and innocent, but historians such as Francis Haskell suggest that this was not necessarily the 
case.39 Evidence from the period will be found to support Haskell’s premise that art was used 
as a means of political communication. The chronicles have descriptions of the massing of 
huge retinues lavishly turned out, the wearing of livery, and the use and recognition of 
cognizances, and such features were incorporated into art and archaeological features. The fact 
that these images are commented upon in so many contemporary sources shows that not only 
were they part of everyday medieval life but that they also had a significance to the writer that 
he wished to record and pass on, that is, he felt that they had some historical or political 
relevance.  
As well as the two distinctions of agitation and integration the thesis will further 
differentiate visual genre between ‘art’ and ‘physical’ propaganda. The former will include 
portraiture, architecture, stained glass and the heraldic motifs of livery. The effectiveness of 
the use of livery as a means of communication will be examined in the light of the legislation 
that was introduced to control its distribution together with the punishments for defacing 
badges.  
An area of visual propaganda that is perhaps less well documented, in political terms, 
is that which could be called ‘physical’ propaganda, that is, the use of the human body rather 
than a work of art. The visual spectacle was an integral part of medieval life, whether it was 
progresses, processions and civic entries; coronations and crown-wearing; plays; extravagant 
martial displays; or executions and the display of bodies. Danielle Westerhof emphasised the 
importance that was attached to the body as a ‘natural instrument’ that was used for 
performance and communication. It was often a vehicle used to express ‘transgressing the 
boundaries of the metaphorical social body’ through its destruction in the form of public 
executions, particularly in cases of treason.40 These events were staged in the knowledge that 
they would be watched by an audience who could be influenced by what they saw. In particular, 
the use of executions and the distribution of the heads and quarters will be analysed to see how 
monarchs used this as a method of political communication and control when faced with 
                                                 
39 Francis Haskell, History and its Images (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 5. A 
viewpoint in which Panofsky, Meaning, and Evelyn Welch, Art and Society in Italy 1350-
1500 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) concur with Haskell. Anglo, Images, and 
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40 Danielle Westerhof, Death and the Noble Body in Medieval England (Woodbridge: 
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opposition. A further sub-genre of ‘humiliation’ was a significant method in belittling the cause 
of one’s enemy through the use of a public downfall without recourse to death. It does however 
appear to be less well regarded by the audience, as perhaps less honourable than an execution, 
since it did not seem to fit in with either a legal or chivalric code of behaviour. The reactions 
by the audience to these genres will then be assessed in terms of whether they were successful 
at either integration or agitation.  
 
In Chapter III the relationship between personality and propaganda will be examined, 
with a particular focus on royal propaganda, in order to determine the influence of each over 
political outcomes. The work of John Watts, Mark Ormrod, and David Starkey emphasised the 
crucial part that the king’s personality played in his kingship.41 Nevertheless Watts argued that 
political ideology was more influential than just personality alone in fulfilling successful 
kingship.42 However, J. R. Lander and Anthony Gross concur in their conclusions that 
ideological matters were not relevant to the fifteenth century and consequently personality was 
critical.43 
Therefore, one may assume that a monarch with the right personality, that is, one that 
adhered to the medieval notions of kingship, would experience little domestic unrest. However, 
when a king was weak or lacking in personality and the kingdom was not being ruled well what 
were the options – was it possible to cover up his deficiencies through the use of royal 
propaganda, or did it become increasing difficult to prevent his removal? The fulfilment of 
kingship was essential to the smooth running of the nation and any failure by the king to do so 
was a serious problem.44 The personality of the monarch was the most powerful asset that could 
be beneficial or detrimental to the outcome of the reign. As Gerald Harriss has argued ‘as 
political society grew, so it needed the monarchy more, not less; to distribute patronage and 
power, to regulate and harmonize its tensions, and to provide a sense of direction and 
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6). 
42 Above, p. 11, n. 11. 
43 Anthony Gross, The Dissolution of the Lancastrian Kingship (Stamford: Paul Watkins, 
1996), esp. p. xv.  
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identity’.45 The success or failure of a monarch to discharge kingship was the basis for 
discontent and thus protest which was reflected in propaganda. 
The thesis then seeks to establish whether personality or propaganda was more 
instrumental in maintaining domestic harmony. In order to achieve this, parameters have been 
chosen as a means of trying to achieve this objective: first, domestic unrest and secondly, 
taxation together with support for foreign war. These parameters will be explored in a series of 
case studies with the intention of revealing whether outcomes were influenced more by 
personality or through the use of royal propaganda. The extent of uprisings during a reign was 
indicative of dissatisfaction with the running of the realm – a fault that was ultimately, although 
not explicitly, laid at the door of the king. Often it was attributed to poor counsel to avoid the 
charge of treason but however it was addressed it was often regarded as the result of poor 
kingship. The raising of taxes, particularly direct taxation, was usually for the defence of the 
realm, which was dominated first by the Hundred Years’ War and then the Wars of the Roses. 
The ability of the king to raise both sufficient funds and troops for a campaign was a reflection 
of his political skills and personal charm, particularly in hard economic times. The reaction of 
the polity to these parameters will be assessed in order to establish whether royal propaganda 
or personality were more effective in achieving the desired outcome. To ascertain the outcome 
between these criteria a detailed assessment of the personality of each monarch will be 
undertaken using contemporary views together with later historiography. This will then form a 
basis upon which to assess the outcomes of the parameters discussed above and determine 
whether propaganda or personality had the greater impact. 
The final chapter, developing on the conclusions of the previous chapters, will 
endeavour to put into context at a regional level the use of propaganda in the North of England. 
In terms of historiography, the region had become associated and even to a degree defined by 
the political aspirations of the Neville and Percy families and their affinities, especially during 
the Wars of the Roses. Their rivalry drew the region, despite its geographical position, into the 
major political conflicts of the period. Thus, the political ambitions of other inhabitants of the 
region, such as the mercantile community and lesser gentry, have been overlooked in terms of 
their influence upon the politics of the North. The chapter will seek to address this through an 
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examination of the records of the city of York and the letters of the Plumpton family to show 
the political concerns of both the Northern mercantile community and gentry. 
The aim will be to demonstrate the involvement of the North in contemporary politics 
and political communication despite its geographical distance from the locus of Westminster 
and the royal household. This is an area of differing historiographical approaches between 
those historians who believe that the politics of the county were exclusively dominated by the 
magnates and those who put forward the case for the might of the gentry, with all the 
implications that might be taken from this for the role of royal propaganda in relation to the 
region, and for the use of propaganda by others. 
The work of Christine Carpenter forged a new direction in the study of medieval life, 
that is, the role of the county in the polity, her emphasis being that the nobility of a county were 
the ones who drew it into the political sphere.46 Echoing the same theme in the north Anthony 
Pollard’s work has similarly shone light on the nature of regional politics and the involvement 
of the county community.47 However, M. J. Bennett stated that the county community was 
capable of working independently of noble influence as his work on Cheshire revealed.48 R. A. 
Griffiths and Mark Ormrod also argued that the nobility did not always dictate county or city 
politics.49 This thesis will show that areas within the North did pursue their interests 
irrespective of noble interests, particularly in the case of York. Other uprisings were apparently 
independent of magnate influence, but due to the nature of the structure of the county polity, 
magnate interest was often involved in order to protect their assets. It is also worth 
remembering that the nobility was not always resident within the county on a permanent basis 
and so there were opportunities for the county to express their concerns free from direct noble 
presence. 
The North as an area was regarded by contemporaries as any land north of the Trent. 
For the purposes of the thesis the area will be restricted to Yorkshire and the North-east and 
the main city focussed on will be York. York was historically an important religious centre, 
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the capital of the region and also, for part of the period, extremely vital economically. It had a 
well-developed communications network as a result of its religious and mercantile 
communities. These two communities influenced the provision of education within the city and 
its environs. An examination of two regional primary sources offer evidence of the connections 
between the North and the rest of the country. The York House Books provide confirmation of 
the important role of York in the politics of the day with detailed information about the politics 
of the city and its involvement with royal and other propaganda during the unsettled years of 
the Wars of the Roses.50 The Plumpton letters provide a different, familial perspective on the 
events of the time in the North.51 The letters reveal the legal machinations of an upwardly 
mobile and avaricious family and catalogue national as well as local issues, exhibiting a 
sophisticated level of communication, knowledge of political events, and, inevitably, gossip 
and hearsay. 
The North was often the subject of propaganda, royal and otherwise, and in evaluating 
this contemporary views and attitudes towards the North will be explored to assess the widely-
held belief that the region was barbarous and wild. Once again the importance of good 
communication and local transport networks will be addressed. Case studies will focus on the 
North as both a producer of and audience for propaganda. The different genres of propaganda 
will be used to demonstrate the significant role that the region played in the politics of the late 
medieval period. The differing relationships that the North had with each monarch will be 
analysed, from the seeming coolness of Edward IV to the region to his brother, Richard III’s 
fondness for the area and its people. 
Through these chapters it will be shown that propaganda, in different forms, was extant 
throughout late medieval life at many levels and in many spaces. It will be demonstrated how 
it was used and required in order to influence political events, by the crown but not only by the 
crown, with evidence of participation spreading wide and deep. The thesis will reveal that the 
political community was greater than just the elite and stretched geographically and socially 
further than just the environs of London.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
Theory: Methods and Opportunities 
    
 The first task of the propagandist is to catch his audience's attention.1 
 
Trying to examine propaganda within the context of fifteenth-century history is difficult 
for a variety of reasons. First, the term propaganda did not originate until the seventeenth 
century, a good hundred years after the period under discussion. Second, the term has become 
synonymous with political ideologies such as Fascism and Communism and their blanket 
indoctrination which is associated with an efficient modern communications network. Finally, 
there is usually an underlying current in any discussion of propaganda that hints at there being 
a certain amount of ‘untruth’ involved in its use. However, by paring these ‘modern’ arguments 
back to the bone it is possible to see similarities in the nature and dissemination of propaganda 
during the late medieval period.  
First, it is the intention here to apply the insights of social scientists and 
communications theorists such as Philip Taylor that we should be cautious in the application 
of what may be instinctive value judgements to the study of propaganda. As Taylor reminded 
us, ‘propaganda thus becomes a process for the sowing, germination and cultivation of ideas 
and, as such, is – or at least should be – neutral as a concept. The problem is that human beings 
frequently inject morality into processes. Yet before we can peel away the multifaceted layers 
of this glass onion, we first need to understand how it historically acquired a pungency it does 
not inherently possess. When the Vatican gave us the word ‘propaganda’ in the seventeenth 
century to describe its organization to defend ‘the true faith’ against the challenge of the 
Protestant Reformation, the heretics shouted foul at such outside interference in the 
development of their ‘natural’ religious thought processes. The legacy of distrust against the 
word in Protestant societies remains to this day. But its recent pejorative connotations date 
mainly from the excesses of atrocity propaganda during the Great War of 1914-18 when the 
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modern ‘scientific’ use of propaganda came of age’.2 In this thesis the central theme will be 
developed on the basis of the model in the work of Jacques Ellul.3 Although Ellul’s work 
focuses on the era of mass production, it enables us to identify certain criteria for use in our 
analysis which are as relevant in the fifteenth century as they were in the twentieth century. 
Ellul differentiated between what he saw as agitation propaganda and integration propaganda. 
The former he regarded as communication leading men to action, perhaps in the form of 
rebellion. The latter he defined as communication intended to make men adjust to desired 
patterns.4 Most authorities writing on propaganda and political communication in the fifteenth 
century have not advanced such a sophisticated typology. For example, early in the 1980s 
Charles Ross argued that rumour was used to create a reaction whilst the use of propaganda, in 
his definition, was to ‘appease and assuage’. He further writes of ‘conscious attempts to mould 
“public opinion” by the use of official propaganda’, referring to ‘all the then known propaganda 
devices’, such as political songs and poems, ballads and rhymes, broadsheets pinned up in 
public places, and so on.5 Ross’s approach suggests that propaganda was reactive rather than 
proactive. This thesis places the emphasis on propaganda being used for both purposes whilst 
interpreting rumour as a form of agitation propaganda in itself. 
Colin Richmond widened the debate in the early 1990’s by identifying a dichotomy 
between publicity and propaganda: ‘the natural, almost reflex promotion of the iconography of 
kingship by all government that is publicity, and the deliberate manipulation of information for 
a limited purpose by the government of the day that is propaganda’.6 The former he saw as the 
natural, relatively neutral, activity of government, the latter as a distortion, an approach 
suggestive of the implicit moral judgement challenged by Taylor and Ellul. The restrictions on 
Richmond’s definition also do not allow for rebel protest, for example, to be considered as 
propaganda and his approach therefore denies the presence of a political voice outside of 
Westminster. This complicates the issue with the entry of another essentially modern term, 
                                                 
2 Philip M. Taylor, Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World 
to the Present Day ([3rd edn.] Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), pp. 2-3. 
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publicity. There is the danger of beginning to identify the differences between not only 
propaganda and publicity but advertising and public relations. One can equally apply Ellul’s 
agitation and integration criteria to publicity and the outcome would be the same as that that 
may be identified as propaganda. Therefore, all the publicity or rhetoric to legitimise kingship 
will be embraced by the term propaganda for the purposes of this thesis. 
  Richmond also stated that there is ‘no propaganda whatsoever … until the Wars of the 
Roses’.7 This was not the case and indeed its use was recognised before the Wars of the Roses 
as identified in the Anglo Saxon Chronicle discussed by Antonia Gransden and peaked with 
the later Tudor period.8 David R. Carlson identifies the early presence of propagandist material 
‘from early in the fourteenth century, evidence is that something like agitation and propaganda 
operations were taken on within the English state’, he further comments that ‘by the late 
fourteenth century, poets too were implicated in this communicative circuit, by which the state 
government was attempting to shape knowledge and practice by the pre-emptive management 
of information’.9 
Kevin Sharpe’s study of the Tudor publicity machine provided a valuable 
multidisciplinary approach to the representation of royalty and accepted the reality of 
propaganda and its usefulness as a concept.10 Sharpe said that authority ‘needs … to be 
performed, written and displayed: to be publicized’.11 Sharpe also saw the value in examining 
different media next to each other in order to identify a more complete picture of political 
representation.12 Richmond’s assertion, that propaganda was only governmental and only 
occurred during the Wars of the Roses, is rather misleading and limiting. It fails to consider the 
many other genres deployed and the social groups that engaged in propaganda during the late 
fourteenth and early fifteenth century. This thesis will seek to explore the nature of the 
propaganda employed by various groups during this period and seek to determine whether the 
aim was integration or agitation and whether the genre used was written, oral or visual. Sources 
examined will be official, governmental and also sources from other groups, including rebels, 
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merchants and clergy. 
This approach provides a complimentary adjunct to Ellul’s definition and together they 
should help to provide an interpretative framework for the study of late medieval political 
propaganda. The integration theory lends itself to a more subtle use of the propagandist's skills. 
In many respects elaborate genealogies could be regarded as a deliberate policy of integration 
by a usurping monarch. If genealogies were judged on the definition set out by Richmond, it 
would appear that they could be construed as publicity rather than integration propaganda. An 
usurping monarch was usually in a precarious position and a genealogy was a recognised 
method to justify their actions. They could be used to assuage domestic disharmony or indeed 
foreign resentment as the duke of Bedford demonstrated in the use of both a poem and a 
painting in Notre Dame to justify Henry VI’s claim to the French throne.13 
It may be useful to identify some of Ellul's ideas on propaganda. Ellul stressed that all 
media must be used for propaganda to be effective.14 A medieval propagandist had a variety of 
media from proclamations to poems and parades available to use. Whilst there is still an 
apparent tension or a conflict of action then Ellul believed that propaganda cannot be said to 
have been successful although this conversely suggests that the agitation propaganda of the 
government's opponents has to have been successful.15 During the period 1377-1485 it was 
inevitable that the political, social and economic climate would lead to a variety of conflicts 
and thus the necessity of using propaganda.  
According to Ellul individuals who are not socially integrated, for example a hill 
farmer, would not be susceptible to propaganda.16 This is rational as they would have little or 
no opportunity to hear proclamations read in a market place or to read any bills that had been 
posted. Although there would have been areas of the country which were isolated, they were 
few and far between and as will be shown the communications network of the period was quite 
far reaching and efficient. Perhaps the most interesting point that Ellul made was when he 
stated that ineffective propaganda is no propaganda at all but then he stresses the problems in 
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trying to assess the impact of propaganda.17 This is a particular problem for late medieval 
historians when the sources are scant or unreliable. Ross noted that for the period of the Wars 
of the Roses in particular, much of the propaganda that he identified coincided with periods of 
crisis for the House of York.18 An alternative interpretation may be that periods of domestic 
unrest were the result of successful anti-governmental agitation and likewise periods of peace 
may be seen as either the result of successful integration propaganda by the government or the 
failure of agitation propaganda by potential rebels. The relative success or failure of royal 
propaganda, and the extent of integration across the political community, will be the subject of 
the final chapter in which the North will be used as a geographical locus. 
Education. 
The increase in the use of propaganda coincided with the development of education and 
subsequent increase in literacy. Education was the principal criteria, according to Ellul, for 
propaganda to work.19 He regarded it as an essential prerequisite for any society.  
There was a development which saw in addition to traditional clerkly schooling more 
extensive teaching of the 3R's in the vernacular. Education was better provided for in the major 
towns with grammar schools and the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Possibly the most 
important group to benefit from this change in education was the mercantile class. The 
necessity of dealing with paperwork and contracts ensured that they attained at least a 
rudimentary education. By the mid-fifteenth century apprenticeship to some London guilds 
was dependent upon being literate in English.20 Both the elementary and grammar schools of 
the capital ensured that their pupils were taught in English to achieve this goal.21 This would 
have been the case for other towns with large mercantile communities from York to Chipping 
Camden. The will of William Kyng, a draper, reveals that he owned three books, a bible, a 
Liber Regalis and a Chronicle.22 Two of the books are stated as being in French; William may 
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have understood French through his business. It was not only the mercantile group who 
understood the importance of education as even the wealthier freeholders were willing to make 
sacrifices in order to ensure a basic schooling for their offspring by sending them to relatives 
in towns to attend school.23 
The rural population was largely dependent upon their parish clergy for any opportunity 
of schooling. Thorold Rogers identified certain examples of bills written by artisans proving 
that this class of men was not wholly illiterate.24 Men such as the Paston bailiff, Richard Calle, 
were able to write as it was a necessary part of the job.25 In his book on the Peasants Revolt of 
1381 Steven Justice highlighted the fact that the letters that roused the peasants were rural in 
origin.26 J. W. Adamson pointed out that the inability of many to write did not mean they were 
unable to read.27 Therefore, although many people may have been unable to sign their name 
and would have been regarded as illiterate, they may still have been able to read.  
Literacy. 
Perhaps the most often cited factor in determining the use of propaganda during the 
period was the increase in literacy. There was a significant decline in the use of Latin with the 
emergence of a standard English. C. L. Kingsford saw a correlation between the displacement 
of Latin by English with political events.28 Charles Ross also saw this as a crucial factor 
together with the need to influence popular opinion which may be viewed as a direct result of 
the increasing literacy.29 It has been estimated that about forty percent of the population were 
literate in the fifteenth century.30 McLaren highlighted the presence of libraries in fifteenth-
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century London which further confirmed the increase in literacy of the population.31 J. R. 
Lander made the point that the posting of propagandist bills would have been pointless unless 
there was a literate audience to read them.32 Steven Justice writing about the rebel literature of 
1381 believed that ‘literacy’ was more than the ability to write and cites the familiarity of the 
rebels with legal documents as evidence of their literate culture.33 However, James Doig 
believed that the increase in literacy was not necessarily vital to conveying a political 
statement: ‘whilst increased literacy enhanced the sophistication of political communication, it 
did not increase the number of people influenced by political messages. The mass of the 
population continued to be reached through aural and visual media’.34 Doig’s observation about 
the importance of the aural and visual concurs with the premise of this thesis, in particular with 
the role of the visual genre which is the subject of the following chapter. The emphasis by Ellul 
on conventional literacy as essential for propaganda perhaps appears less relevant to the 
medieval period but if the discussion focusses on visual literacy then it is still valid and that is 
the approach that will be adopted in this thesis. 
Oral. 
Joyce Coleman made the distinction between the oral tradition of performance by bards 
and that of aurality which was based on the reading of a written text.35 Public reading, or 
aurality, turned literature into a social event and thus made it possible to influence a larger 
audience.36 When a text was read precisely and repeatedly it could have a cumulative effect in 
promoting ideology to a large audience, as may be seen in the case of the Lollards. The 
distribution of texts would increase the geographical spread and demographic of the audience 
and the communal act of listening would give rise to discussion and debate about the subject 
of the text and thus empower different sections of society, in essence they were open to 
politicization. In communities which had little access to literature, the spoken word or oral 
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tradition would still have been an important method for hearing about events. 
Visual. 
The emphasis thus far has been on the increase in education and literacy during the 
second half of the fifteenth century. Although this was undoubtedly significant, no less 
important was the visual tradition. It is important to note that the visual genre was as capable 
of both integration and agitation propaganda as its literary counterpart. Visual literacy was 
more extensive amongst the population and made it an ideal medium for integration 
propaganda particularly events such as public displays or processions, which could reach a 
diverse audience. The study of art history, especially of the Tudor and Stuart periods by 
historians such as David Starkey, has provided a valuable source of information to the political 
historian.37 The introduction of legislation to control, in particular, the giving of badges 
revealed that images were powerful at agitating strong reactions and allegiances. This thesis 
will suggest that visual literacy played a very prominent role in politics in its ability to either 
integrate or agitate. It is therefore the subject of its own chapter where it will be studied in 
detail. 
The more established genres of the visual and oral tradition continued to be as expedient 
for communicating with the polity as the newer phenomenon of the written word, particularly 
in the vernacular. All of these media co-existed and, in the case of aurality, complemented each 
other to provide a stimulating environment for political discourse.  
Communication. 
Fundamental to the success of the increase in education and literacy was the ability to 
communicate using these new skills.38 In their book on Propaganda Bertrand Taithe and Tim 
Thornton describe the importance of the symbiotic relationship between propaganda and 
communication: 
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First, propaganda allows an examination of the means of communication and 
persuasion in the political societies of Western Europe ... when a combination of 
increasing literacy and increasing incentives to involve the wider population 
revolutionized the need to transmit ideas and information. Secondly, it gives us the 
chance to look at the way that such communication in itself was viewed by 
participants in the political process and those outside it.39 
 
Communication has a dual interpretation in this discussion. First, the use and 
dissemination of different methods, such as proclamations and letters, and secondly, the 
physical means of transport to reach both a regional and foreign audience. 
i) Transmission of information. 
People wanted to know what was going on, and as Colin Richmond remarked ‘the 
fifteenth-century English political community was a small world’.40 In 1436 a proclamation 
to the sheriffs of London illustrated both the methods and venues used by those seeking to 
‘tell or publish false rumours, …, or to write, set, fix up or cast forth any bulls, letters or 
other…writings to the prejudice of the king’, and ‘cast them forth in divers cities, boroughs, 
towns and other notable places, especially where a concourse of people is wont to be … so 
matter of discord and scandal may arise’.41 This revealed the importance of controlling the 
communication of propaganda and the potential outcome if measures were not taken and it 
also showed that the opposition used the same methods and arenas where official government 
messages were disseminated. As Watts stated ‘the widening political community of the later 
Middle Ages was matched by an expanding discursive community’.42 
The crown had a regular network of messengers to keep them informed of events 
around the country, and in times of war they would be dispatched abroad. In the Historie of the 
Arrivall of Edward IV, recounting how Edward IV recovered his throne in 1471, the author 
describes how the king received ‘dayly messages from the Lords at London, how that the 
bastard [of Fauconberg, Thomas Neville] who had assembled greate people’.43 William Cely 
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writing from Calais in 1482 reported that ‘ther comys every day ffrom Sent Thomers to my 
Lord a messenger off my Lord Chamberleyn’.44 During the war with Scotland Edward IV 
developed an efficient method of using mounted couriers who could cover 200 miles in less 
than 2 days.45 These professional messengers were able to convey propaganda efficiently if 
required and report back any opposition propaganda. The major cities and towns also had their 
own officially employed messengers for the delivery and collection of information. In 1471 the 
mayor of London reported how they had received news of the battle of Barnet, in ‘particulars 
which they had learnt from letters under the King's own hand as well as from eyewitnesses who 
had been specially dispatched for the purpose of reporting on the state of the field to the civic 
authorities’.46 The city of Coventry sent officials to London, for example in 1425 W. Oxton 
was paid £1.1s. 4d. for riding to the capital three times.47 From the account rolls of the York 
Mercers and Merchant Adventurers there is evidence in 1434 of direct communication between 
the city and the capital: ‘item, paide to John Dene for beryng of a letter to London directe to 
the maire of London, iijs, iiijd’.48  
C. A. J. Armstrong stated that most people were in fact reliant upon such hearsay for 
their news.49 We know that lawyers such as the Plumptons’ Godfrey Green would travel 
between the north and London and were thus able to collect or disseminate news fairly quickly 
along a given route. With other travellers on the road, such as pilgrims and players, there would 
have been a regular exchange of news and views. Unless such news ended up being recorded, 
such as the above in the Paston letters, it is not possible to estimate just how much information 
was potentially being circulated but it would appear to be quite considerable. The Paston letters 
provided a fairly comprehensive picture of the dissemination of news. Sir John Paston wrote 
of news of the spread of the plague in 1471: ‘I kan not her by pylgrymes that passe the contre, 
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nor noon other man that rydethe or gothe any contre, that any Borow town in Ingelonde is ffree 
ffrom that sykenesse’.50 In 1462 John Russe updated John Paston on news and informed him 
that there are more tidings: ‘but they were not publyshyd; but John Wellys shal abyde a day 
the lenger to know what they are’.51  
News was also as important to the English abroad and in 1450 Henry VI wrote to the 
captain of the ship, Nicholas of the Tower, indicating that he had ‘offered to carry word to the 
besieged town of Cherbourg of the rescue planned and bring us word of the town’s present 
state’.52 The movement of information, whether domestic or foreign, was obviously 
commonplace, and to that end there was an established transport network in place to facilitate 
this. 
ii) Transport network.  
As has been shown above there was an array of people travelling around distributing 
proclamations, letters and other correspondence. In order to maximise this movement there 
needed to be an efficient transport network that included road, river and sea travel. One tends 
to think that medieval society was very parochial with people remaining in their locality and 
not being subject to external influences but this was not the case. There is evidence, as 
discussed above, of extensive and regular movement around the country, particularly by road. 
The repair of roads was often the subject of a bequest in a will. In 1394, courier Thomas 
Chapman left money for the ‘repair of highway between Kilbourn [Kilburn] and Eggeswere 
[Edgeware]’.53 Other merchants also left such bequests – obviously valuing the importance of 
the state of the road as integral to their business and vital to communication.54 It was not only 
the merchants who used the road system as many of the large landowners of the North also had 
estates in the south and vice versa, for example the Lords Beauchamp and Lovell had estates 
at Barnard Castle and Bedale respectively. This naturally led to a flow between London and 
the North of both landowners and their servants. The judge Sir Guy Fairfax would travel 
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between the North-East and the London courts to deal with his clients’ interests.55 A letter to 
Sir William Stonor in 1479 described the journey that an officer of the bishop of Lincoln was 
about to embark on: ‘to morowe I will be at Bannebury and ther until Monday next: from 
thennes to Leicester, and there until þe morowe next…: so to Newerk, and ther until ij daies 
…: thenne to Lincoln’.56 
The Crowland Chronicle talked of the supporters of the Bastard of Fauconberg in Kent 
coming ‘some by road, some by the river Thames’.57 The use of inland waterways for transport 
was mostly commercial and based towards the east coast due to the continental trade routes.58 
This east coast transport provided valuable communication links to the continent and foreign 
news. 
It was apparent that the late medieval polity was well provided for in terms of a transport 
infrastructure that facilitated the movement and flow of this information nationally and 
internationally when required. This circulation of man and material enabled regular 
communication, whether political or commercial, to take place and as such enabled political 
ideas and discourse to take place outside the boundaries of London, parliament and the court. 
The aim of the next section is to ascertain when there was a need to influence public 
opinion and if so which methods were selected. By showing that propaganda, as defined above, 
was used it may be possible to reveal the changes that were taking place within English political 
society. To understand the motivation that led to the use and indeed need for propaganda it is 
necessary to assess the state of both the nation and its inhabitants. The main obstacle for the 
historian during this period is the inherent medieval use of exaggeration and inaccuracy. This 
coupled with often meagre sources makes it more difficult to establish an accurate picture 
although J. R. Lander felt that there was much merit to be found even in the poorest sources.59 
Fourteenth- and early fifteenth-century England was dominated by the Hundred Years 
War. It influenced politics in terms of the taxation and the manpower required. The drain on 
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these resources inevitably led to domestic unrest culminating in the Peasants’ Revolt. Richard 
II’s unorthodox approach to kingship alienated him from the nobility and saw the eventual 
demise of the Plantagenet dynasty. Henry Bolingbroke’s usurpation of Richard II ushered in 
the new era of Lancastrian rule. Although his was an unremarkable reign Henry IV enabled his 
more dynamic son, Henry V, to inherit without dispute. Henry’s vigorous reclaiming and 
defence of English assets in France, particularly his success at Agincourt, ushered in a period 
of pride with domestic politics in accord. However, his early death and his son’s minority and 
subsequent inadequate kingship led to years of domestic upheaval and losses abroad known as 
the Wars of the Roses. 
The origins and nature of the Wars of the Roses have been debated over several 
centuries. Historians of the nineteenth century, such as William Stubbs and William Denton, 
explored the dynastic aspect and the role of the barons in the conflict and suggested that it was 
a period of continuous bloodshed.60 Charles Plummer’s coining of the phrase ‘bastard 
feudalism’ focused on the use and misuse of the affinity by the aristocracy that caused domestic 
unrest.61 However, it was not until K. B. McFarlane that a credible alternative view was 
proposed.62 He saw the problem not as a dynastic struggle amongst ‘overmighty’ subjects but 
rather as one arising from the inadequacy of the king, Henry VI, to successfully fulfil the ideals 
of kingship. J. R. Lander and Charles Ross followed in the McFarlanite tradition and both 
emphasized the fact that there was little disruption to the country unlike Denton.63 More 
contemporary views expressed by Christine Carpenter and John Watts took the view the 
conflict was a constitutional issue rather than one of personality.64 Michael Hicks did not 
believe that it was Henry VI’s kingship the led to the conflict, whilst Anthony Pollard has 
included economic factors and an inadequate political framework in his explanation of the 
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crises but ultimately argued that it was Henry’s weakness that contributed most importantly to 
the wars.65  
The crises that took place during the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries could be 
said to be rooted in poor communication between the crown, nobility and the rest of the polity 
and it was this failure to effectively address the various issues that troubled the realm that led 
to misunderstanding, resentment and unrest. However, communication methods and networks 
were quite varied and extensively used which suggests that the problem lay with the chief 
communicator, the king, from whom the direction of the realm ultimately rested. The inability 
of a king to communicate with the various offices of state and thus the rest of the polity left a 
void into which disquiet could develop. 
The polity.  
What effect did the developments in education combined with the domestic crises 
already mentioned have on the attitude of the populace? Mark Ormrod stated that although 
those primarily involved actively in the political process were a minority ‘there was no 
monopoly on political consciousness’.66 Ormrod also believed that there was the evolution of 
public opinion across a large section of the population.67 John Watts saw a connection between 
the talk of sedition and rumour and the inevitable legislation that it spurred as evidence of how 
‘the pressure of public expectations was strongly felt’ by government.68 
This meant that successful propaganda had the potential to affect a large number of 
people, such as merchants, who wielded not inconsiderable power within their own world. For 
example, the support of the staple merchants at Calais in 1460 was crucial to the Yorkist cause. 
Colin Richmond stated that the gentry had become politically independent and it was in fact 
their wishes that shaped political events.69 Current historiography demonstrates that the wider 
polity was increasingly aware of politics, secondly that they wanted to be heard and, finally 
they had the means with which to communicate. It became increasingly apparent that they 
needed to be responded to and included in the political dialogue, usually reserved for the king 
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and magnates, thus making the use of propaganda relevant. 
Thus far propaganda has been defined as dependent upon the existence of certain 
criteria but it would be useful to bring some homogeneity to the term as it will be used in this 
thesis. Propaganda will be broken down into the following categories: integration, and 
agitation. Within these categories the genre employed whether literary, visual or oral will be 
identified and discussed. The literary genre will encompass proclamations, genealogies, 
official histories, pamphlets, letters and bills. Secondly, the oral tradition will include poetry 
and sermons. The visual genre will be the subject of its own chapter as it is an area that deserves 
a fuller evaluation than has been previously undertaken. The visual analysis will be divided 
into art and physical, with the former to include badges, clothing, paintings and architecture 
and the latter typified by processions, massing of armies and the destruction of symbols.  
Methods. 
Ellul's premise that the propagandist must utilise all possible methods was as applicable 
to medieval society as it is to the twenty-first century.70 Essentially the medieval propagandist 
had three methods of dissemination available as outlined above and these methods often 
overlapped. The literary form has survived the centuries better than the oral tradition although 
certain literary genres, such as poetry, would also have been read out. The rise in literacy in the 
second half of the fifteenth century made the literary genre more accessible to a greater 
proportion of the population. The quantity of literature produced for public oration raises 
certain issues. First, it shows that the public, or at least a greater proportion of it, had an interest 
in politics.71 The increase in political communication highlighted the growing importance that 
the government attached to influencing public opinion whilst often countering rumour. This 
was reflected in the various regional uprisings from Kent to Yorkshire confirming that the 
political audience extended through the whole kingdom. 
Proclamations. 
By the later middle-ages proclamations were the crown’s main means of 
communicating with the population; whether it was to agitate to raise troops or reveal traitors 
or integrate by announcing a treaty they were the most effective means of mass communication 
available. The subject matter contained within the proclamations was extensive, ranging from 
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the granting of charters to the raising of troops for foreign war to the more mundane dealing 
with trading regulations.72 James Doig highlighted the political necessity of proclamations for 
Edward III 73 whilst Alison Allan emphasised their importance during the Wars of the Roses.74 
Proclamations at once inform the historian of current issues whether mundane or sensational 
and had the facility to be both integrational and agitational in their content.  
The majority of proclamations were produced in Latin until the mid-fifteenth century 
which meant that that they required translating into the vernacular, usually by a clerk in the 
sheriff’s office. Proclamations were often made by criers employed by the town or city at public 
gatherings, such as fairs and market squares, where the audience would be large. Instructions 
as to the extent, frequency and immediacy of the distribution were attached to the proclamation 
and obviously varied with the contents. Doig emphasised that in most cases any propagandist 
appeal was contained in the preamble rather than the main body of text.75 It was therefore at 
the discretion of the sheriff whether or not he incorporated it into the reading of the 
proclamation. Unfortunately, extant records do not reveal whether any of the preamble was 
orated at the time and thus any propagandist element cannot be proven with any certainty. Allan 
and Doig concur that despite the extensive use of proclamations as a frequent method of 
communication between both crown and local authority with the polity it was not until the 
Yorkists that they became overtly propagandist in nature. 
The Coventry Leet Book provides an example of the space where the proclamation was 
to be read when Edward IV was calling for the suppression of liveries in 1472: ‘this forsaide 
Privee seel was solemplye proclaimed in the open[(torn) market ne] xt after the resceyt’.76 The 
problem of the abuse of liveries was a big concern for Edward which explains why it was 
proclaimed only two days after receipt. The medieval market square had a dual purpose as a 
space for economic activity and political communication. 
The proclamations discussed above have been the official word of the crown but they 
were also a channel for dissent used by rebels or disaffected members of the establishment. 
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Rebel proclamations have survived due to their inclusion in many contemporary chronicles 
which was indicative of their impact on public opinion. These proclamations tended to be 
produced in the vernacular which indicated the regional nature of many grievances and the 
social class that were voicing their concerns.  
Genealogies.  
An usurping monarch had to establish his legitimacy to the throne if he was to survive 
and genealogies were deployed as a means of bolstering a new and insecure regime. Without 
the acceptance that he was the rightful heir to the throne his position would never be secure, 
thus claims of hereditary right had to be well researched and persuasively presented. Memory 
played an important role to play in establishing legitimacy; as Robert Bartlett stated, ‘in some 
areas of medieval life very long memories were cultivated. Genealogical memory was 
obviously important in a dynastic society’.77 The elaborate genealogies may be viewed as 
integration, their main purpose being the justification for dynastic change. It has been claimed 
by J. W. McKenna that ‘fifteenth-century England was distinguished for a series of royal 
governments which developed increasingly sophisticated methods of re-inforcing their 
increasingly tenuous claims to the throne’.78 In an article on the genealogical The Chronicle 
from Rollo to Edward IV Raluca Radulescu states that it ‘is illustrative of contemporary 
fifteenth-century anxieties over rightful kingship and governance of England’ all necessary to 
justify a change in dynasty.79 Further, Radulescu emphasises how important these pieces of 
prose were ‘since it was through the dissemination of this type of material that the language of 
politics was shaped in the advent of the Tudor era.80 
According to Alison Allan, Richard of York's pedigree had by 1461 become the 
cornerstone of Yorkist propaganda.81 The core of the genealogies was based around ancient 
history and legends of earlier kings which were meant to emphasise the antiquity of the house 
of York and raise support. The fact that copies of the Yorkist pedigree have survived suggests 
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that these were consciously produced in quantity for distribution, although not in the same 
manner as poems or proclamations. They were sophisticated and designed for an educated 
audience who could read them at their leisure from the nobility to the gentry.82 Thus their 
effectiveness as propaganda must have been restricted to those who were probably Yorkist in 
sympathy. Therefore, Allan's argument that ‘because of the venerable heritage which they 
depicted, such documents were inherently propagandist’ seems somewhat limited to the 
confines of the privileged few.83  
Official histories.  
An official chronicle was usually commissioned by someone wishing to express an 
official viewpoint.84 Antonia Gransden believed that the official histories were intended only 
to please the king and his immediate circle.85 It was only through dissemination via other 
chronicles and secondary sources that their message was transmitted and for this reason they 
could be called integration rather than agitation propaganda. Walsingham certainly used the 
‘Record and Process’ in his chronicle, for example.86 
Both the Chronicle of the Rebellion and the Historie were written at the behest of the 
government and as such may be viewed as propaganda.87 They are still of value as accurate 
depictions of events despite being partisan and as a method of propaganda they were unusual.88 
In terms of style, the Chronicle was on the offensive, attempting to discredit both Warwick and 
Clarence whilst the Historie was an attempt to portray Edward IV in such a way as to make 
him attractive. Again the basis of the Historie was a further attempt to legitimise Edward IV's 
rule whilst referring to ‘the pretensed auctoritie of Henry, than callyd Kynge’.89 Gransden 
argued that the chronicles that were produced by the government were created only in 
‘exceptional circumstances’ and provided a form of ‘moral reinforcement’.90 It could be 
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suggested that these chronicles were an attempt at creating an historical memory favourable to 
the Yorkist dynasty, knowing that the texts, or at least parts of, would be incorporated into 
other works. 
Sermons. 
The crown would use the pulpit to reach a large and captive audience in a way that 
perhaps proclamations were unable to. There, the word of God’s anointed on earth would have 
had a certain gravity that a market place could not provide. The majority of the clergy would 
have acceded to the wishes of the crown in wanting to use their church as a mouthpiece for 
secular issues. The pulpit became increasingly important during the Hundred Years Wars as 
part of the media used by the crown to communicate with the people.91 W. R. Jones regarded 
the use of pro rege prayers as a form of ‘news service’ aimed at influencing public opinion that 
the King’s wars were also theirs.92 Alison McHardy argued that the campaign for the Norwich 
crusade was financially successful through communication via the clergy.93 McHardy also 
cited the example in 1432 when a mandate for prayers was issued prior to the departure of the 
duke of Bedford ‘to France to recover, defend and conserve English rights’.94 The Cely letters 
provided evidence of news being relayed on a visit to St Paul’s Cross as Robert Cely wrote to 
his brother George in Calais: ‘my brother Rychard Cely and I wer at Pollys Crosse to here the 
sarmon, and ther we herde fforste word that howr uncle the Dene of Yorke ys passyd to God’.95 
Like most of these media of propaganda, however, sermons were not the exclusive 
property of the crown. The most infamous sermon of the period was perhaps the one given by 
Richard Scrope, archbishop of York who in 1405 used the pulpit to agitate his worshippers to 
rectify the apparent mis-governance of the realm. Scrope was later to pay for his agitation with 
his life which will be discussed more fully in Chapter IV on the North of England. Richard III 
used the pulpit to promulgate the story about Edward IV’s illegitimacy to justify his usurpation. 
The late medieval sermon was utilized to disseminate information that came from the 
government and king and also could be used, in exceptional circumstances, to express 
complaint against the king. It is apparent that the use of sermons and prayers provided a regular 
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opportunity to either integrate or agitate the population whilst keeping them informed about 
political and military developments. This was necessary to maintain popular support in terms 
of finance and man power and importantly those prayers that related to war were possibly made 
in English to emphasise the importance of their being understood.96 
Poetry. 
V. J. Scattergood thought that political verse more than any other medium had real 
value in both the formation and manipulation of opinion.97 Scattergood defined the role of a 
poet of political verse as follows: ‘his proper mission was to celebrate victorious battles, to 
praise the heroes of the nation and to pursue its enemies with scorn’.98 Scattergood remarked 
that early medieval political poems ‘were oral and may have been sung before a noble 
audience in a castle assembly, or before burgesses and peasants in a market square, or by 
soldiers around the military camps’.99 A. C. Spearing emphasised that poetry had to have an 
immediate effect upon the medieval audience and was often written with this aim in mind.100 
Poetry crossed the divide between the written and oral medium making it more accessible and 
thus potentially more useful as a propagandist’s weapon.101 Political verse of the period was 
mostly written in English as it was intended to be heard by a wide audience, the majority of 
whom would not have understood either Latin or French. J. A. Burrow highlighted the 
important fact that much poetry was written in local dialect thus precluding it from national 
circulation in its original form at least during the reign of Richard II.102 This suggests a 
regionalised pattern to the poetry of the period which would seem appropriate as political 
crises were often local in nature. Ann Astell suggested that the poet used veiled references 
and codes to refer to contemporary issues and that a minority of the audience would be able 
to decipher them.103 From this we are to assume that poets were writing for two audiences 
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and were thus imposing a form of self-censorship on their work. It also indicated that they 
were very aware of the interests of their intended audience. Astell emphasised the importance 
of allegory as a means of communication, stating that it was ‘an acknowledged vehicle of 
delight, instruction, and persuasion; and a powerful means for poets to define their audience 
by dividing them’.104 In her article on public poetry during the reign of Richard II Anne 
Middleton regarded Gower’s revisions of his Confessio as a reference to the importance of its 
intended audience, not just the king ‘the king is not the main imagined audience, but an 
occasion for gathering and formulating what is on the common mind’. 105 Although the poem 
was originally written for Richard II it was subsequently dedicated to Henry of Lancaster, 
and Middleton was emphasising the fact that it was really for the public, an expression of the 
anxieties that were prevalent within society. Poetry was apparently moving away from the 
courtly/chivalric tradition and becoming more contemporaneously involved with political 
issues.  
Scattergood stated that the scarcity of preserved political verse suggests that it was 
relatively unimportant as political situations were often in a state of flux.106 This almost 
contradicts his statement that the polity was influenced more by verse than any other medium 
but perhaps it was the immediacy of political verse that led to its easy disposal thus showing 
that it was a particularly appropriate medium for political propaganda.107 C. V. Wedgwood also 
stressed the transitory nature of political poetry: ‘a poem concerned with the temporary and the 
topical, however wittily ingenious it may be, however tense with the moment’s passion, is 
never so strong a candidate for immortality as one inspired by a perennial theme’.108 Alfred 
Hiatt states the advantages of poetry were that it ‘allowed authors to impress and persuade, to 
commemorate and excoriate, to lament and declaim in ways more flexible, and often more 
compelling, than prose’.109 
                                                 
Press, 1999), p. 6. 
104 Astell, Political Allegory, p. 24. 
105 Anne Middleton, ‘The Idea of Public Poetry in the Reign of Richard II’, Speculum, 53 
(1978), 94-114 (p. 107). 
106 Scattergood, Politics and Poetry, p. 27. 
107 Above, p. 41, n. 97.  
108 C. V. Wedgwood, Poetry and Politics under the Stuarts (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1961), p. 3. 
109 Alfred Hiatt, ‘Historical and Political Verse’ in Julia Boffey and A. S. G. Edwards (eds), A 
Companion to Fifteenth-Century English Poetry (Cambridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2013), pp. 
157-169 (p. 168). 
43 
 
Scattergood stated that the ‘writing of political verse was dangerous for those in any 
way critical of the regime’.110 The issue of censorship and suppression suggested that the 
message, in whatever medium, whether truthful or false had the potential to be disruptive and 
that it had the potential to succeed. Scattergood said that the punishment of subversive poetry 
proved ‘that verse was thought to be a highly effective mode of propaganda’.111 In 1377 the 
bishop of Bangor threatened to excommunicate the author of lampoons against John of 
Gaunt.112 It is clear that poetry was an integral part of medieval life and communication and 
was produced both in the oral and literary form. It was not exclusive and was utilised by various 
groups to express political complaint or satire as well as its more usual association with leisure 
and romance. 
Letters. 
Letters were a quick means of communicating and the road network ensured the 
relatively easy and regular movement of post, a means of political communication available to 
the crown and to others involved in political debate. Christine Carpenter found that familial 
letters were invaluable in filling in the gaps left by official records. She also notes that there 
was a scarcity of complementary noble letters.113 Family letters provided opportunities for the 
communication of news and are a rich source for information on political events which 
included examples of propaganda. They reveal the extent to which the medieval community 
was able to communicate with each other, not only at home, but also abroad. In late May 1482 
in a letter to George Cely in Bruges, William Dalton in Calais informed him of a copy of a 
letter from Gloucester and Northumberland that was sent to the king and had been dispatched 
by messenger from England.114 
What becomes evident is not only the importance of the material contained within the 
letters but the sheer quantity that were being produced and were in circulation. In the case of 
the Celys, correspondence was very regular, particularly between London and Calais, with 
often only a few days between letters. On 2 June 1480 Richard Cely the elder wrote back to 
George Cely in Calais, in response to his letter of 29 May.115 If these extant letters were 
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extrapolated to include all merchant families it would reveal an enormous amount of 
correspondence. The same could be said for the Plumptons, Pastons and Stonors if the same 
method was adopted for the gentry and even aristocracy. In these letters, whether mercantile, 
familial or legal in nature, reference was often made to national events, and thus, indirectly, 
there was the opportunity for propaganda to be disseminated not only at home but also abroad. 
Bills. 
The circulation of pamphlets and bills was another method of political expression that 
existed at this time. V. J. Scattergood stated that a bill was ‘brief, direct and simple’.116 News 
from battles, such as casualties, was conveyed through the use of bills.117 They were regularly 
used to inform the public about various issues and ‘offered an alternative mode of expression 
to the non-verbal language associated with popular politics’.118 They were resorted to when the 
usual methods of communication had been perceived as being corrupted by vested interests 
and as such were often the voice of dissent.119 The bills were posted in public places with the 
intention that they should be read first-hand or else read out loud to a crowd. In 1404 in Oxford 
a clerk was accused of putting up bills that ‘were fixed upon the gate of Oxford castle and the 
doors of the churches of St. Martin and St. Peter in the Bailey’.120 He was freed as innocent by 
Henry IV but whoever the true author had been, they were using a publicly posted bill to 
highlight the case of a certain Emma Gerard. It was perhaps the only means to seek redress 
when other methods had failed. 
Wendy Scase made the important point that many unofficial political bills, posted up 
on doors and windows, were by their very nature unlikely to survive.121 This lack of opposition 
evidence therefore makes it harder to assess the body of propaganda that may have been 
circulating at the time. In 1425 bills were used in an anti-Fleming campaign: ‘the xiij day of 
Feverer at nyght, were caste many byllys in the cytte and in the subbarbys a-gayne the 
                                                 
116 Scattergood, Politics and Poetry, p. 183. 
117 Armstrong, ‘Some examples’, p. 432. 
118 Scase, Bill-Casting, p. 234. 
119 Ibid., p. 237. 
120 'Close Rolls, Henry IV: May 1404', in Calendar of Close Rolls, Henry IV: Volume 2, 
1402-1405, ed. A E Stamp (London, 1929), pp. 334-339. British History Online 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-close-rolls/hen4/vol2/pp334-339 [accessed 23 April 
2016]. 
121 Wendy Scase, ‘“Strange and Wonderful Bills”: Bill-Casting and Political Discourse in 
Late Medieval England’, in Rita Copeland, David Lawton and Wendy Scase (eds), New 
Medieval Literatures 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 225-247 (p. 228). 
45 
 
Flemyngys, and sum were set in the byschoppe ys gate of Wynchester, and in othyr bischoppys 
gatys’.122 This example reveals a popular expression of discontent by the mercantile 
community, not against the king and parliament, but against a minority. The merchants of 
London were agitating against the Flemings for economic reasons rather than political but the 
event reveals how bills were used to voice complaint. In 1450 bills were put up around London, 
including on the king’s door at the palace of Westminster; unfortunately Gregory’s Chronicle 
omits to disclose the contents.123  
Another method was to scatter bills along the roads so that they would have been picked 
up and passed on from place to place.124 The fact that so few bills survive, Wendy Scase 
believed, indicated the success of the measures taken by the authorities to control the posting 
of bills, indicative of the threat that they posed to the establishment.125 They could be regarded 
as the conversion of seditious rumour onto paper thus marking a transition from verbal 
complaint that coincided with an increase in literacy among the lower classes. The legal moves 
to suppress bills suggested that the ‘authorities understood that libellous texts could easily jump 
from literate to oral media’.126  
Clementine Oliver’s study of the pamphleteer Thomas Fovent provides a valuable 
contemporary insight into Ricardian politics, particularly the Merciless Parliament.127 Fovent’s 
work has been cited as pro-Appellant propaganda but Oliver disagrees and suggests that his 
work was a more complex reflection on the changing nature of political consciousness.128 
Although unlikely to be propagandist in relation to anything other than a limited audience, it 
provides further evidence of an interest in political discourse. 
There was a wide range of propaganda available to both crown and opposition during 
this period. There was a medium that was appropriate at different times and for different 
audiences. The oration of proclamations on behalf of the state could reach a wide audience, 
and, likewise, rebel poetry could reach a large section of the population. The rise in literacy 
benefitted certain groups, such as the merchants and the lower gentry and extended the 
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opportunities for literary propaganda as may be seen from the posting up of bills. Official 
histories and genealogies, although only seen by an exclusive audience would have been 
equally important in their ability to integrate or agitate those at the top of society, that is, those 
who usually determined the course of politics. Overall the methods used revealed that political 
attempts to explain and persuade were expressed through different media and were available 
to a large proportion of the late medieval polity and most importantly they reveal that there was 
a need for political communication. 
Now that the methods available for propaganda have been identified it is possible to 
examine their use. In order to do so, it will be necessary to identify the propagandists and the 
motives that led them to produce proclamations, poems and other types of propaganda. The 
most obvious propagandist at any time was usually the king and his government. He was in a 
unique position to issue propaganda and would normally derive the most benefit. Historically 
the propaganda produced by the crown was well documented and preserved thus making it 
appear that this was the only source of propaganda. However, groups such as the rebels of 1381 
and 1450 also made effective use of propaganda which has survived. During the turbulent years 
of the Wars of the Roses rival factions had as much necessity to produce propaganda and 
counter-propaganda for their own cause. As the underlying theme for the thesis has been drawn 
from Ellul’s distinction between agitation and integration propaganda these are the criteria that 
will be the focus of the following case studies which will attempt to analyse who used these 
methods and who the intended audience was. 
First, methods used for agitation propaganda will be examined and for a balanced 
perspective examples of opposition propaganda, where extant, will also be considered 
alongside royal propaganda.  
Case Study 1: Henry V and the French Campaign. 
The campaign in France was to dominate the nature and scale of Henry V’s need for 
persuasive rhetoric as he required large amounts of financial support as well as manpower. 
Thus from the nature of Henry’s reign one would anticipate that any proclamations would have 
a clear focus on the French war and in fact many served as bulletins from the ‘front’ to inform 
the domestic audience. On 28 January 1414 a truce between England and France was 
proclaimed.129 In May 1415 Henry wrote to the archbishop of Canterbury asking for support 
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from the clergy in terms of manpower, ‘in order to recover the heritage and rights of the crown 
. . . for which all christians are bound to fight if need be to the death’.130 Henry is appealing to 
their duty as Christians and ensuring that he has as many troops as possible. It was not just 
taxes and manpower that were required for a successful expedition but the victualling of his 
army as seen in his request to the sheriff of Kent for 200 oxen, again using language  
emphasizing his desire to ‘recover the heritage and rights of the crown’.131 
Despite its geographical remoteness from the south coast, the North was still expected 
to contribute, both financially and with manpower, to the French expedition. A. E. Goodman’s 
article gave a cameo of the response in the North to Henry’s appeal for men to serve in 
France.132 Out of the respondents it emerged that the reasons or ‘excuses’ for not serving were 
usually illness or old age and a lack of finance. However, this is not to suggest that 
Yorkshiremen shirked their duty. It is evident that of those who responded many had relatives 
already engaged in the service of the king.133 Goodman described in the article how Robert 
Waterton revealed that he intended to speak to the gentlemen at York at a session of the peace 
to try to urge them to fight with Henry.134 It would appear that how Waterton was meant to 
raise support was left up to him – there was apparently no evidence of anything officially 
produced by Westminster. This raises a couple of points: first, that Henry had faith in the ability 
of his officials to impel the local men to action and second, that Henry had no official 
propaganda established for this purpose. It may be that he did not think it was necessary 
believing that the established network of the Neville affinity would raise support on his behalf. 
The excuses made were for the most part probably true or had a grain of truth in them 
thus suggesting that the propaganda used by Waterton was less than successful at agitating but 
were the conditions, already discussed, such that it was inevitable that any call to arms would 
be of limited success? However, Henry V’s extensive tour of the region in 1421 successfully 
resulted in raising financial support for the French wars.135 From this it may be concluded that 
the king’s physical presence and success in France had a more favourable impact on a northern 
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audience than Waterton’s undirected attempts to raise troops for the French wars.  
Despite his success at Agincourt in 1416 Henry, in raising troops on the south coast, 
again used anti-French propaganda to stir up support, explaining that ‘great number of his 
enemies of France ... are at sea in no small multitude arrayed for war, going about with all their 
might to invade the realm’.136 The above may be symptomatic of the beginning of a waning of 
support for the French wars, and this is further highlighted two years later in May 1418 in an 
order to the sheriff of London: 
to cause proclamations to be made, that all hired soldiers in the city and suburbs of 
London whatsoever estate or condition who are retained to sail to France on the 
present expedition shall under pain of imprisonment hasten thither with all speed, and 
to arrest and keep in custody until further order all whom they shall find therein more 
than one day after such proclamation.137 
Henry had had to resort to threats with no appeal to any anti-French sentiment or 
propaganda. The description of the soldiers reveals that he was desperate for manpower 
suggesting that his former supporters among the gentry were no longer willing to fight. It is 
clear from these two proclamations that Henry’s focus had changed from agitation to persuade 
the population to defend the kingdom and the dual monarchy to a threatening style redolent of 
a king who had lost confidence in his own rhetoric. 
After Agincourt Henry instigated a more sophisticated approach to his propaganda for 
the continuance of the war with France through the publication of the Gesta Henrici Quinti in 
1417. Although the author is anonymous he is believed to have been a chaplain connected with 
Archbishop Arundel.138 The Gesta emphasized Henry’s piety at the same time seeking to 
justify his foreign policy and proposed second French campaign. Although in a narrative form 
it, ‘loses nothing in persuasiveness’.139 It has been suggested that the Gesta was produced for 
both a domestic and foreign audience. Henry needed to present himself and his campaign in 
favourable terms to counter existing French animosity in the Council of Constance.140 Whilst 
Henry was waiting for the arrival of his army at Canterbury he had noted down the previous 
agreements that had been reached between his father and the French and subsequently these 
were sent to the Emperor Sigismund to strengthen his case against the French so, ‘that all 
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Christendom might know what great acts of injustice the French in their duplicity had inflicted 
on him’.141 Henry had already cultivated an advantageous relationship with Sigismund which 
was strategically very astute.142 
Despite his success at Agincourt Henry’s French ambitions were not completed and he 
still needed to agitate an increasingly war-weary realm of the value of the campaign against 
the obdurate French to uphold his inheritance: ‘by use of this blameless sword to exact what 
the French, by their blameworthy and unjust violence … [had] striven to usurp and 
withhold’.143 As well as appealing to national pride there was an emphasis on God’s favourable 
intervention and support of Henry, all devices intended to elicit popular support, which to a 
degree they did.144 It is at the end of the Gesta that the aim of the text becomes apparent, ‘in 
respect of the public enemies of his crown, has already triumphed twice, so may he triumph 
yet a third time, to the end that the two Swords, the sword of the French and the sword of 
England, may return to the rightful government of a single ruler’.145 
War was one of the most important issues that a medieval king had to communicate and 
justify to the realm. Although Henry’s success at Agincourt secured his reputation and 
popularity with his subjects the high cost was nevertheless a challenge to maintain. It becomes 
apparent from the proclamation above from 1418, that only three years later and despite the 
publication of the Gesta he was struggling to get the necessary support. The proclamations 
reached a large national audience who were the source of both financial and physical support 
whilst the Gesta operated at an international diplomatic level. Both audiences played an equally 
important role in agitating support for Henry’s French campaign, from within and without the 
realm, and would have appeared to have contributed to his further success in France. 
 
Case Study 2: The Peasants’ Revolt – Opposition Agitation. 
Royal propaganda had an efficient network and infrastructure with which to reach its 
intended audience but what means were available to the rest of the polity? In the case of the 
Peasants Revolt of 1381 letters were the main method used to agitate and revealed the rebels 
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as rather more educated than the average peasant. However, Justice regarded these ‘letters’ as 
broadsides intended to posted up in public places.146 The very existence of these texts 
suggested Justice demonstrated that their audience, ‘had a stake in the intellectual and 
political life of church and realm’.147 The complaint against the imposition of the poll tax, 
especially in the counties of Essex and Kent, revealed ‘a very substantial and perhaps 
increasing proportion of the English population regarded itself as effectively excluded from 
the king’s justice’.148  
The letter by Jakke Trewman stated: ‘doth yow to understand that falsnes and gyle 
havith regned to long, and trewthe hat bene sette under a lokke, and falsnes regneth in everylk 
flokke’.149 Of course, Richard was not ruling personally so the complaint was very much 
aimed towards his counsellors and Gaunt but the language used would have resonated with 
the commons enough to agitate them into action. The Kentishmen stated that they were only 
rebelling ‘to save the king’.150 The judiciary and lawyers were specifically targeted with the 
public burning of documents, an act of rebellion and agitation.151 This was a rebellion that 
had a strong literary element in the production and circulation of letters, as Justice said there 
‘were so many acts of assertive literacy’, as well as the physical destruction of papers. 
Case Study 3: The earl of Warwick’s letter 1470 – Opposition Agitation. 
Opposition also manifested itself in those closer to the king as demonstrated in 1470 
when Warwick and Clarence wrote a much publicised letter to the commons, and unusually 
there was direct evidence of the siting of the letter for public perusal: 
The whiche letre above wretyn divers copies were made and sette upon the standarde 
in Chepe, upon the stulpes on London brigge and uppon divers chirche doris in 
London and in other places in Englonde, before the comyng inne and landing of the 
seid duc and erle oute of Fraunce... In the tyme of Richard Lee, grocer, thanne beyng 
mair, the wiche toke downe the seide letres and wolde not suffre theime to be openly 
knowen ner seen to the commones.152 
It appeared that it was not difficult for a citizen of London to see a copy of the above 
                                                 
146 Justice, Writing and Rebellion, p. 29. 
147 Ibid., p.30. 
148 Ormrod, Political Life, p.117. 
149 R. B. Dobson, The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 ([2nd edition] Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 
1983), p. 32. 
150 Nigel Saul, Richard II (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), p.63. 
151 Justice, Writing and Rebellion, p. 41. 
152 John Vale’s Book, pp. 92, 219. 
51 
 
letter and it is interesting to note how vigorous the then mayor was in removing the letters as 
the support for Edward IV in London was unanimous. It is not known whether any other cities 
received copies but it shows that Warwick was aware of the importance of communicating with 
the capital to try and influence opinion, especially as support for Edward was so strong in 
London. Warwick through the text with phrases such as ‘the grete hurte, enpoverisshing and 
the utter destruccion of you’, and, ‘the reaume like to be aliened and gouverned by strangers’ 
was appealing to the common man in a populist move to persuade London to support him by 
emphasising the dangers of the political situation being allowed to continue as it was.153 
Both these letters, very different in origin, were used to express the concerns of both 
the nobility and commons, those concerns being the poor governance of the realm. However, 
whilst the letter of Jakke Trewman wanted change it was within the normal boundaries of loyal 
complaint whilst Warwick’s masqueraded as such but had a different outcome in mind, that 
was the deposition of Edward IV. However, they reveal that letters as method of political 
communication were used to reach a large broad audience and were available to the whole 
polity. 
The following section will focus on the use of royal integration propaganda. For the 
most part this propaganda was used during moments of royal crisis when the crown itself was 
insecure and sought justification for its behaviour. 
Integration Case Study 1: Henry IV. 
Henry IV’s dubious accession necessitated the need for integration propaganda, 
especially in view of the inevitable Ricardian opposition, and the early years of the reign were 
dominated by government propaganda to this end. Henry’s seizure of the throne required a 
comprehensive defence and justification, both genealogically and legally, if he was to secure a 
smooth transition. The need for effective integration propaganda was therefore paramount at 
the start of his reign. Henry’s initial problem was the legal justification for his usurpation. 
Before he could claim the throne Henry had to obtain Richard’s renunciation of the crown, as 
Jenni Nuttall stated ‘the creation and acceptance of Richard’s supposed demerita notoria were 
pivotal to the success of the Lancastrian usurpation’.154 
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Michael Bennett described Henry’s claim as a ‘fiction of Richard’s abdication, Henry’s 
own challenge for the crown, and the acceptance of his titles by the realm’.155 
The official version of events related in the ‘Record and Process’ stated that Richard 
willingly relinquished the throne: ‘I fully, willingly, directly, and totally renounce my right to 
the rule … of these kingdoms and dominions’. It then has Richard state: ‘I confess, 
acknowledge, recognize … I have been and am entirely inadequate and unequal to the task of 
ruling’.156 Conveniently Richard goes on to state that he would like Henry Bolingbroke to 
succeed him.157 At once the document had Richard admitting he was unfit to rule and would 
like Henry Bolingbroke to be his heir. It was a very deft piece of Lancastrian integration 
propaganda which was circulated widely as demonstrated by its incorporation into texts like 
the St. Albans Chronicle.158 Lucy Brown stated that Henry’s claim was tenuously based on ‘a 
mixture of unspecified hereditary right, vindicated by his military success, and the urgent need 
to restore England from its current parlous state’.159 The hereditary claim of Edmund Mortimer, 
via the female line, was the stronger but Edmund was only a minor at the time and Henry 
ensured that he was kept in his custody.160 Henry’s claim was the stronger due to it being 
through the male line but this was not enough to justify his usurpation.161 This weak claim left 
Henry in a legal quandry which he sought to rectify by stating his military success and the need 
to restore order, essentially all the qualities that characterised good kingship, and which 
Richard was perceived to be lacking in.162 
However, the document known as the ‘Manner of King Richard’s Renunciation’ 
provided a more authentic version of events.163 This stated that in fact Richard was not so 
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acquiescent in his desire to resign and appears to be an independent version of events by an 
eye witness.164 From the ‘Manner’ it was evident how much the real events were doctored to 
produce a piece of propaganda that appeared plausible and totally justified Henry’s actions. 
When Richard was asked whether he had considered signing the resignation document 
produced by Bolingbroke’s supporters he replied ‘that he would not do it under any 
circumstances; and he was greatly incensed’.165 This should be compared with the ‘Record and 
Process’ where it is stated that Richard was willing to ‘fully, willingly, directly, and totally 
renounce my right to the rule, governance and administration of these kingdoms’.166 Both these 
represent opposing views of the event, each expressing their own bias, and somewhere between 
the two the more accurate picture of the deposition lies. Richard’s personality was hard to 
discern with any certainty so it is possible that that he may have acquiesced but then his style 
of kingship was quite contrary and he could have resisted relinquishing the throne so easily.167 
The ‘Record and Process’ was incorporated into many contemporary manuscripts in 
order to legitimize the usurpation and to further establish the Lancastrian dynasty textually.168 
The dissemination of this text was a necessary component in what had been a comprehensive 
programme of integration propaganda by Henry which also employed the visual genre.169 
Integration Case Study 2: Richard III. 
As it became apparent to Richard III that the Woodville faction held sway his 
propaganda became more extreme in his efforts to legitimize his claim to the throne. He 
fabricated a story that Edward IV had been illegitimate and therefore his offspring were not 
legitimate heirs to the crown. There are different versions of the story recorded, some stating 
that Edward himself was a bastard whilst the other, the pre-contract story, stated that his 
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children were illegitimate.170 
The Crowland Chronicle wrote of the story circulated, ‘contained in a certain 
parchment roll, that King Edward’s sons were bastards, by submitting that he had been 
precontracted to a certain Lady Eleanor Boteler’. The roll was rumoured to have originated in 
the North although it was realized that Richard was at the root of it.171 It was also recorded in 
the Parliament Roll: ‘also, it clearly appears and follows that all the issue and children of the 
said King Edward are bastards, and unable to inherit or claim anything by inheritance, by the 
law and custom of England’.172 This left the way clear for Richard to be recognized as the real 
heir to the throne: ‘moreover, we consider how you are the undoubted son and heir of Richard, 
late duke of York, the true inheritor of the said crown and royal dignity, and by right king of 
England by way of inheritance’.173 
Dominic Mancini made it clear what Richard's true intentions were: ‘since he so 
corrupted preachers of the divine word, that in their sermons to the people they did not blush 
to say ... that the progeny of king Edward should be instantly eradicated, for neither had he 
been a legitimate king nor could his issue be so’.174 Mancini was referring to Richard’s use of 
government sponsored preaching when in June 1483 ‘at St. Pauls Cross  ... with a huge audience  
... was declared by Dr Ralph Shaw  ... that the children of King Edward were not right inheritors 
of the crown’.175 Vitellius A XVI records the sermon, ‘at powles crosse, that kyng Edwarde’s 
children were not Ryghtfull Enheritours unto the Crownr, but that the Duke of Glowcetir’s title 
was bettir than thers’.176 
This allegation was repeated in a speech given by the Duke of Buckingham to an 
audience of the mayor and citizens of London and reiterated on the following day to an 
                                                 
170 Mancini, pp. 94-97. Mancini said that Edward ‘was conceived in adultery’ and that his 
marriage to Elizabeth Woodville was illegal as he ‘was legally contracted to another wife’. 
171 Crowland, p. 161. 
172 'Richard III: January 1484', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-
Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and 
Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/january-1484 [accessed 4 May 2016]. 
173 'Richard III: January 1484', in Parliament Rolls of Medieval England, ed. Chris Given-
Wilson, Paul Brand, Seymour Phillips, Mark Ormrod, Geoffrey Martin, Anne Curry and 
Rosemary Horrox (Woodbridge, 2005), British History Online http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/no-series/parliament-rolls-medieval/january-1484 [accessed 4 May 2016]. 
174 Mancini, p. 95. 
175 Dockray, Richard III, p. 80. 
176 Chronicles of London, p. 190. 
55 
 
audience of lords and gentry.177 It appears that Richard was highly organized in ensuring that 
as many people as possible heard his claim. The audience at St. Paul’s would have been large 
and diverse and the use of Shaw would have added gravitas to the event.  
The speeches made by Buckingham were designed to persuade the influential London 
audience and the lords. This could be described as pre-integration propaganda as Richard had 
not yet declared his true intent and it was not agitation propaganda as Richard would certainly 
not have welcomed the influence of external factors in a situation which he was so skillfully 
manipulating by himself. His confidence or naivety was such that no material evidence was 
produced to further substantiate either version of the story.178 Richard was relying on the verbal 
communication of a respected member of the elite and a Cambridge doctor of theology to do 
his persuading for him. In the context of having to communicate with a London audience it 
was probably an astute move by Richard who was not popular with a southern audience. 
Despite attracting a large audience at St. Pauls Cross the death of the young princes meant that 
Richard’s propagandist sermon served no purpose but rather confirmed, in contemporary eyes, 
his evil intentions. 
Conclusion. 
In this chapter the intention was to identify, based on Ellul’s idea of integration and 
agitation, examples of the methods available to the crown and late medieval polity to express 
their political grievances and opinions. One of the most important criteria that enabled this 
political ‘conversation’ was the existence of an efficient communications network that allowed 
information, whether political, social or economic to circulate. The prodigious number of 
familial letters and their contents confirm this flow, certainly amongst the gentry and 
mercantile communities. 
The chief communicator was naturally the crown and government through 
proclamations, letters, sermons or more esoteric works such as ‘official histories’. Noble 
opposition was expressed through similar methods whilst the general polity had recourse to 
poetry, songs and bills. Although propaganda of an agitational style, is often associated with 
crises, and this is not in doubt, it also had a persuasive role in integration, particularly after a 
crisis.  
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The case studies, particularly for agitation sources show that there was no barrier to 
expressing complaint, loyal or other, and that the means of communication were similar across 
the social groups. Reaching as large an audience as possible was the main purpose for all 
involved and from the extant records this appears to have been successful, confirming that 
communication methods and public arenas were efficient and that there existed a politically 
involved population. 
The various methods employed, often subtle or specific, meant that they could influence 
different audiences from proclamations used in the market square to a more exclusive audience 
for a genealogy. This was a period, when due to a more informed polity combined with political 
uncertainty there was the opportunity and necessity for propaganda to be employed, often 
extensively. 
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CHAPTER II  
 
Visual Propaganda: Uses and Interpretation. 
 
‘it is as well to remember that public attitudes were influenced a great deal 
more easily by visual than by written media’.1 
 
It is the contention of this thesis that the use of visual propaganda in the later middle 
ages was extensive and laid the basis for the Tudors to take it to a higher level of sophistication. 
In this chapter visual media will be examined in terms of their propensity to agitate or integrate, 
either the whole population or certain influential elements. The examples used will vary from 
livery and badges to effigies, architecture and executions. Despite the emphasis usually being 
focussed on the king and the associated representation of kingship this does not portray the full 
extent of visual propaganda at this time. The need and indeed ability to communicate with 
members of the public was not the sole prerogative of the monarch; other groups were also 
adept at communicating through visual representation.  
In the early medieval period when literacy levels were low the need to communicate to 
the public at large had to be met by other methods and the visual genre was one such method. 
An inability to read or write did not mean an inability to understand other symbols or images. 
The Franciscan St. Bonaventure (d.1274) wrote of the use of images for religious instruction: 
‘they were introduced on account of the transitory nature of memory, because those things 
which are only heard fall into oblivion more easily than those things which are seen’.2 This 
statement was as readily applicable to politics as religion. Generations had become skilful at 
interpreting visual cues and, even with an increase in literacy in late medieval England, visual 
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genres were still an important means of communication. In fact, combined with the written 
word, large-scale communication was becoming increasingly refined.3 
In identifying the shortcomings of many literary sources, historians looked towards the 
visual arts as a less corrupted source. Francis Haskell, however, warned against too much 
reliance on this approach as ‘many investigations ... have sought to demonstrate that even 
images formerly assumed to depict only what could have been seen by an innocent eye ... were 
in fact the products of conscious or unconscious manipulation’.4 
Haskell was highlighting the problem of interpreting works of art as historical evidence 
as seen through Montfaucon’s eighteenth-century study of the Bayeux tapestry: 
Acute though Montfaucon’s interpretations often were, it never occurred to him that 
the images he was trying to interpret might - just as easily as written records, have 
been manufactured as political propaganda. Because he was convinced that the 
images had been made at the same time as the events they depicted had taken place, 
he was certain that the record they gave of those events must be true.5 
Montfaucon was saying that contemporaneous sources were not subject to propaganda, 
inferring therefore, in the case of the visual genre, propaganda was the result of hindsight. 
Haskell was acknowledging the potential presence of propaganda and that art was regarded as 
an effective medium. Evelyn Welch stated that political overtones were expressed through a 
variety of methods including poetry, sculpture, painting or heraldry.6 Welch conceded that it 
was the more everyday sights that were used to greater effect: ‘contemporary remarks suggest 
that for the majority of citizens simpler and more ubiquitous objects, such as coins, seals, 
pennants, banners, and coats of arms, acted as the most overt expression of political authority’.7 
The above views convey, first, the argument that art was an important method of 
communication; second, that it was open to manipulation by both contemporaries and later 
interpretation by historians. Richard Marks wondered whether monumental art had an effect 
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on public opinion as it is hard to assess, however, he concluded that it did ‘or else the 
works…would not have been commissioned’.8 
By contrast, Sidney Anglo9 and Theodore Rabb,10 in examining the Tudor period and 
the Renaissance respectively, argued that too much had been read into the symbolism of the 
past using the methodology of the twentieth century and thus signs had been incorrectly 
interpreted as portentous when in contemporary eyes they were innocent. Rabb stated ‘we 
need to recognize that marvellous manipulations of images and forms may offer insights into 
the genius of an artist, a scholar, or a patron, but not into the workings of political 
propaganda’.11 Rabb believed that the visual arts were just that, art to be enjoyed and with no 
political overtones.  
More recently John Watts has argued that both visual and verbal language reinforced 
the reality that they depicted.12 Paul Binski felt that we can uncover ‘accounts of the production 
of medieval art, but not its reception’.13 There is no question, as these debates would suggest, 
that there are significant challenges arising from the problems and possible multiple readings 
of visual evidence. Its very complexity lies behind the range of perspectives historians have 
taken, some in denying the political relevance of the messages which might have been 
intentionally included within it and read from it, and others in claiming a simpler and 
straightforward manner of production and reception. In this chapter we will be sensitive to the 
limitations of the sources, but in particular be aware of the issue of reception, for it is in the 
eye of the beholder that this aspect of late medieval political communication must be judged.  
It is possible to gauge the reception of some forms of medieval art from comments in 
contemporary chronicles particularly with reference to items such as badges. We know that the 
reception of badges caused such a reaction that parliament was forced to seek legislation on 
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the matter.14 Other items, often clothing, also had inherent meanings that were often understood 
by the public. In a book review on textiles during the 1930’s and 40’s Dr Anna Jackson stated 
that ‘cloth ... has a great capacity for communication’ and ‘is by its very nature, one of the most 
visible of the arts’.15 In 1444 the the Great Chronicle made reference to the use of livery ‘in 
those dayes and long afftyr every lordys lyvery and servauntys were knowyn by the conysaunce 
brawderid upon the sleve’.16 The chronicle suggests that this was a well recognised method for 
displaying livery and identifying the family associated with the badge. The transmission of 
information via clothing, including badges, was obviously an established and recognisable 
method of communication. 
The evidence to be examined here will confirm the view of Haskell and Welch that 
politics and propaganda were expressed through the visual arts. For Rabb and Anglo to dismiss 
the importance of art as a conduit for political messages is misplaced as the primary sources 
will subsequently reveal the extent to which the visual genre played a role in influencing the 
politics of the late medieval period.  
Perhaps what was less evident after the reception was the subsequent interpretation of 
these visual cues. Watts suggested that we need to examine the possibility of misinterpretation 
of symbols or their unintended impact.17 Therefore, in order to try and assimilate some 
impression of the influence of the visual image it may be beneficial to use twenty-first century 
definitions as a benchmark for investigation. As discussed in the opening chapter the definition 
of propaganda as delineated by Ellul will be used as the basis of the analysis. Ellul’s 
requirement that education is a prerequisite for propaganda to take place needs clarifying 
further for the visual genre.18 If by education we mean the ability to recognise visual symbols, 
which of course is what literacy is, then the medieval population did have a basic knowledge 
that they would have gained through religious wall paintings in church. The medieval 
population was able to assimilate knowledge from various visual sources which could also lead 
them to be manipulated via the visual medium. A rather unusual letter from the Armburgh 
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papers illustrates the use of visual images from the medieval bestiary. Joan Armburgh was 
writing to John Horell in 1429/30 condemning him for betraying her family and describing him 
as a ‘kukkowysbird devouryng the heysogge’ indicating that both writer and recipient were 
aware and understood the nature of visual associations from the bestiary and were therefore 
cognisant with visual metaphors.19  
For the purposes of this thesis the examination of the presence and extent of visual 
propaganda has been divided into art and physical. The former is represented through heraldry, 
architecture, and paintings, expressed in its many forms - essentially the conventional image 
of visual propaganda. Art is also found in combination with the literary genre, for example in 
the case of genealogies. Art, in many forms, has a certain permanence about it which was suited 
to integration propaganda, often through commemoration found in architecture and funerary 
monuments. This was used to establish a dynastic precedent in the public’s mind. Whereas 
physical propaganda was of a more transitory nature and more suited to short-term political 
necessity. Physical propaganda can be regarded as being manifested through events such as; 
public executions, processions, military displays, coronations and funerals, often produced for 
specific occasions. 
Through the definitions outlined above it should be possible first, to determine the 
presence of a political aim within the various visual genres and second, to try and identify the 
motives behind their use, and finally to try and assess any impact upon the medieval audience 
at both home and abroad. First, the art genre will be examined, starting with the role of 
heraldry. 
Art. 
 
Heraldry.  
Heraldry was integral to the visual world of late medieval England and as such had 
accrued a political as well as historical significance. Since the beginning of the thirteenth 
century the art of heraldry had developed into a pictorial language that was universally 
recognisable. This system of armorial bearings had been fully established by the fourteenth 
century and had become gradually integrated into the decorative arts. Heraldic decoration could 
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be found on buildings, ships, horse harnesses, clothing and domestic plate amongst other 
places. The Hundred Years War provided a fertile environment in which politics and culture, 
from badges to coronations, came together in a powerful combination.20 During Edward III’s 
reign in 1346 the citizens of Honfleur were sent a sheep that had the cross of St. George painted 
on its back whilst the fleur-de-lis was displayed on its rear.21 A century later the English were 
still trying to impress their rule over the French and in 1435 the Parisians were forced to wear 
the St. George cross.  
The armorial badge could be grouped into four distinct types. First, personal which was 
usually to be found on the clothing, furnishings and jewellery of an individual and included 
royal or noble badges. Second, livery which was worn by retainers and armies on uniforms and 
adorned flags. Third, official which were associated with a specific household or corporate 
office, such as the judiciary. Finally, corporate which was the mark of the guilds or orders of 
chivalry.22 As livery became more widespread and due to the limited palette of dyes available 
to clothiers a further distinguishing mark became necessary to identify various retainers, the 
badge. 23 Their usage also increased as armorial bearings became more complex and thus harder 
to identify immediately.24 In referring to heraldry Adrian Ailes emphasised its role ‘in the war 
to win hearts and minds’ for a largely illiterate population.25 As Ailes argued, it was during the 
reign of Richard II that both the badge and livery collar entered the political arena.26  
The actual choice of a badge developed over many years drawing on various influences. 
David Starkey defined the requisite qualities of the badge, ‘to fulfil its function the badge had 
to be, of necessity, a simple, easily remembered and recognisable emblem’.27 Both Starkey and 
Saul regarded the badge not only as a symbol of service but also as a visual manifestation of 
bastard feudalism.28 Michael Michael saw the use of badges as political as there must have 
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been a consensus of opinion as to the significance of the gesture, that is, it was universally 
recognised as having more than a purely familial meaning.29  
The initial design of the badge was diverse with some commemorating events such as 
Henry VII’s crown in a hawthorn bush or were visual puns such as the bray of Sir Reginald 
Bray.30 The adoption of the white boar by Richard III appeared to be an unusual choice as 
traditionally it was regarded as a king whom god had transformed into that shape for his sins, 
who was unreconciled and unreconcilable, his temper rancorous, his moods inhumane but his 
royal intelligence undimmed by his beast vision. However, there were other associations with 
the boar that may have led Richard to use it. It has often been thought that it was a pun on the 
Latin for the city of York, Eboracum, and reflected his fondness for his northern capital. 
Another suggestion has been the connection to St. Anthony, whose badge was the wild boar 
who had acted as his protector whilst he was in the wilderness.31 Richard was so associated 
with the boar that the Crowland Chronicle said ‘in the year 1485 on the 22nd day of August 
the tusks of the boar were blunted and the red rose, the avenger of the white, shines upon us’.32 
A good indicator of the importance of the badge is to examine the scale of their 
production and distribution. The large-scale production of badges for the pilgrim trade had 
been in existence for years and thus manufacture of livery badges would have been 
straightforward. G. L. Harriss stated that in times of unrest the production of badges was a 
cheaper alternative to the distribution of fees.33 
At certain critical times Richard II distributed livery badges for example, in 1387 he 
distributed silver gilt crowns in an attempt to gain the support of the recipients in his struggle 
against the Appellants. Shelagh Mitchell noted that Richard’s next distribution of livery badges 
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took place at the Smithfield tournament in 1390.34 This was at a time when, although Richard 
had defeated the Appellants, he still needed to reassert his authority and build up support and 
rather than the silver gilt crowns of 1387 Richard chose the white hart, his personal badge, 
wearing a crown and chain about its neck as his badge.35 The author of Mum and the Sothsegger 
complained about Richard’s extensive use of the livery by his retainers: ‘þat swarmed so 
thikke’ and further stated that it made him unpopular: 
 So, trouthe to tell/ as toune-men said, 
 For on þat ƺe merkyd/ ƺe myssed ten schore 
 Of homeliche hertis/ þat þe harme hente.36 
 
The author was stating that for every hart badge that was issued, Richard lost ten score 
of the hearts of the people. This comment reflected the negative impact that his affinity was 
having on his popularity, through both the use of a visual device combined with the physical 
oppression associated with those who wore the device. This was despite an attempt by the 
Commons who had earlier in his reign sought to bring the giving of livery under control.37 
Perhaps one of the most openly propagandist use of a badge during the reign of Henry 
IV was the use of Richard II’s hart to agitate against the king. In November 1402 Maud de 
Vere, countess of Oxford was accused of distributing badges in support of Richard II: ‘harts 
that were fashioned, for which the countess set down as pledge to Neil Goldsmith a censer of 
silver-gilt to pay for the harts that were of king Richard’s livery’.38 Maud must have believed 
in the efficacy of such badges to make such a financial commitment confirming that this was 
an effective means of communication. The badge as a focus for agitation against Henry IV 
may be seen by Henry Percy's adoption of the white hart of Richard II in 1403 at Lichfield, 
when ‘Ser Henry Percye and all his men were arayed in the livery of the hertis, the whiche 
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wasse kynge Richardes livery’.39 However, the use of the dead king’s badge was unsuccessful 
in raising the support that Percy had hoped for as it had for Maud. This may have been 
indicative of the lack of support for Richard suggesting that the population were aware that he 
was dead and that they had no complaints about Henry’s rule. 
The quantity of badges found in London suggests that the distribution of badges was 
at its height during the second half of the fifteenth century coinciding with the political 
upheaval associated with the Wars of the Roses.40 In 1454 the Duke of Buckingham had 
2,000 badges of his badge made in order to quickly muster a force.41 In 1483 Richard III 
ordered 13,000 livery badges bearing the white boar to be distributed whilst he travelled 
north.42 The Hundred Years War also saw large scale badge production as in 1411 the 
Parisians hastily adopted the Burgundian badge and within a fortnight 100,000 of these 
badges had been produced.43 The quantities involved reveal how important it was to have a 
large retinue and that the use of the badge was vital to agitation propaganda. 
In 1377 Walsingham revealed the unpopularity of association with John of Gaunt: ‘they 
tore from their necks the chains which they had received from the duke and hid them in their 
sleeves or gauntlets’. Walsingham was scathing in his view of Gaunt’s adherents saying that 
they believed that ‘they could gain riches before heaven and earth’.44 This example provides 
evidence of the contemporary perception of Gaunt and revealed that his badge was widely 
recognised and a powerful political symbol. 
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The importance of being correctly identified was paramount during the crisis years of 
1469-71, when the wearing of the wrong badge may have been literally fatal as Commines 
reported upon the news of the flight of Edward IV from England ‘they told me at this dinner 
that after the news had arrived from England, within less than a quarter of an hour everyone 
was wearing that livery: ‘of the ragged staff’’.45 The availability of the Warwick livery would 
appear to be an example of literary hyperbole but if true suggests a sophisticated level of 
political acumen and organisation. In 1470 upon his arrival at Ravenspur, Edward IV tried to 
prove his allegiance to Prince Edward as he ‘wered ane estryche feder, Prynce Edwarde’s 
lyvery’.46 By wearing Prince Edward’s livery Edward was attempting to use integration 
propaganda in order not look like a threat.  
These examples confirm that badges were an important method of political 
communication and had been elevated from mere chivalric tradition to a recognised method of 
propaganda. However, as with any mode of communication it could be subject to 
misinterpretation. The extensive use of badges, and their variety, inevitably led to confusion 
on occasion. This could have serious political implications, particularly in a battle scenario as 
Elizabeth Danbury highlighted:  
On the morning immediately preceding the battle of Poitiers, Sir John Chandos rode 
out to reconnoitre the French positions, and Marshal Jean de Clermont those of the 
English. Each noticed that the other bore the same device as himself, ‘une bleue dame 
ouvree de broudre ou ray d'un soleil’.47 
The resultant argument thus confirming the importance of the badge and the fact that 
despite becoming more complex in design they were still open to be misunderstood. 
Warkworth provided another example of the problem of mistaken identity at the Battle of 
Barnet as ‘the Erle of Oxenfordes men hadde uppon them ther lordes lyvery, both before and 
behynde, which was a sterre withe stremys, wiche [was] myche lyke kynge Edwardes lyvery, 
the sunne with stremys’.48 This led to the Earl of Warwick’s men fighting against the Earl of 
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Oxford’s men rather than King Edward’s which led to Edward’s subsequent victory. This 
incident revealed how powerful and recognisable the badge was, particularly during the heat 
of battle but conversely it also reveals the impact that misinterpretation could have on the 
propagandist use of visual media.  
Another vestige of armorial device on a grander scale was the livery collar which, like 
a badge, was worn as a sign of adherence to a particular individual or family. Although these 
were distributed to loyal supporters they were not mass produced and distributed like badges 
to all retainers as a means of identification. They were more likely to be worn on ceremonial 
occasions than on the battlefield and were often reproduced on effigies as an indication of 
political allegiance. There are some excellent examples to be found in All Saints church, 
Harewood. On the tomb of Sir Richard Redman (died circa 1426) he is depicted wearing the 
collar of the alternate knots and ribbon and SS’s, which was the livery of the House of 
Lancaster. He had been made speaker in 1415 as he had assisted in the mobilisation of the army 
which sailed to France with Henry V. On a later tomb of 1461, Sir William Gascoigne is 
wearing the Yorkist livery of a collar of suns and roses and has a lion of March pendant. 
Gascoigne had been with the Lancastrians in the Wars of the Roses but Edward IV pardoned 
him in 1461, hence the Yorkist collar.49 In Rougham, Norfolk the effigy of Sir William 
Yelverton, Justice of the King’s Bench, circa 1470, shows him wearing a Yorkist collar.50 In 
his study of the Cobham brasses Nigel Saul emphasised the importance of these funerary forms 
in terms of their wider importance: ‘brasses were crucial to the strategies of legitimation by 
which families drew attention to their status’.51 These examples show how funerary art had the 
possibility to integrate the viewer to support the regime represented, if it was still in power, 
and that they were used throughout the country. 
There is evidence that Richard II wore the Lancastrian SS collar belonging to his uncle 
John of Gaunt.52 It was allegedly worn as a token of affection by Richard upon Gaunt's return 
from Spain in 1389. Pictorial and literary evidence had Richard wearing not only his own livery 
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but that of two of the most powerful men within his circle, that is, the SS collar of Gaunt and 
the broomcod of Charles VI. Richard appeared to be courting the political support of two 
strategically important characters, on whose goodwill his reign relied.  
One of Henry V’s greatest political coups was his courtship of the Emperor Sigismund 
in an attempt to gain more extensive support for his French campaign. He wined and dined 
Sigismund lavishly but more importantly he made Sigismund a knight of the Garter and gave 
him a Lancastrian SS collar. In 1417 when Sigismund returned to Constance it was reported 
that he wore the robes of the Order of the Garter and the collar at high mass.53 The visual 
implication of Sigismund wearing the collar of the king of England must have had an effect on 
French morale. The wearing of the SS collar was also to be found in other parts of the continent, 
including Mantua when in 1436 Henry VI allowed Gianfresco Gonzaga ‘to present fifty SS 
collars’ to his own countrymen.54 This was a visual expression of mutual support for the 
Lancastrian regime and reinforced the relationship between Henry, Gianfresco and the 
Emperor Sigismund.  
Although fewer were produced than badges, livery collars had an important role 
amongst the more influential members of society. As may be seen from the example of 
Sigismund, the collar reached an international audience at a time when English political 
influence was looking towards re-asserting itself in France. Henry V must have realised that 
Sigismund would wear it in public and the propagandist effect that it would on the French. 
The visual abuse of armorial devices was used as a statement of political dissatisfaction 
as in 1377 when angry Londoners put John of Gaunt’s arms upside down on the doors of 
Westminster Hall as a sign of disrespect.55 Usk recorded an interesting example of the removal 
of the arms of Roger Walden by Arundel upon his return to Canterbury: ‘while those of the 
said Roger-once they had been taken down…I saw stuffed ignominiously under benches, or 
hurled from windows by menials and thrown out’.56 The replacement of the armorial decoration 
emphasised the extent to which it was used but also that it had immense personal and visual 
significance. In August 1450 many soldiers who had returned from war in France penniless 
blamed their hardship on Suffolk and Say and expressed their resentment in the following way 
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according to Bale’s Chronicle ‘the sowdeours yeden aboute in divers places and wher that they 
sygh ony armes either of the duk of Suffolk or lord say they pulled hem down and despoilled 
them’.57 
This reinforced the idea that arms were recognised easily and that the destruction of 
their arms was a very emotive visual response. The population would have understood the 
insult that was being directed at these two lords. Bale recorded another example of arms being 
taken down by political rivals in 1450, in this case those of the Duke of York:  
Item the ffriday the xxx of Octobr wer drawe down in divers places of the citie and 
aboute in the subarbes the armes of the seid duk of york a bage of the ffetherlok and 
the kings armes set up. Item upon all halowen eve the seid armes of the duk of york 
wer set up agein.58 
 
The repeated removal and reinstatement of the arms made it apparent that this visual 
genre was taken seriously by the authorities as a means of political communication, and in this 
case as agitation propaganda.  
The discussion so far has shown that badges were worn and distributed in large numbers 
by both the king and the nobility and that this had political implications. It was towards the end 
of the fourteenth century that the giving of badges in particular aroused concern and the 
Commons began to try to introduce legislation. R. L. Storey stated that it was the increase in 
unrest and disorder that most concerned the Commons.59 
There was a fear that the large-scale distribution of badges could be construed to be 
taking away allegiance from the king and transferring it to another figure. In 1388 the 
Commons called for the total ban on the giving of badges including those of the king. Richard 
II was happy to acquiesce to this request by the Commons but the lords refused and the issue 
was deferred to the next parliament.60 In May 1390 Richard published an ordinance that was 
intended to control the distribution of liveries as the Commons were becoming vociferous at 
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the apparent extent of the abuse of the system. J. M. W. Bean argued that Richard saw this as 
an opportunity ‘for the restoration and maintenance of his own authority’.61 In 1397 another 
bill was drawn up which aimed its criticism directly at Richard who had been distributing his 
livery of the white hart quite extensively.62 The 1399 statute forbade the lords from distributing 
any livery badges – only the livery of the king was permitted and then it could not be given ‘to 
anyone below the rank of esquire which was surely a reaction to Richard’s Cheshiremen’.63 
Given-Wilson connected the legislation on livery with an increased use by Richard at times of 
crisis and suggests that it was ‘political’ legislation.64 The degree to which the Commons 
endeavoured to try and control the use of badges and liveries confirms Given-Wilson’s above 
point which acknowledged the power of this particular visual genre to influence political life.  
It was not until the early years of the reign of Henry VI that the problem of badges re-
emerged. In 1427 and 1429 parliament expressed concern at the apparent abuse of the giving 
of livery and a fine and prison sentence were to be imposed on anyone granting livery for the 
reason of maintenance.65 However, the enforcement of such laws was lax and once again no 
solution was found to control the issuing of badges. The influence of the aristocracy played no 
small part in this lack of success as they were the very group who were often abusing the law 
for their own personal gain. In April 1457 Henry VI commanded that the sheriff of Worcester 
read a proclamation regarding the misuse of livery: ‘the king has learned what disturbances, 
riots, unlawful assemblies, murders, homicides and mischiefs daily result from liveries of 
badges and cloth given’.66 This list of offences attributed to livery emphasises the effectiveness 
of the medium at agitation. Edward IV, like Henry VI, was faced with the same problems and 
similarly failed to grasp the nettle in terms of controlling the situation. Statutes were issued in 
1468 that declared retaining to be illegal but Charles Ross stated that no evidence has been 
found to show that they were enforced.67 In 1472 Edward IV wrote to Coventry asking for the 
control of liveries, the said letter being proclaimed in the market place for all the inhabitants to 
hear.68  
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Thus it appears that the over-use of livery, and badges in particular, caused great 
concern to the Commons and monarch during the late fourteenth century and mid-fifteenth 
century that resulted in attempts at their prohibition. This need to curb the use of badges 
confirmed that they were indeed efficient at agitating large groups of the population whether 
it be for a lord or a king. Bean stated that despite successive attempts at the control of livery 
there was little serious enforcement of the legislation.69 From Richard II through to Richard III 
there developed an increasing use of badges as their political importance intensified in relation 
to the political crises that were taking place. Their flexibility and easy distribution gave them 
an advantage and immediacy over other methods of propaganda and they were able to reach a 
large and diverse audience. 
Architecture. 
Architecture, like effigies, provided the opportunity to legitimise and commemorate 
through the use of art on a more monumental scale. David Starkey’s essay on Ightham Mote 
clearly demonstrated how the use of heraldic emblems in architecture was meant to express 
political allegiance and social hierarchy.70  
The English occupation of parts of France during the Hundred Years War afforded the 
opportunity for architectural propaganda to be employed abroad. Such was the scale of the 
English presence in France during the reign of Henry V, that in order to execute the necessary 
repairs to buildings and defensive structures, large numbers of English craftsmen were sent 
over to help.71 They were also employed in the construction of new building projects as well 
as probably being responsible for the addition of royal arms to certain strategic or prominent 
buildings in order to enforce the integration and establishment of the English presence. Henry 
V, wanting to demonstrate the permanence of the English began to build a palace in Rouen and 
a new castle in Harfleur. Henry died before the castle was completed and in fact it was still 
unfinished when Rouen fell in January 1450 and the removal of all English arms in both the 
castle and palace was ordered by the French royal council and, by the following May all traces 
of the English occupation had been erased.72 Edward IV spent considerable sums in 
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maintaining the English occupation around Calais. At Guines Castle ‘the walls were 
ornamented with shields of the arms of St. George, King Edward ‘the old arms of the castle’, 
and the arms and devices of ‘divers lords and magnates’’.73 The English had obviously 
incorporated these arms as political propaganda, in an attempt to integrate themselves with the 
French and create a permanent reminder of their authority.  
Nicola Smith regarded both the pulpits of York and Canterbury as statements of 
Lancastrian propaganda, tracing the kings’ genealogy in sculpture and their hereditary rights. 
Smith said that the York pulpitum was ‘a straightforward, not to say triumphalist, assertion of 
the legitimacy of the Lancastrian establishment’. Edward IV’s campaign to remove images of 
Henry VI from churches was indicative of the power that the visual image provoked. Edward 
was trying to establish the Yorkist regime whilst removing the opportunities for Henry’s cult 
to survive and with it thoughts of Lancastrian revival. Archbishop Booth said of the York statue 
that the veneration of the image also resulted in the ‘vilification of our lord Edward IV, king 
of the English’.74 However, despite the removal of Henry VI’s statue in York Minster people 
still came to pay homage at the place where it had stood.75 By implication this shows how the 
visual image had been absorbed into the public memory. The use of dynastic imagery within a 
religious setting could be said to give it more gravitas and legitimacy as well as the opportunity 
to further integrate the dynasty to a wider audience. 
Images of heraldry and badges were incorporated into stained glass and, although 
religious in setting, the glass often had secular or political themes incorporated into the designs. 
David King’s article on the stained glass of Norfolk churches identified examples of political 
propaganda being displayed within a religious setting. In the Harling panels King interprets the 
depiction of the parhelia, as seen by Edward IV, in the glass as propaganda. More obvious 
propaganda was to be seen in the portrayal of Sir Robert Wingfield wearing the Yorkist collar 
of suns and roses with the pendant lion. King conceded that it was not possible to confirm with 
any certainty whether the intention of these windows was to publicise the Yorkist cause but the 
evidence of the connections of the patrons did suggest that a political aspect was intended 
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within the designs. 76 Although they have little immediacy about them, one may surmise that 
the sight of such badges may have initiated conversations about the meaning of the device at 
many levels and potentially have provoked political discussion or debate about the wearer of 
certain livery and their affiliations and views. Stained glass formed part of the complex visual 
library of medieval commemoration and as such was a type of integration propaganda. 
Paintings.  
For the average medieval parishioner their local church wall would have been their first 
exposure to painting. These wall paintings were essentially an aide-memoire to help the 
congregation remember the story of the bible and reinforced the major sermon topics.77 
Although not political in nature their importance lies in their role in introducing certain codes 
and symbols that would later become familiar within a political context. They enabled the 
audience to read various signs and interpret them thus making them visually literate and able 
to apply this technique to the visual genre used in a political setting.  
Erwin Panofsky stated that, ‘an historical painting is, in a sense, a vehicle of 
communication’ suggesting that art had another purpose than merely to appeal to the observer 
at a decorative level.78 He saw it as a method to convey certain messages, whether political, 
social or religious. The following section will explore the limited genre of portrait painting. 
This was not a period known for its quantity of portraiture unlike the later Tudor period and, 
therefore there are few examples to examine. David Starkey stated that during the Tudor period 
‘in straight forward royal portraits ... propaganda ruled supreme’.79 Unlike his forbears Richard 
II developed his own style of kingship, one dimension of which was patronage of the visual 
arts, including representations of himself for public display. M. V. Clarke was correct to 
emphasise the significance of the visual genre, particularly as a political medium ‘it must be 
remembered that Richard's subjects could read a coat more easily than they could read a 
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letter’.80 Richard II commissioned his portrait for Westminster Abbey, and it combined both 
religious and political propaganda. It has been said of the portrait that ‘it would seem that 
Richard II commissioned this portrayal of himself to represent his perpetual presence in the 
choir of the abbey’.81 Paul Binski regarded the Westminster portrait ‘as a monument to royal 
paranoia’ and argued that it was almost impossible to determine whether it represented the 
‘political or personal insecurities of Richard’.82 Binski felt that the portrait gave the impression 
of distance between the audience and the monarch, a reflection of Richard’s views on 
kingship.83 The date of the portrait was c.1390-1399, a similar time to the production of the 
Wilton Diptych. These later years of his reign were troubled and, perhaps as much for his own 
benefit, these commissions were meant to reinforce his kingship at a personal level as well as 
to a national audience. 
Binski believed the portrait was a reflection of Richard’s self-image with ‘its 
exceptional form, provoking the kind of genuflection appropriate to an icon, acted as a highly 
artificial sign of the anxieties of Richard’s court towards the end of his reign’.84 A further 
example of Richard’s presence in the abbey was the large panel representing his personal 
emblem of a white hart sited in the muniment room.85 Richard’s commissions for Westminster 
Abbey reflected his idiosyncratic approach to kingship and the ‘advertising’ of his badge of the 
white hart which he had adopted in about 1390.86 Later medieval monarchs do not have 
appeared to use art in the same way as Richard II. It could be said that Richard II was ahead of 
time in terms of propagandising his own kingship through the arts. The public display of these 
commissions would have reached a privileged and sizeable audience, including the nobility 
and the influential Londoners. Richard was endeavouring to instil and integrate his image and 
inheritance into the fabric of both the abbey and the eyes of the audience who saw the images. 
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These paintings were as much about his personal reign as they were about the longevity of the 
Plantagenet dynasty.  
Although non-royal portraits are extremely rare during this period there are two worth 
examining. First, a portrait of the diplomat Edward Grimston, who was in the service of Henry 
VI, was painted in about 1446 by the artist Petrus Christus who worked out of Bruges. It clearly 
shows Grimston holding a chain of SS’s, the Lancastrian collar, at the very forefront of the 
picture.87 Second, a portrait of John Donne by Hans Memling shows him wearing the Lion of 
March pendant that was Edward IV's personal badge. He and his wife were probably part of 
the wedding party that attended Margaret's marriage to Charles of Burgundy in 1468. It is 
interesting to note that the Donne family arms, like those of Grimston, are more discreetly 
portrayed in the background suggesting that Memling painted them in their wedding party attire 
and like the effigies already discussed, royal badges of allegiance were regarded as superior to 
familial motifs. These portraits would have been commissioned with the aim of dynastic 
integration as well as commemoration to establish a familial link with certain dynasties and 
historical events. 
Portraits of a rather unconventional style but with a definite political message were 
exhibited in France in 1438. According to the author of the Parisian Journal paintings on cloth 
were displayed on the gates of Paris depicting William de la Pole, Robert, Earl of Willoughby 
(sic) and Sir Thomas Blount. 88 The pictures showed the knights, who had been accused of 
perjury, hanging by their feet on the gallows and with two crows appearing to pick out their 
eyes. Whoever was responsible for these paintings was not only an accomplished artist but also 
very politically aware of the apparent injustices caused by the presence of the English in Paris. 
The timing of these pictures was curious as the English had lost Paris in April 1436 but they 
show that the Parisians were not going to forget the injustices of the men portrayed and the use 
of such a public space was inevitably going to attract a large audience. However, no direct 
response from the public was recorded, apart from the author himself who referred to them as 
‘very unpleasant pictures’ which one can assume was the response of the majority of the 
audience.89  
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The most famous contemporary work of art was the Wilton Diptych produced for 
Richard II. Although this was essentially produced for Richard’s private devotions it would 
still have been seen by the various members of his own household and also those of any other 
families that he stayed with when travelling. Its propagandist possibilities were thus limited 
but it still merits a brief discussion due the extensive use of motifs that were found on more 
public works that could be regarded as having political significance. 
The diptych associated Richard with Edward the Confessor rather than St. George thus 
emphasising Richard's desire for peace with France rather than war as associated with St. 
George. Extensive use was made of Richard's livery of the white hart and also the broomcod, 
which was the livery of Charles VI, invoking another connection to the French throne. It had 
been suggested that, as the Latin name for broomcod is planta genista, it was adopted in 
reference to the name Plantagenet.90 In attempting to assess whether the diptych carries any 
political significance one needs to establish its date of execution. Despite the youthful 
appearance of Richard, M. V. Clarke argued, the diptych was probably painted towards the end 
of his reign. There were several reasons that drew to her to this conclusion. First, the omission 
of Anne of Bohemia's arms suggested it was painted either before their marriage in 1382 or 
after her death in 1394. Second, the monk of Evesham suggests that the white hart was given 
to Richard at the Smithfield tournament in October 1390. Third, the use of Charles VI's livery 
of the broomcod probably coincides with the Anglo-French entente of the period from 1396. 
Finally, Clarke linked the youthful portrayal of Richard on the diptych with two manuscripts 
produced by Phillipe de Mézières for the crusading Order of the Passion. Clarke concluded that 
‘a crusading picture with the liveries of England and France united and executed between 1396-
1399 cannot be traced to any other origin than de Mézières’s propaganda for the Order of the 
Passion’.91 The use of pictures in de Mézières’s manuscript showing the dress and badges for 
members was produced with the intention of recruiting men in England for the Order.92 It was 
essentially a piece of propaganda for the Order of the Passion and the influence of the pictures 
was reflected in the Diptych.93 Richard must have been very affected by the manuscript’s style 
and it reflected his ideal of kingship based on orthodox piety. 
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The exterior of the diptych revealed a white hart whilst the other side showed the royal 
arms of both England and France together with the arms of Edward the Confessor. These are 
the pictures that were most likely to have been seen by members of the household. Both images 
were secular reinforcements of Richard’s heraldic motifs that were used elsewhere. As a 
statement of Richard's belief in kingship it is significant as this was the motivating rationale 
behind many of his political decisions. It was also a reflection of his personality which will be 
discussed in a subsequent chapter. 
Thus far the discussion about visual propaganda has focussed on domestic propaganda. 
The propaganda during the Hundred Years War was centred on the need to legitimise the 
English claim to the throne by a plausible genealogical route. Elizabeth Danbury showed that 
charter decoration during the Hundred Years War was used for propagandist ends.94 Although 
both English and French documents travelled across the Channel in an attempt to legitimise 
each other’s claims Danbury believed that essentially they were aimed at a domestic audience 
to maintain support for the war.95 Of course it was as important to keep the home population 
believing the claims to maintain support, as it was to try and to get the French to believe them. 
The charter artists portrayed the English monarch in French royal robes and combined this with 
other visual cues from genealogies. Danbury said of these artists that they were not only skilled 
artistically ‘but in their capacity, within a small space, to illuminate a cause’.96 These charters 
would have been seen by only a minority but it was a group without whose support the 
campaign would have foundered. 
As Regent the Duke of Bedford saw it as his mission to reinforce English claims to the 
French throne through the production and dissemination in France of a persuasive genealogy. 
The genealogy commissioned by the Duke of Bedford, to further legitimise Henry VI's claim 
to the French throne was ‘a very shrewd piece of late medieval dynastic advertisement’ that 
must have had a considerable impact.97 The genealogy was to accompany the poem by 
Lawrence Calot that Bedford had displayed side by side in Notre Dame and in a number of 
other French churches to emphasise the dual descent of Henry VI to both the English and 
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French thrones.98 Rowe regarded the genealogy as ‘a perfect interpretation of the Treaty of 
Troyes’ and its distribution around France was meant to reinforce Henry’s claim to the throne.99 
Bedford also produced new coinage to stress the nature of the dual monarchy of Henry VI.100 
The juxtaposition of the shields of England and France reproduced on the new coinage was 
meant to be regarded as ‘an heraldic representation of the dual monarchy’.101 The change of 
the design of the salute, the main gold coin in France, in which the figures of Henry VI and the 
angel are reversed, would have reached an extended audience. McKenna regarded this reversal 
as a definite political statement by Bedford on behalf of the infant Henry.102 The methods 
employed by Bedford to try and secure his nephew’s dual monarchy confirmed the importance 
and influence that was attached to the visual genre. Bedford’s use of coins and genealogies 
suggest that they were important components in the integration campaign to influence French 
opinion.  
Conclusion. 
Art as propaganda during this period, although varied in media, was essentially 
embodied in the heraldic tradition. It could be found in both secular and religious settings as 
seen in stained glass windows. Some genres, such as badges, would have had a large reception, 
even international in the case of the French wars. Their very size and variety gave them a 
portability ideally suited to situations of political uncertainty and flux. The regular use of 
legislation to control the distribution of livery reflected its ability to create dissent and arouse 
unrest and confirmed that this particular mode of visual communication was effective and 
dangerous in its ability to agitate various groups. It was used in the knowledge that it had 
political implications and was not just decorative and this was why it had to be controlled. 
Other genres, such as effigies and portraits, were by nature less mobile and reached a 
smaller audience. By their very size they were meant to be regarded as more substantial and 
impressive to the onlooker. However, it was this distinction between the genres that made them 
suited to a variety of occasions for propaganda to reach different audiences. On occasions when 
a large audience needed to be engaged the badge was the perfect medium, but on other 
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occasions when a particular audience was to be targeted then the more complex genealogies 
were more apposite. The Hundred Years War produced visual propaganda in the form of 
genealogies and charter decoration that was specifically directed at the integration of the 
French population. The role of memory was very important to the medieval psyche and was 
reflected in the extensive use of livery and badges in glass and stone. Architecture and effigies 
were to a degree about building a dynastic history that sought to legitimise often shaky 
foundations. 
Physical. 
This next section examines the role of visual propaganda through the use of the human body. 
The human body was and is a powerful means of communication, both in life and death. The 
regal appearance of a monarch was meant to instil confidence in those who saw him whilst the 
display of a corpse was seen as a means of confirming death and exhibiting control. Within this 
context the role of the body in death will be discussed including executions and the display of 
body parts and the reaction to such displays. Secondly, the power of the living body will be 
considered with regard to military displays, royal processions and public humiliation.  
Executions and the display of corpses. 
In a talk to a committee of the Chinese politburo the twentieth-century Communist 
leader Deng Xiaoping said ‘as a matter of fact, execution is the one indispensable means of 
education’.103 Five hundred years earlier executions were still one of the most emphatic 
methods of visual propaganda available. Public executions had a complex role to play in 
medieval life; they enforced the authority of the king and his regime and were meant to quell 
any further transgressions. Commenting on the Kentish rebellion, 1438-9, Gregory’s Chronicle 
remarked that the display of the heads of the rebels in the county was ‘to cause men to be 
ware’.104 Another example shows the insecurity of the Yorkists as in March 1461 before the 
battle of Towton: ‘one Walter Walker, grocer, who had been guilty of making light, as it was 
thought, of the new king’s title to the throne, was beheaded in Smithfield as a warning to other 
doubting Thomases’.105 Executions were also regarded as a reassurance to the audience in 
seeing justice done when witnessing a penitent receiving absolution. The fact that executions 
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were such spectacles suggested that the involvement of the public was essential. Seth Lerer 
emphasised the relationship ‘between legal practice and social imagination that was designed 
to assure deterrence by creating memorable spectacle’.106 Mervyn James’s description of the 
Corpus Christi play as a projection of the ‘communal piety of community’ was applicable to 
the viewing of an execution.107 It revealed an inherent understanding of what was acceptable 
behaviour and it was a public agreement of the need for justice to be seen to be exercised. 
The manner of an execution followed certain social guidelines. On their way to the 
place of execution the gentry were generally allowed to ride on horseback but could be 
humiliated by being taken in a wooden cart, occasionally being forced to travel sitting 
backwards. If they were guilty of treason their heraldic arms were reversed which was a signal 
of both a physical and social death.108 This was meant to deter further transgressions whilst 
reinforcing authority and literally destroying the perpetrator’s body, traitors often having been 
dragged to the site of execution.109  
Danielle Westerhof stated that the urban audience was expected to take part in an event 
that was intended for the traitor’s social circle, which was often non-urban and thus an 
execution was able to communicate to different social groups.110 The common criminal was 
usually forced to walk. It can be assumed that the audience would be cognisant with such 
protocol for the event to have the desired impact.  
In 1384 during a turbulent period in London politics between a former mayor, John of 
Northampton and the current mayor, Nicholas Brembre, Walsingham tells of the effect of the 
execution of an adherent of Northampton: ‘this action curbed the trouble among the commons 
for the time being and put an end to the revolt of the people’.111 This example reveals that the 
execution had worked in quelling unrest but unfortunately this is a relatively rare example 
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revealing contemporary reaction. However, the general consensus among many of the 
chroniclers was that these executions often had an adverse effect on the population, although 
of course rebellion and resentment was more interesting to comment on and record than 
compliance. They may have quashed rebellious behaviour but the texts demonstrate that the 
medieval population had little appetite for excessive retribution. In 1381 Richard II sought 
vengeance, rather than justice, on the rebels and set about the matter with a ruthlessness that 
horrified the population: ‘the populace shuddered at the spectacle of so many gibbeted bodies 
exposed to the light of day’.112 Richard made a bad misjudgement in his response to the rebels 
and his callous treatment of the rebels had a negative effect. In 1450 the treatment of the rebel 
Jack Cade's own death had a similar effect. He was given a ritual beheading at Newgate despite 
the fact that he had died previously from injuries. Subsequently his head was displayed on 
London Bridge whilst the towns of Norwich, Salisbury, Gloucester and Blackheath were each 
sent a quarter to display to their citizens. However, according to the Waltham Annals, it would 
appear that London began to suffer from ‘head’ fatigue: ‘London said ther shuld no more hedes 
be set upon ther’.113 So many rebels were executed that Gregory remarked: ‘men calle hyt in 
Kente the harvyste of hedys’.114 
After the Lincolnshire rebellion when the ships of Warwick and Clarence had been 
captured the Earl of Worcester passed what was regarded as an excessive humiliation on the 
prisoners: 
and so xx persones of gentylmen and yomenne were hangede, drawne, and 
 quartered, and hedede; and after that thei hanged uppe by the leggys, and a 
 stake made scharpe at both endes, whereof one ende was putt in att bottokys, 
 and the other ende ther heddes were putt uppe one.115 
This act had a negative effect amongst the people and thus lost any propagandist 
benefits with regard to the upholding of justice. When it came to Worcester’s own execution 
the crowds that came to watch were so great that ‘the people presed so fast abowte hym that 
thofficers were fayne to turne in to the fflete with hym’.116 The gathering of such a large crowd 
revealed his unpopularity and more importantly that people were aware of what was politically 
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acceptable. The commons had realised that Worcester’s actions had not been legitimate; he 
was meant to act within the law not outside it. Executions by the state appeared to have received 
mixed responses from the public judging from the textual sources. Even when the audience 
understood the reason for the execution they were still conscious that these events should be 
carried out within the letter of the law and in proportion to the crime. 
It was not just the monarch who used executions to make a public statement, and there 
were occasions when other factions used executions to express their message of complaint or 
displeasure. The rebels in 1381 made their own political statement with several beheadings as 
the Westminster Chronicler reported:  
The heads of the archbishop and the rest were stuck on poles and carried through the 
city streets, as if in triumph after some great victory, being set up on London Bridge. 
The hallowed head of the archbishop they set in the middle and higher than the others 
and to make it specially recognizable among them they nailed on it a scarlet cap.117 
The rebels were showing their supporters how successful they had been whilst at the 
same time issuing a warning to the crown that they could use the same methods and venues for 
executions as the authorities. The Anonimalle Chronicle recounted another episode from 
1381of the rebels’ behaviour: ‘at this time they captured three of Thomas de Bamptoun’s 
clerks, cut off their heads and carried them about with them on poles for days as an example to 
others’.118 Bamptoun had been one of the commissioners assigned to collect the outstanding 
poll tax in Brentwood, Essex that included the town of Fobbing which was one of the first to 
rise up against the tax. His threatening behaviour resulted in his speedy exit to London but it 
was his clerks who were made an example of in the locality. 
During the Kentish uprising in 1450 Jack Cade had Lord Saye beheaded and publicly 
degraded him by having his naked corpse dragged through the streets. He caused further 
offence by putting Saye’s head next to that of Crowmer, the sheriff of Kent, to make it appear 
‘that oon to kysse that other’.119 Interestingly, the chronicler stated that this act did not affect 
Cade’s popularity, rather the subsequent robbing of Philip Malpas and Geerst caused him to 
lose support as the Londoners feared that he would rob them too.120 Cade’s mistake in behaving 
like a common thief lost him popular support whereas his physical despoilation of Lord Saye 
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was acceptable revealing that the population understood what was politically defensible in 
terms of law breaking. This could imply that the Londoners were mere onlookers, or politically 
passive but rather it suggests an en-masse political and moral conscience of an informed 
audience. 
The visual impact of a head was important enough for them to have been sent nationally 
in order to be displayed in public places such as market squares or city gates. It was the same 
case for the quarters that were despatched to various towns. The quartering of a corpse had a 
two-fold purpose. First, it identified the criminal as a traitor and second, it provided a four-part 
message to be despatched around the kingdom.121 In 1403 after the death of Henry ‘Hotspur’ 
Percy at Shrewsbury his quarters were sent to London, Newcastle on Tyne, Bristol and Chester 
with his head also, the cost of which was to be met by the exchequer.122 Presumably his head 
was sent to Chester as he had been justiciar of Cheshire and maybe due to the connection that 
the town and county had had with the late Richard II. After the death of Hotspur’s father, Henry 
Percy, at Bramham Moor in 1408 his severed head was sent to London whilst his quarters were 
despatched to York, Newcastle, Lincoln and Berwick which were all areas of Percy support.123 
In 1441 the clerk of Eleanor Cobham, duchess of Gloucester, who had been implicated in her 
use of witchcraft to try to kill Henry, was executed. His head was set upon London Bridge, 
whilst his quarters were sent to the centres of learning of Hereford, Oxford, York and 
Cambridge.124 
In a letter asking for expenses from two sheriffs of London to Henry VI after the 1450 
rebellion there is evidence of how important it was that these heads and quarters were 
despatched. Through the use of writs the various body parts were sent to named locations for 
the attention of the mayor or bailiff of the town. The costs of the carriage in this case were born 
by the sheriffs who were despatching parts as far away as Norwich, Coventry and Gloucester. 
The importance of taking these parts was stated quite unequivocally ‘for and by cause that 
unneth any persones durst nor wolde take upon hem the caridge of the seyd hed and quarters 
for doute of her lyves’.125 This emphasised the importance that the crown placed on ensuring 
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that the population saw the outcome of rebellion – it was an important means of control or 
integration, albeit through the use of terror and subjugation. 
There is ample evidence in the chronicles and other primary sources of the display of 
body parts, but for these heads and quarters to be successful as propaganda they needed not 
only to be seen, which they were when so prominently displayed, but also to be identified for 
the audience to appreciate the political significance. The heads were displayed on poles at a 
great height above London Bridge potentially at a height that would have made identification 
quite problematic.126 If this was the usual case, and we have no evidence to confirm or deny 
the height of the poles, then this raises a number of questions about the viability of displaying 
these heads as a means of propaganda. First, some of the heads would already be in a 
‘distressed’ state by the time that they arrived and would therefore be difficult to identify. 
Second, there is no evidence of any form of written identification at street level. However, there 
would appear to have been an oral method of communication to identity the victim. Froissart 
detailed the journey of Sir Hugh Despenser in 1326 from Berkeley castle to Hereford where 
‘he was dragged on a hurdle through all the streets  ... to the sound of horns and trumpets’.127 
In 1382 Walsingham talked of adultresses being paraded around London ‘with flautists and 
pipers preceeding them’ apparently to ensure that as many people as possible could see them.128 
This indicated that this was a proven method employed to draw people out from their homes 
and work to view a spectacle. Proclamations would have been read out by the sheriff whose 
responsibility it was to organise the carriage and display of heads and quarters. It was necessary 
for an accompanying text to be read out so that the people could understand both the crime and 
the punishment and probably the name of the victim, particularly when they were often 
geographically distant from the site of the execution. There was the likelihood that the original 
proclamation would have posted up or some other written notice. When carried out thoroughly 
and legally there is little doubt that the use of executions had the desired impact but when it 
                                                 
126 Home, Old London Bridge, frontispiece. 
127 Froissart, Chronicles, trans. & ed. Geoffrey Brereton (London: Penguin Books, 1978), p. 
44. The horns and trumpets were also played as he was led through the towns between 
Berkeley castle and Hereford. Mancini describes a scene in 1483 where: ‘the Genoese began 
to sound trumpets and horns, and hoisting the king’s banners they announced that they would 
obey the protector’, the use of the trumpets was obviously meant to draw attention to the 
sight of the banners. See Mancini, p. 87.  
128 St. Albans, p. 613. From the accounts of the Mercers of London there is evidence that 
trumpeters were regularly used to accompany the mayor or sheriff. See Lisa Jefferson, The 
Medieval Account Books of the Mercers of London, II (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2009), pp. 698, 
728, 986. 
85 
 
was regarded as excessive then it could have a negligible, even negative effect in controlling 
opposition. 
The human cadaver had many uses for a medieval audience as has been shown in the 
form of heads and quarters. However, it also had propagandist merit, whilst still intact, in 
proving the death of certain prominent individuals. After the battle of Barnet the Lancastrians 
perpetuated the rumour that both Warwick and Montagu were still alive but Edward IV was 
astute enough to ensure that their remains were publicly displayed at St. Pauls:  
Kynge Edwarde commaundyd bothe the Erle of Warwikes body and the Lord 
 Markes body to be putt in a carte  ... and there commaundede the seide ij 
 bodyes to be layede in the chyrche of Paulis, one the pavement, that every 
 manne myghte see them.129 
Apparently this display drew in many people, and their corpses ‘were seen by many 
thousands’.130 Following a letter from Thomas Fauconberg requesting entry to the city, 
believing that the earl of Warwick was still alive, the mayoralty replied thus: 
they assured him that the Earl was dead, and that his corpse, as well as that of his 
brother the Marquis Montagu, had been exposed to view for two days in St. Paul's.131 
It was also a matter of respect and chivalric etiquette that the bodies of Warwick and 
Montague were displayed unmutilated for public viewing. The Historie of the Arrivall 
explicitly stated that the bodies were to be displayed in order that ‘the people shuld not be 
abused by feyned seditiows tales’ and to quell any rumours that the earl was alive which may 
have led ‘to newe murmors, insurrections, and rebellyons, amongst indisposed people’.132 This 
confirmed that this was a necessary visual deterrent against further unrest and this public 
display of whole corpses, heads and assorted limbs was an effective method of exerting 
discipline through the use of physical propaganda. The murder of Henry VI finally ended a 
period of uncertainty for Edward IV and by displaying Henry VI's body Edward IV was literally 
                                                 
129 Warkworth, p. 17. 
130 John Adair, ‘The Newsletter of Gerhard Von Wesel, 17 April 1471’, Journal of the 
Society for Army Historical Research, XLVI (1968), 65-69; the letter from the citizens of 
London to the Bastard of Fauconberg cited by J. R. Scott, ‘Letters Respecting Fauconberge’s 
Kentish Rising in 1471’, Archaeologia Cantiana, XI (1877), 359–363.  
131 'Folios 71 - 80: Aug 1470 - ', in Calendar of Letter-Books of the City of London: L, 
Edward IV-Henry VII, ed. Reginald R. Sharpe (London, 1912), pp. 91-100. British History 
Online http://www.british-history.ac.uk/london-letter-books/voll/pp91-100 [accessed 22 
March 2016]. 
132 Historie, p. 21. 
86 
 
laying the ghost of not only the king but the Lancastrian cause to rest as Warkworth described: 
‘and one the morwe he was chestyde and brought to Paulys, and his face was opyne that every 
manne myghte see hyme; and in hys lyinge he bledde one the pament ther’.133 This was 
integration propaganda with the sole aim of confirming the end of the Lancastrian regime and 
the consolidation of the Yorkist dynasty. 
Possibly, one of the most controversial physical displays of a dead monarch was that of 
Richard III. In the above examples there was an emphasis on the revelation of the king’s face 
for all to see. However, in the case of Richard III Henry Tudor had the naked body of the king 
slung over a horse and his face hidden from public view.134 It has been suggested that this was 
a cleverly constructed piece of propaganda that showed Richard’s curved spine or hunchback 
to its greatest effect.135 If this was Henry’s motivation it did indeed reinforce the supposed 
wickedness of Richard with his crook back and crook mind that became a Tudor myth 
immortalised by Shakespeare. It also served to emphasise the end of the Yorkist dynasty and 
the legitimacy of the Tudor regime in ridding the country of an evil and illegitimate monarch.  
The display of both heads and quarters was a regular and accepted method of visual 
communication, used by both the crown and the opposition. The despatching of various heads 
and quarters to towns sent a message to the inhabitants not to rebel. In the case of a monarch it 
was an accepted part of kingship in maintaining order and applying justice. However, if taken 
too far this relationship with the population could be damaged as may be seen from Richard 
II’s treatment of the Kentish rebels. However, although the action was not popular it was 
effective as the region caused little trouble afterwards. Executions by the crown were seen as 
a means to integrate whereas when used by rebels they were meant to agitate the population. 
These events took place in a public space reinforcing the importance of public opinion and the 
need to claim authority and communicate with as large an audience as possible. Events such as 
executions were brief but the subsequent display of heads and quarters sent a longer term 
message to the polity. 
Public appearances and processions.  
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This next section discusses the impact of the living body on the medieval psyche in 
terms of its ability to propagandise its audience in a variety of ways. The physical 
manifestations of visual propaganda were expressed through various events, such as 
processions, military displays or civic entries. These public appearances were more adaptable 
than the traditional media of art. Implicit in an examination of this propaganda is the 
relationship between performer and his audience. Nicholas Howe emphasised the importance 
of this bond when he stated that ‘each [ceremony] must have a clear understanding of the 
expectations shared by its audiences or witnesses, especially if it is to make them complicit in 
its work’.136 This suggests that great care was taken in the preparation and execution of these 
occasions to ensure that the correct message was being conveyed. G. L. Thompson’s 
description of events in France was as applicable to fifteenth-century England when he stated: 
Political attitudes can be formed not only by what people read or see or want, but also 
by events in which they share. It is interesting to examine the political connotations of 
any large-scale group activity that offers scope for the distribution of information, the 
generation of emotional excitement and the organisation of considerable numbers of 
people.137 
Events such as coronations had a limited audience whereas civic entries reached a far 
larger and more varied audience.138 Caroline Barron suggested that ‘increasing care was taken 
both to write the messages …and also to make a written record of the event’, leading to the 
conclusion ‘that the political messages were perceived to be important’.139 Margaret Aston too 
saw the value in the secular image to the king and government as ‘it elevated through splendour 
and its representations served to instil respect and evoke attitudes and gestures of worship’.140 
Processions could be used for either integration, especially important for any usurping 
monarch, or for agitation purposes. Howe emphasised that ceremonies were important as a 
means of communicating with an illiterate population and as such prove that this medium was 
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an important method of propaganda.141 The display of magnificence seen in processions and 
journeys around the kingdom was an effective propagandist method, that both reassured the 
subjects that all was well or, alternatively imposed the power of the monarch in areas of unrest. 
Anglo said of the public appearances of monarchs that ‘their symbolic function was to affirm 
the abstract permanence of kingship’ whilst also legitimising the current dynasty.142 William 
Leahy regarded the royal entry during the Elizabethan age as an event specifically organised 
by the urban elite whereas the royal progress was an occasion for the monarch to visit the 
remoter, often rural, areas of his kingdom.143 All of these events, where the monarch was seen 
by his public, were traditionally ritualistic but implicit within the established framework was 
an inherent political awareness by everyone involved.  
The coronation of a monarch was an established visual confirmation of a new king’s 
inheritance. Although it was only witnessed by an exclusive audience it was the composition 
of the spectators that was important in terms of integration propaganda amongst the ruling 
elite. As regent of France, the Duke of Bedford, being an astute propagandist, organised Henry 
VI’s two coronations, first in England in 1429 and then in France in 1431. These were obvious 
opportunities for English integration propaganda to promote the dual monarchy.144  
However, there was always the problem of misinterpretation, especially abroad, as 
recorded by the author of the Parisian Journal when the Queen of England arrived at the Bois 
de Vincennes in 1422 and two ermine cloaks were carried in front of her the ‘people did not 
know what to make of this’.145 Any propagandist message was lost in this visual ritual although 
it was probably more to do with cultural differences. 
Another opportunity for the king to be regally attired in public was Crown-wearing 
which became increasingly important as it emphasised, visually at least, the wearer's position. 
Traditionally kings went ‘crowned’ at Epiphany, Christmas, Easter, Whitsun, All Saints’ and 
both the feasts of St. Edward, that is all the major dates in the English calendar.146 Monarchs 
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with a weak claim to the throne, particularly usurpers, used these opportunities as ‘an appeal 
to the visual senses’ in an effort to integrate themselves with the public.147 The Crowland 
Chronicle emphasised that in 1470 when Henry VI was restored to the throne: ‘ceremonially 
and in public, the crown was placed on his head’.148 Strohm cited an example from the 
‘Vitellius chronicle’ about Henry VI’s failure to appear ‘crowned’ on St. Edward’s day and 
how it was commented upon thus confirming the importance of the event.149 As C. A. J. 
Armstrong pointed out, both Edward IV and Richard III, ‘went crowned’ at times of relative 
calm and not just when their position was in danger’.150 This marked a change in the nature of 
being ‘crowned’ from religious to a more political aspect. It was a visual statement of dynastic 
politics rather than religious commemoration. This was especially important for Richard III 
whose claim to the throne was weak. The more opportunities that there were to see the king 
crowned confirmed his position and further entrenched the dynasty in people’s memory.  
The civic entry was primarily an opportunity for a town to show fealty to their monarch, 
either for services rendered or in the hope of recognition. Kipling regarded the civic entry as 
becoming more of a drama than a ceremony.151 This had implications for the effectiveness of 
the event as propaganda because the centrality of the royal ritual was reduced whilst the role 
of the citizens gained more importance.  
In August 1392 there was a visual reconciliation, in the form of a pageant, between the 
city of London and Richard II. Most probably organised with a great deal of court involvement 
this pageant had a defined political message for the London audience. According to Caroline 
Barron the ‘message was that it was the duty of the Londoners to show humility and loyalty to 
their magnificent and magnanimous sovereign’.152  
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This event was very much about Richard asserting his authority and kingship through 
the use of physical integration propaganda. The message to the Londoners was very clear, that 
was, he was the king and would not tolerate any further rebellion on their part. An 
unconventional royal entry may be seen in 1456 in Coventry when Margaret of Anjou entered 
the town with Prince Edward but without Henry VI. Margaret was visually assuming the role 
of Queen regent in a political move to maintain the Lancastrian grip on the throne during one 
of Henry’s bouts of illness.153 By the use of the Jesse Tree as an emblem associated with royal 
entries, both Margaret and Coventry were seeking to maintain the Lancastrian crown. It was 
an attempt at integration propaganda in the face of growing unrest and opposition among 
Yorkist supporters.  
In the case of France, Thompson saw these events as a moment when ‘politics and 
ceremonial combined to bring affairs of state within the experience of even the humblest 
citizens of Paris’.154 It was an opportunity for the whole communitas to be brought together in 
a participatory situation of mutual recognition – both audience and player aware of the 
importance of their role in the maintenance of the social hierarchy within the realm. 
Another opportunity for the whole nation to see the king was provided when there was 
a royal progress through the countryside. Anglo’s argument that royal progresses were just an 
excuse to escape the plague appears unconvincing if one considers, for example, the progress 
of Henry V in 1421.155 This particular progress had a definite political agenda: first, to raise 
money for the campaign in France, second, to remind the regions of who their monarch was as 
he had been absent for over three years, and finally, to introduce his new French queen. Henry 
visited areas of unrest, such as Bristol and Shrewsbury.156 He also visited the shrines of 
Beverley, Bridlington and Walsingham which led the chroniclers to focus upon this trip as a 
‘pilgrimage’.157 The tangible results of this tour were the loans that were raised, with the largest 
number of loans raised where Henry had visited.158 The physical and visual propagandist 
benefit of seeing the king had worked. The presence of Katherine for part of the journey would 
have served to illustrate, physically, the dual monarchy and the success of the French campaign. 
                                                 
153 Kipling, Enter the King, pp. 67-8. 
154 Thompson, Paris and Its People, p. 204. 
155 Anglo, Images, p.107. 
156 E. F. Jacob, The Fifteenth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 194. 
157 James Doig, ‘Propaganda and Truth: Henry V’s Royal Progress in 1421’, Nottingham 
Medieval Studies, XL (1996), 167-179. See p. 173 for Henry’s route.  
158 Ibid., p. 172. 
91 
 
It would have encouraged national pride and with it the desire to support continued success in 
France. This progress encapsulated the essence of how powerful an effect physical propaganda 
could have and how important it was in the late medieval period.  
These various processions all had one common object and that was for the king to be 
viewed by the public. The traditional events such as coronations were all the more important 
as integration propaganda when an usurpation had taken place. Royal progresses, on the other 
hand, often had a more prosaic purpose, that is, the raising of money or troops for war, that is, 
agitation propaganda. The latter in particular, were devised with a specific outcome in mind 
and thus emphasised the accepted use of visual propaganda as integral to politics. Even when 
the king had returned to London his visit the visual spectacle would continue to influence the 
audience through the communal sharing of the event and its incorporation into local memory. 
As in life, death provided opportunities for political propaganda. Sydney Anglo 
regarded funerals as of greater importance than a coronation.159 An opportunity to emphasise 
dynastic pretensions could not be missed, even if it involved a corpse. The imagery of death 
had an important place in medieval society as may be seen from the extravagant funeral 
procession of Henry V.160 Two examples reveal the importance of this visual ceremony to the 
politics of the period; the burial of Richard II and, second the reburial of Richard, duke of York. 
The former had been a legitimate king and the latter pretensions of being one but both funerals 
had important political messages to convey to the polity. The burial of Richard II will be 
discussed in the case study on Henry IV below.161 
The reburial of Richard duke of York in 1476 by his son Edward IV was an example of 
physical genealogical propaganda to emphasise the Yorkist claim to be the legitimate heirs to 
the throne. The late reburial of the duke and his son, the earl of Rutland, after their deaths at 
the battle of Wakefield in 1460 may be due to the turmoil of the early years of Edward’s reign, 
and it was not until he had regained the throne in 1471 that Edward felt sufficiently secure to 
undertake the task. The procession took place in July 1476 starting in Pontefract, where the 
duke had initially been buried, and finished in Fotheringhay. It was a very extravagant cortège 
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that obviously was meant to be seen by as many people as possible.162 Edward IV ensured that 
every opportunity was taken to show that Richard duke of York had been the rightful king, thus 
confirming Edward as the legal heir to the throne. For example, an effigy of the duke was made 
for the occasion, an honour usually only reserved for a monarch or bishop.163 Banners 
displaying the arms of the duke together with the royal arms further reinforced the notion of a 
Yorkist dynasty.164 The elaborate hearse and accompanying peers of the realm together with 
large numbers of mourners were obviously designed to attract a large audience and to place the 
event within a nationwide memory. This impressive display of visual integration implied that 
Richard had been the legitimate heir and thus Edward IV had been justified in his usurpation 
of Henry VI.  
Given-Wilson speculated that few of the audience would have understood the 
symbolism but the effort that was taken to perform these events would suggest otherwise.165 
Again the impact of the spectacle on the population cannot be clearly determined from the 
textual sources but the fact that these events were so obviously designed to be seen suggests 
that they were expected to have an impact, particularly on the memory of the audience, through 
the participation in the rites. Both these funerals served to emphasise the dynastic legitimacy 
of the Lancastrian regime by Henry IV and the Yorkist dynasty by Edward IV. These visual 
spectacles were designed to reach and affect a larger audience more easily than, for example, 
the display of complex genealogies about dynastic descent. 
Propaganda that intimidated was regularly used at both home and abroad throughout 
the period. A monarch could, with a military display, impose his position in a more threatening 
manner either to instil fear into his foreign enemies or to restore order at home and likewise it 
could be used by the opposition. This intimidation may be regarded as a form of visual 
propaganda that could be effective at either integration or agitation. In 1387 the Appellants 
used such a show of physical propaganda: 
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the lords ... presented themselves to view as if they were about to engage in a struggle 
to the death, their lines drawn in battle-array and deployed so as to form wings. At news 
of this the mayor and aldermen promptly went out to give them a peaceable reception.166 
This event elicited a fast and favourable response from the city of London, perhaps 
more than a written appeal might have done.  
In the autumn of 1457 Henry VI was faced with a trio of opposition. First, rebellion by 
the Londoners, second the threat of French attack, and finally the Yorkist lords were exercising 
their might. In response to the situation a large number of archers, 13,000, were despatched to 
various locations around the capital to intimidate the citizens. However, the archers’ presence 
had a negative impact on the meeting of the great council called by Henry VI and no resolution 
to the disorder was forthcoming.167 In January 1458 another great council was called and it is 
interesting to note that the nobility arrived with large retinues, each trying to out-do the other, 
much to the worry of the Londoners.168 This reaction by the nobility shows that they were not 
going to be intimidated by either their peers or Henry. 
Another area overlooked as a means of propaganda was public humiliation which 
provided the opportunity to discredit your opponent to a wide audience. As Danielle Westerhof 
stated the chivalric nature of society was associated with both honour and shame ‘which 
exacerbated the dishonour of public humiliation’.169 The parading of defeated enemies was a 
great opportunity for integration propaganda. Edward’s parading of Margaret of Anjou after 
the battle of Tewkesbury was a very definite political statement: ‘Queen Margaret was captured 
and kept in security so that she might be borne in a carriage before the king at his triumph in 
London, and so it was done’.170 Edward was publicly making a statement about his success in 
defeating the Lancastrian regime and this humiliation of a proud, powerful and unpopular 
queen was performed with the intention of integrating the Yorkist regime. 
Humiliating one’s enemies did not always have to involve them being physically 
exhibited. Henry V was capable of being less than honourable in victory, for example, after the 
siege of Rouen he used explicit visual symbols to insult his conquered enemies: ‘and the king 
had a page behind him on a very handsome horse, carrying a lance to which near the blade he 
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had tied a fox's tail after the manner of a pennon, on which many wise people made remarks’.171 
The use of a fox's tail was a well-recognised symbol of defiance, and Henry was possibly 
mocking the French, even suggesting that they were fools.172  
The appearance of Henry VI provoked comment amongst the chroniclers on more than 
one occasion. In October 1470 Warkworth described the deshabille of Henry VI: ‘whiche was 
not worschipfully arrayed as a prince, and not so clenly kepte as schuld seme suche a prince’.173 
This observation suggested that Warkworth was expressing a view that Edward should have 
been more respectful towards Henry whilst in prison. However, only a few months later there 
was an event which has stimulated much comment from recent historians, the ‘Blue Gown’ 
event, when Henry VI appeared poorly attired in an old gown.174 The apparent dishevelled 
appearance of Henry VI on Maundy Thursday, 11 April, 1471 received various contemporary 
comments. The necessity of Henry VI’s appearance was the rapid approach of Edward IV 
towards London. The Great Chronicle of London gave an account of Henry VI being paraded 
around the streets of London with the Archbishop of York in an attempt to gain support for his 
continued readeption in 1471: ‘evyr he was shewid In a long blew goune of velvet as thowth 
he hadd noo moo to chaunge with’.175 Paul Strohm regarded the whole episode with scepticism 
regarding the text as ‘a narrative fabrication’.176 The Great Chronicle of London continued to 
say that Henry lost support with this appearance – quite the opposite of the supposed 
intention.177 This apparently reinforced Starkey's premise that the king's body and physical 
appearance were of political importance.178 What does this event have to say in terms of visual 
propaganda? First, that contemporary chroniclers referred to his appearance, and in the case of 
the Great Chronicle, stated that he lost support, suggesting that the king’s appearance was of 
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political importance. Interestingly, Richard Marks noted that John Blacman said that Henry 
was always modestly attired and: ‘rejecting expressly all curious fashion of clothing’.179 If 
Blacman was correct and Henry VI was usually dressed quite simply then why would his 
slightly untidy appearance have merited such comment from the chroniclers? The event 
perhaps stresses the distinction between the private attire of the king and the expectations of 
his public appearance which on the above occasions was not met. As Lancastrian propaganda 
it failed to impress the Londoners as they subsequently opened the gates to the returning 
Edward, a king who was always regally attired.  
Strohm started from the belief that the story was not true, written with hindsight to 
amplify the failings of Henry VI but suggests that the event was religious in nature rather than 
a traditional royal procession or a failed royal ‘progresse’.180 Starkey sought to defend the claim 
that the Lancastrian court was indigent in comparison with later Yorkist magnificence and 
states that this one event created this false impression. Although approaching the event from 
different perspectives they both agreed that visual magnificence was integral to kingship and 
was expected by the public audience. However, what is perhaps overlooked is whose idea it 
really was for the procession. Was it really a poorly organised attempt to rally Lancastrian 
support in the face of the advancing Yorkists or more likely, the wishes of a religious but 
mentally unstable king to perform his Maundy Thursday duties? If Margaret or Warwick had 
been in London it is unlikely that Henry would have been allowed to appear in public dressed 
so poorly and without a fitting retinue. This suggests that Henry was exercising his own royal 
will and there was no-one present from preventing him from appearing in public 
inappropriately dressed. 
Not all of these events had a positive impact and some were actually counter- 
productive in terms of the response that they elicited. One such example was during Henry 
VI’s reign which was the trial for heresy of Eleanor Cobham, duchess of Gloucester in 1441. 
This event was an extremely visual affair including the recantation of Roger Bolingbroke, her 
clerk, who later suffered a heretic’s execution and his head was put on London Bridge whilst 
his quarters were despatched to known centres of Lollardy.181 For her part in the alleged plot 
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against Henry, Eleanor was forced to walk with a burning taper in her hand from Westminster 
to various churches over the following three market days. This ensured that the streets were 
busy, and she would have been witnessed by large crowds, further compounding her 
humiliation. There has been speculation that despite her personal unpopularity, the real 
intended victim of this performance was her husband, the duke of Gloucester. His enemies 
Suffolk and Beaufort were believed to have been behind her very public and extended 
punishment.182 However, the English Chronicle revealed that perhaps the theatre of it did not 
have the desired effect: ‘Þe whiche penaunce sho fullfilled and did full mekely, so þat þe pepull 
hadde off hir grete compassion’.183 This was a complex visual event involving witchcraft with 
politics and the intention must have been to raise sympathy for Henry VI whilst agitating 
certain factions to oppose Gloucester, although it appears only to have raised sympathy for 
Eleanor.  
Physical propaganda was the obvious and sometimes brutal companion to that of the 
art genre. It communicated on a large-scale and involved the participation, either physical or 
visual, of the audience. Executions, processions and coronations were part of medieval life but 
this should not diminish their power in affecting public opinion and behaviour. Like art, these 
visual events sought to agitate or integrate according to particular circumstances and drew in 
the population through their attendance. 
Case Study: Henry IV and the use of visual propaganda. 
Having examined the role of visual propaganda it would now be appropriate to see how 
this genre was used as a means of political communication by Henry IV. Henry IV used various 
methods of visual propaganda both before and during his reign. It can be argued that his success 
in overthrowing Richard II in 1399 was in part down to the effectiveness of his use of visual 
propaganda and the comparatively limited effort of Richard, in responding. Henry was able to 
communicate messages about his own strength and purpose, and about his capacity to rule 
effectively, contrasted with the weakness of Richard, primarily through visual media. 
As discussed art was symbolically powerful especially when combined with heraldry. 
At times of political unrest these signs could be regarded as controversial as seen in 1399 when 
Bolingbroke destroyed an example of the royal livery and in doing so perhaps made known his 
                                                 
182 John Watts, Henry VI and the Politics of Kingship (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 190.  
183 English Chronicle, p. 64. 
97 
 
intention to take the throne: ‘above the gates of Warwick castle [was depicted] a crowned hart 
of stone, which at that time was the said King Richard's livery,  ... the duke of Lancaster ordered 
them to be knocked down, which was done’.184 Bolingbroke was essentially eradicating the 
physical symbol of Richard and at the same time removing the opportunity for an audience to 
remember Richard, in a form of damnatio memoriae.  
The above action by Henry reveals his awareness of the benefits of art to influence 
popular perception and as such incorporated them into his own methods of political 
communication. Henry’s usurpation left him in a vulnerable position and the problem of the 
distribution of livery was indicative of this. In the first year of Henry IV’s reign a statute was 
passed forbidding the lords from distributing badges and again in 1401 a demand was made by 
Parliament that the giving of livery badges should be abolished except for the King.185 As Usk 
recorded: 
It was also decreed that in future the lords of the realm should not give any suit or 
livery of cloth, or badges, or especially of hoods, to anybody except those servants 
who remain continuously in their households, because of the numerous seditions 
which the realm had undergone as a result of such practice.186 
The Percies were certainly using their badge of a crescent as a method to agitate men 
in order to defend their northern castles.187 In the summer of 1404, with the possibility of Percy 
rebellion Henry IV issued a directive that stated that only the king’s livery badge was allowed 
to be worn.188 This was an attempt to try and limit the Percies’ building up a large affinity with 
which to attack Henry. 
The importance of the legislation against liveries was reflected in the level of penalties 
imposed for not proclaiming swiftly, for example Henry IV’s proclamation to the sheriff of 
York stated he was liable to a £1000 fine if he did not fulfil his duty to proclaim against the 
wearing of liveries.189 It may be fair to assume that the level of the fine was directly related to 
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the importance of the proclamation suggesting that the livery issue was extremely contentious. 
However, the fact that so many badges have been discovered suggests that these restrictions 
were largely ignored.190 The rest of Henry IV’s reign appeared untroubled by the issue as Saul 
stated ‘the problem had solved itself: the badges had won Henry the support that he needed to 
overcome the opposition, thus enabling him to reduce his dependence on them’.191 
Henry used the livery collar as a counter to the above problems as according to Chris 
Given-Wilson he was positively profligate with his issuing of livery collars.192 Given-Wilson 
saw the use of the SS collar as a major part of Henry’s integration propaganda.193 This suggests 
that Henry, short of funds for traditional patronage, sought to use livery collars as a form of 
visual currency to establish his presence around the nation. These collars were a mark of 
prestige which would have been very influential in legitimising and establishing Henry’s 
regality amongst an elite audience. 
Henry’s use of visual propaganda was not restricted to the physical genre which could 
only really be used sporadically, he also realised the necessity of adopting the more permanent 
method of art in a public space as may be seen in Canterbury and York Minster. Richard Marks 
found it unsurprising that Henry IV used visual media to promote the Lancastrian dynasty as 
natural heirs.194 Marks cited the example of the pulpitum of Canterbury as a work of 
monumental art representing genealogical propaganda. The statues of previous kings at 
Canterbury all connected the Anglo-Saxon monarchs of Ethelbert and Edward the Confessor 
together with Richard II. The link to Richard II was to persuade the viewer that Henry IV was 
his rightful successor.195 Richard adopted the same approach at York Minster, a site which 
would influence a large audience. In 1403 Henry donated a window at York Minster which had 
a definite integration theme within its design. The use of David and Saul was a biblical simile 
for the relationship between Henry, his grandfather, Edward III and Richard II. Sarah Brown 
regarded this as propaganda intended to reinforce the Lancastrian claim to the throne.196 The 
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siting of this window in the North aisle would have ensured that it was seen by a large audience, 
the Minster providing a large space for political propaganda. These two examples, at two of 
the most important religious centres in the country, are also geographically influential at a 
strategic level; Canterbury for support against the French and York as a bastion against the 
Scots. As well as legitimising his usurpation through genealogical imagery Henry was 
emphasising his right to the throne to an influential clerical audience, whose support he would 
require. 
 It has been demonstrated that Henry was quite astute when it came to the use, 
distribution and control of art as propaganda. In the case of physical propaganda he appears 
to have been as efficient. As Henry Bolingbroke he made unashamed displays of military 
strength, as the Monk of Evesham emphasised describing Bolingbroke's entry into Bristol: 
‘[His] followers went on to Bristol where, with about 100,000 fighting men in all, they made 
a splendid display of themselves and their arms and weaponry in front of the town and 
castle’.197 Bolingbroke continued his journey, reaching Chester where ‘he remained for 
several days displaying himself and his military might in splendid fashion to the people of the 
town’.198 This was a particularly astute piece of political propaganda as Chester was a centre 
of Ricardian support. Although Henry was still only claiming that he wanted his inheritance 
his approach to Richard at Conway was more suggestive of his ulterior motive: ‘the duke of 
Lancaster arrived with his large and powerful army, which he drew up in awe-inspiring 
manner in full view of the king’.199 The show of strength and use of intimidation propaganda 
by Bolingbroke must have had a psychologically damaging effect on Richard's supporters 
and was further confirmed by the relative ease with which Henry subsequently took the 
throne. 
Bolingbroke used openly visual methods to publicly humiliate Richard II during August 
1399 when returning to London: ‘not once during this time was the king allowed to change his 
clothes; during all the time that he rode through these towns he was dressed in the same simple 
set of garments’.200 Richard was not displayed as a king and therefore his authority as perceived 
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by those who saw him was no longer credible. It appeared that Bolingbroke took a systematic 
approach to the visual destruction of Richard’s kingship before openly declaring his intentions 
regarding the throne. The fact the event merited such a comment from the chronicler was 
significant. This suggested that such behaviour had overtones of a political nature and, given 
the language used, was in the manner of a deliberate ‘staging’, of power and intent by 
Bolingbroke. This was not simply a practical movement of armed men, it carried an underlying 
message to those that witnessed the event, and the suggested length of the display further 
intimated that Bolingbroke wanted as many people as possible to see Richard and understand 
the messages being conveyed. Walsingham stated that Richard was very much a broken man 
by the time he reached London and that he understood the power of visual propaganda ‘for he 
had asked not to be exhibited to the citizens of London since he had been led to believe that 
they were taking great pleasure in his downfall’.201 A contradictory note to this journey is 
expressed by Walsingham who stated that when they visited religious houses Bolingbroke 
ensured that ‘they showed due kingly respect for the king’ and that he ‘always deferred to the 
king, standing behind him’.202 This was probably a conscious effort by Bolingbroke to promote 
his own piety, and thus suitability to be a king, by showing respect to the current monarch and 
hoping to gain the support of the church. 
When Henry came to the throne as the duke of Lancaster he had a large personal fortune 
and retinue at his disposal and consequently stated that he would not impose the burden of 
taxation on his subjects to the level of Richard II. Henry made a public display of burning the 
blank charters that had been so unpopular during the reign of Richard II, he ‘brente openli atte 
London all the blacke charteres þat Kynge Richard and his counseall hadde compelled men to 
seall’.203 This act was an attempt to symbolically ‘burn’ the past and initiate a new era of 
Lancastrian fiscal probity. The dramatic display of flames and smoke would have spoken to a 
public who felt impoverished by the previous regime more than the spoken word. 
At this point Henry was showing himself to be quite accomplished in using visual 
techniques to communicate with his subjects, he was in fact becoming quite the showman 
which he further took advantage of with his coronation ceremony. An usurping monarch’s 
                                                 
response of a man who knew that he was defeated or as the calculated response of a man 
wanting to exhibit his humble side. 
201 Walsingham in Chronicles of the Revolution, p. 124. 
202 Ibid., p. 124. 
203 English Chronicle, p. 26. 
101 
 
coronation would have been an important opportunity for political integration. In the case of 
Henry IV he sought to legitimise his claim through the introduction of the use of the oil 
associated with St. Thomas Becket. Burden saw this ‘as both a defensive reaction and a 
proactive response to the current political climate’.204 The coronation took place on a Monday 
rather than Sunday so it coincided with the feast day of Edward the Confessor adding more 
gravitas to the event. Burden notes the irony that the Confessor was closely associated with 
Richard II.205 Henry by setting a new precedent was seeking to legitimise the new Lancastrian 
dynasty and also establishing a connection to Canterbury. Henry would have hoped that the 
association with Becket and Canterbury would have created the image of a highly pious man 
and dull the memory and style of his usurpation. 
However, this was not the case and Henry IV was to be dogged by the persistent 
rumours of Richard's escape and subsequent hiding in both Wales and Scotland which led to 
the raising of support for Richard's re-instatement to the throne. Philip Morgan saw Richard's 
ghost as the focus of internal dissent and the mascot of external enemies in France, Scotland 
and Wales.206 This political turbulence caused by Henry’s usurpation meant that Richard 
required a funeral that showed enough respect to a former monarch but that also made it 
apparent that Henry was now king. Such was the murmuring amongst the population that in 
1400 Henry was forced to exhibit the body of Richard to quell rumours of his survival as Usk 
recorded: ‘the body of Richard, former King of England, was brought, with its face uncovered 
so that all could see it, to Saint Paul’s church in London’.207 Of course not everyone believed 
what they saw and later perception has been influenced by the chroniclers and other sources. 
Even the displaying of Richard's body did not quell the rumours. The French writer Creton was 
particularly sceptical about the identity of the corpse, believing it to be Richard’s chaplain, 
Maudeleyn who was of similar build: ‘nevertheless, they had the body of a dead man carried 
openly through the city of London, accompanied by the sort of pomp and ceremony that befits 
a dead king, saying that it was the body of the deceased King Richard’.208 However, the English 
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Chronicle expressed no such suspicion about the provenance of the body on display.209 Here 
was an example of two contrasting views affected by a variety of factors from personal 
allegiance, hearsay and of course propaganda. 
There is no evidence that an effigy of Richard was used during the funeral procession.210 
The absence of an effigy for Richard II implied that Henry IV was denying his legitimacy as a 
king and any dynastic continuity as effigies had been used both for Edward II and III.211 
Effigies were there to ‘rationalize’ the concept of the king’s two bodies.212 For the most part, 
however, Richard was accorded the respect of a full royal funeral including a celebration of 
exequies at St. Paul’s cathedral.213 For the visual propaganda to be believed the majority of the 
onlookers must have been convinced that it was Richard. Froissart stated that ‘over twenty 
thousand people, men and women, came to see King Richard lying there’.214 Where Richard’s 
‘royal’ funeral departed from the norm was in his quiet burial at the Dominican Friars in King’s 
Langley rather than at Westminster Abbey. This burial was a statement of his death rather than 
as his status as a former king. The politics of space meant that essentially Henry broke the 
dynastic link with Westminster and thus visually de-legitimised the Plantagenet claim to the 
English throne. He also removed the possibility of a shrine developing to Richard and thus the 
potential for Ricardian support to have a visual and tangible focus.  
Despite Henry’s attempt at integration through visual propaganda to prove that Richard 
was dead the rumours continued to circulate into the reign of his son. Perhaps if Henry had had 
a more convincing argument and use of propaganda to justify his usurpation, the cult of Richard 
II might not have had such a following. Amongst the commons at least the visual display of 
Richard poorly attired had the desired effect at the usurpation but it was not sufficient for the 
more educated classes as seen by the continuing opposition to his reign by the friars. 
In June 1403 Hotspur finally rose up against Henry but due to Henry’s fast reaction, on 
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the advice of George Dunbar, he was killed at Shrewsbury. The volte face of the Percy clan 
was a serious problem for Henry and he was keen to quell any rumours of Hotspur’s survival. 
Thus Henry had to resort to the public display of the body of Henry Percy after the battle of 
Shrewsbury as the English Chronicle reported in 1403: ‘& Ser Henris Percie hede wasse smytte 
off and sette vp atte Yorke leste his men wolde have seide þat he hadde ben alyve’.215 However, 
rumours of Percys survival provoked yet another act of physical propaganda by Henry as 
recorded by the Chronicle of London who stated that because ‘som peple seyde that Sr. Herry 
Percy was alyve, he was taken up ayen out of his grave, and bounden upright betwen to mille 
stones, that alle men myghte se that he was ded’.216 This use of visual integration by Henry 
was the second time that he had used this method to try to assert his authority suggesting that 
he had still not persuaded the population of his right to the throne through either the use of 
propaganda or his charisma. 
Despite his success at Shrewsbury, disquiet in the North still existed and resulted in the 
most infamous event of Henry’s reign, the rebellion and subsequent execution of Archbishop 
Scrope in 1405. The causes and circumstances of this Northern uprising will be examined in 
detail in chapter IV. However, it was indicative that the propaganda of the early part of Henry’s 
reign had not been successful in appeasing the unease about the nature of his accession. 
Scrope’s unsuccessful rebellion culminated in an act of visual propaganda that was to 
shock the nation, the execution of the prelate. Scrope was beheaded on 8 June 1405 in full view 
of the city of York on Pentecost Monday which also coincided with the feast of St William, the 
official saint of York Minster. This meant that there were large crowds, an audience, to witness 
this visual propaganda by Henry IV. Later the citizens of York used Henry as an audience to 
seek his forgiveness as described by the English Chronicle: ‘the citesens off the cite camme 
oute barefote and vngirte, with halterez aboute their neckes, and fell doune befor the kynge 
askynge mercye and grace’.217 Whether they were advised officially to make such a physical 
statement is not known but their action would certainly have been a deterrent to anyone else 
seeking to rebel against Henry IV. Henry apparently sent them away brusquely which suggests 
that he had not instigated this event and had no desire to take any further political advantage 
                                                 
215 English Chronicle, p. 34. 
216 Chronicle of London From 1089 to 1483, ed. Edward Tyrell & N. H. Nicolas (London: 
Longman, 1827), p. 88. 
217 English Chronicle, p. 36. 
104 
 
from the scene as visual propaganda.218 
Henry IV employed visual propaganda for a second time when in July 1405 he had the 
rebel heads displayed. They were exhibited in York, on Ouse Bridge and Bootham Bar, and 
Newcastle, Guisbrough, Yarm, Scarborough, Helmsley and Richmond.219 Henry IV’s 
reputation suffered as a direct result of the execution and Scrope became the focus of a cult. 
Despite the unpopularity of Henry’s actions, however, his ruthless and efficient dealing with 
the uprising meant that he subsequently experienced less unrest during his reign. Walker stated 
that Henry’s quelling of the uprisings was critical in allowing ‘a crisis-ridden regime to assume, 
… some appearance of permanence’.220 Alastair Dunn stated that Henry’s triumph in 1405 lost 
him enormous popular support and fuelled much anti-Lancastrian propaganda.221 The 
execution, brutal and unpopular as it was did apparently result in the cessation of complaint 
and rebellion against Henry, within England, at least.  
Throughout his reign Henry appeared to understand the importance of visual 
propaganda as a means of political communication: perhaps he felt more comfortable with it 
than perhaps other methods and certainly used it consciously to both agitate and integrate. The 
early examples cited above had mixed results but it was the execution of Scrope that finally 
enabled the integration of the Lancastrian dynasty. Henry used visual propaganda at the most 
critical moments of his reign and consciously chose to do so in an almost theatrical fashion. 
Conclusion. 
  Images can fail as well as succeed.222 
Binski’s comment is apposite within the context of this thesis as the main theme was 
always to ascertain the presence and use of the visual genre as either agitation or integration 
propaganda. Assessing the effectiveness of the method was always going to be hindered by a 
lack of evidence within the sources available. Occasionally, definite outcomes were recorded 
but often they were not, which made determining the efficacy of the genre difficult.  
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From the range of media examined it appeared that medieval society was exposed, on 
a daily basis, to a variety of visual symbolism. Whether the stained glass of great cathedrals, 
livery badges of a local lord, royal processions or public executions, they all ‘spoke’ to an 
audience who was able to decipher the various motifs. Visual communication was available 
not just to the privileged few as may be seen from the behaviour of rebels such as Cade. This 
in turn of course reinforced the notion that the whole populace was visually literate and having 
witnessed other visual events could then repeat them for their own cause. Richard Marks argued 
that the genealogical monumental art must have influenced public opinion, ‘or else the 
works…would not have been commissioned’.223 Within both art and physical lay the notion of 
memory which served an important role in integration propaganda, especially in the case of a 
usurping monarch. The physical genre provided opportunities for not only commemoration but 
also the communal participation of experiencing a royal progress or an execution. These visual 
events were designed to reinforce notions of hierarchy, social cohesion and justice. 
As seen in the case of Henry IV it was visual propaganda that was used to reinforce his 
claim to the throne, control unrest and project his kingship. Often these events were large-scale 
and designed to reach a varied audience and in his case they appeared to have had a mixed 
outcome. As Joel Burden stated ‘it is necessary to recognize that ritual does not weave its magic 
primarily through the written word, but rather through the impact of images, actions, sounds, 
gestures and spoken words on the full range of the human senses’.224 The fact that Henry placed 
so much faith in the use of visual propaganda and it formed an integral part of his programme 
of integration strongly suggests that it was an important part of late medieval political 
communication as Burden suggests. The use of so much visual communication by Henry IV 
validates Binski’s premise that ‘for an image to work in a way that is other than magical or 
apotropaic it must be seen’.225 Although Binski is referring to objects as art it is completely 
relevant to physical propaganda as they are all ocular means of communication. 
The regular and extensive evidence of the actual use of either art or physical 
propaganda as a means of communication suggests that the genre was a successful method. 
Despite the increase in literacy, particularly from the mid-fifteenth century, the role of visual 
media did not appear to diminish as the Tudor dynasty subsequently placed an increased 
emphasis on visual propaganda. Visual propaganda during the late medieval period was 
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extensive, varied and politically and strategically necessary. It communicated with the whole 
medieval communitas, revealing how large and diverse the political audience was, and how 
visual propaganda was an effective means of communication.  
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CHAPTER III 
Propaganda or Personality: The Greater Persuader? 
 
When he exhibited himself through the streets of the city he was scarcely watched by 
anybody, rather did they curse him with a fate worthy of his crimes.1 
 
The above quotation from Mancini raises the question of the importance of public 
support for the king, in this case Richard III. Was it important that Richard III appeared to be 
disliked? How integral was the monarch’s personality to the concept of kingship and its 
fulfilment? The previous two chapters have explored the nature and existence of propaganda 
during the period and suffice to say this is the opportunity to examine aspects of propaganda 
in the context of monarchical success or failure. The use of propaganda in relation to the king’s 
personality will be examined. 
The stability of the crown was dependent upon the support of not only the ruling classes 
but an ever increasingly politically aware populace. How was this support elicited simply 
through good kingship? What were the criteria and sources of evidence used by medieval 
society to judge whether a king was successful? If as Mark Ormrod said ‘the over-use or abuse 
of the royal prerogative simply to enhance the king’s authority or to silence his enemies was 
less and less tolerated as the political community came to expect and demand the observation 
of certain conventions’, this would suggest that public expectations of kingship increased as it 
became more defined within an ideological framework and less dependent on the person of the 
king.2  
Medieval kingship provided a framework that the monarch was expected to adhere to 
and, importantly it was known and understood by the whole polity. The king was regarded as 
God’s representative on earth and as such he was expected to display prudence, justice, 
temperance and fortitude. He was to be seen to defend both the realm and the church, as well 
as upholding justice. Ormrod argued that there was also a mythological element within the 
concept of kingship which was also bound in with the significance of heroic acts together with 
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the comparison of previous monarch’s attributes.3  
Recent historians of late medieval England have placed varying emphasis on the 
significance of the royal personality, but it has nonetheless been important for all of them. 
Bertram Wolffe believed that ‘on the personality of the king depended the tone and quality of 
the life of the realm’.4 The increasing development of and sophistication of, the engine of late 
medieval politics changed some of the established notions of kingship. Ormrod believed that 
these changes both increased the king’s power and also raised the expectations of society with 
regard to the ideal of successful ‘kingship’.5 John Watts’s study of kingship under Henry VI 
drew the conclusion that despite the formalisation of royal administration it was still the king 
himself who was ‘the real centrepiece of public life’.6 According to Watts the king had two 
basic tenets to adhere to; listen to counsel and to exercise his personal will.7 If he failed in these 
then it would be regarded as ‘weak kingship’ and could lead to political uncertainty or unrest.8  
David Starkey regarded personality as a key component of kingship.9 He divided the 
Tudor monarchs into one group of ‘distant’ monarchs and the other ‘participatory’. Although 
citing later rulers such as Elizabeth I as ‘distant’ and Charles I as ‘stiff, proud and prudish’ 
these different styles of monarchy are as applicable to the monarchs of the later medieval 
period.10 Their different personalities led them to interpret kingship in their own way which 
could have serious implications for the realm. The successful implementation of the law and 
public order ‘might depend quite simply on the strength, or otherwise, of the king’s own 
personality’.11 John Watts stated that the later medieval monarch ‘enjoyed considerable 
freedom in the management of his leading subjects, and it was his character and abilities, above 
all, which determined the fortunes of the polity during his reign’.12 J. R. Lander argued that ‘in 
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the absence of ideological issues which did not enter politics until the religious divisions the 
Reformation produced, the government was still mainly a matter of personalities’.13 Lander’s 
assertion that there was no ideology in fifteenth-century politics is in stark contrast to Watts’ 
viewpoint. If Lander was correct that personality was the dominant factor in medieval kingship; 
then monarchs such as Henry IV and Henry VI would have struggled to reign for as long as 
they did unless they fulfilled the ideals of good kingship in the eyes of the population.  
Propaganda. 
Scholars of the Tudor period such as Kevin Sharpe have looked at the Tudor monarchy 
with a modern eye to ‘brand positioning’ and regarded the monarchy as a business that had to 
establish itself securely in order to be successful.14 The period under discussion was much less 
sophisticated, in terms of the printed word or works of art, but the elemental desire to hold onto 
the throne was nevertheless as strong and consequently various methods of persuasion were 
employed. Sharpe’s premise that dynasties could only survive through the use of aggressive 
propaganda and self-publicity is more contentious and less pertinent to the later medieval 
period when the king’s personality was an important factor in the fulfilment of kingship 
together with other factors such as policy and good counsel. In this respect qualities such as 
the ‘charisma’ of the king or another noble are not tangible but could be very powerful 
motivators of support.15 
What were the responses of the various monarchs at times of crisis? Did they try to 
ameliorate the situation, or did they resort to autocracy as in the case of Richard II? Did a 
usurping monarch use different methods to ensure popular support? In particular, given our 
concerns here, how did the monarch’s personality, refracted through policy and concepts of 
good kingship, combine with the use of propaganda? 
Chronicles, letters and other primary sources provide an indication of the regard in 
which a monarch was held, as seen in the opening quotation, but they unfortunately tended to 
reflect the bias of the author. How did the medieval populace show its support for a king? A 
lack of opposition or rebellion during a reign may have been the result of a variety of factors; 
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good kingship, magnates busy at war in France, the rest of the population affected by plague 
or socio-economic factors, or successful propaganda. It is therefore preferable to assess the 
esteem with which the monarch was held by using a selection of more measurable parameters: 
the frequency of uprisings and their grievances; the raising of taxes and support for war. These 
parameters are by no means exhaustive in gaining an impression of the success of a monarch 
but rather act as an overall indicator.  
It may be useful to expand on the above parameters in terms of definition and scope. 
First, uprisings, either against the king or those around him were a reflection of the success of 
his kingship amongst the polity. Second, the raising of taxes together with support for war was 
indicative of the backing that the king and government had within the realm. The Hundred 
Years War, as well as requiring large amounts of finance, also provided opportunities for 
enrichment at a national and personal level. Although moved by patriotism, often as a result of 
royal propaganda, participants were regularly motivated by the possibility of financial reward 
from the ransoms and other booty that were part of medieval warfare. The role of the monarch’s 
personality in engaging public support or even leading the campaign had a crucial part to play 
in the public’s reaction to going to war. Before the parameters are examined a brief 
historiography of each monarch’s reign will be undertaken, through contemporaneous sources 
and also more recent historical analysis, considering the interactions of their personality and 
propaganda efforts, especially through the issues of uprisings and taxation. A series of case 
studies will follow providing a deeper examination of these parameters. 
Richard II.  
As the only child of the Black Prince, Richard was brought up in an environment that 
was heavily imbued in the chivalric and martial tradition. Unlike his father, however, he was 
slightly built with a sensitive and pious nature and this is perhaps why he sought to establish 
his own style of kingship. Richard II tried to change the parameters of recognised English 
medieval kingship and it was his more autocratic style that aroused so much ill-feeling among 
his subjects, in particular the magnates. A. R. Myers said of Richard that ‘he had a fatal 
incapacity to judge situations and read men’s minds’.16 
It has long been the accepted view that Richard was very unpopular throughout the 
kingdom. Much of this opinion was built on a foundation of Lancastrian propaganda which 
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was incorporated into the sources via the ‘Record and Process’.17 Although an invaluable, and 
often accurate source, the ‘Record and Process’, sought to exaggerate the negative aspects of 
Richard’s reign in order to justify Bolingbroke’s usurpation. Recent work by Christopher 
Fletcher argues that it was the influence of Arundel’s sermon, and the language he used, that 
affected subsequent interpretations of Richard’s character including the ‘Record and 
Process’.18 Arundel’s attack on Richard’s lack of masculinity was a theme taken up by not only 
contemporary commentators but also later historians. Fletcher stresses that as we are unable to 
assess contemporary views on perceived effeminacy it is difficult to gauge the public 
perception of Richard in terms of his manhood and ability to fulfil the ideal of kingship.19 
Although biased towards Richard the Westminster Chronicle was not afraid to describe 
his contrary nature or the repercussions of his decisions. In 1388 the chronicler recalled how 
Richard acted as a mediator between the duke of York and the duke of Gloucester: ‘and after 
this exchange they would have hurled themselves upon each other had not the king with 
characteristic mildness and goodwill, been quick to calm them down’.20 B. F. Harvey suggested 
that Richard's mood swings may have been a cunning ruse.21 Chris Given-Wilson felt that 
Richard’s approach to kingship ‘had a destabilising effect on the reign and made him too many 
enemies’.22 
Richard employed physical propaganda to enforce his own style of kingship and in 
particular a view of his own supremacy. In 1385 the Westminster Chronicler reported: ‘in his 
lust for glory and his eagerness to have from everybody the deference properly due to his 
kingship, the king allowed the archbishop (of Canterbury) to kneel before him to beg his 
pardon’.23 Elevating his presence visually was perhaps Richard’s way of trying to assert his 
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kingship whilst he still felt constrained by the influence of those around him.24 As well as using 
visual media Nigel Saul found that Richard also used language as a means of enhancing his 
status. Saul felt that the use of flattering vocabulary by Richard was in part to satisfy the 
theatrical side of his nature and to feed his ego. The objective behind the language was to 
portray himself as God-like.25 These examples provide evidence of a dichotomy within 
Richard’s personality. Whilst appearing autocratic and aloof there are suggestions of 
vulnerability and insecurity in this behaviour. 
The murder of Gloucester by Richard in September 1397 destroyed any vestiges of 
popularity and received universal condemnation. The author of the Julius B II chronicle 
emphasised the heinous nature of Gloucester's murder: ‘and with oute eny answere, or lawe, or 
processes, pryveley lete him be stranglyd, and unmanly be murdrid’.26 The death of Gloucester 
was certainly unpopular with the higher echelons of English society as it must have appeared 
to them that no-one was safe from the whims of a king exercising his prerogative without 
restraint. Froissart revealed how much harm the murder did to Richard’s standing as shown at 
a tournament at Windsor: 
but very few lords attended, for at least two-thirds of the English knights and squires 
were strongly hostile to the king, not only because of the banishment of the earl of 
Derby and the wrong done to his children, but also because of the murder of the duke 
of Gloucester at Calais and the execution of the earl of Arundel in London, so that 
none of the families of those nobles came to the feast. There was almost no-one 
there.27 
Periods of his reign were identified as the first and second ‘tyranny’, immediately 
suggestive of his style of kingship. Caroline Barron sought to redress the balance in her articles 
which set out to challenge the influence of hostile propaganda.28 Barron felt that Richard was 
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‘a king frightened into tyranny’.29 The verdict against Richard came in many ways from his 
apparent lack of support during Bolingbroke's invasion. Barron argued, however, that the 
rapidity of Bolingbroke's invasion and the fact that Richard had the greater part of his retinue 
with him in Ireland left him at a serious disadvantage ‘in the final analysis it was Richard's 
absence, not his unpopularity, which led men to desert him’.30 However, Barron was aware of 
his shortcomings and stated ‘Richard saw no reason to love or woo the common man; he never 
made any attempt to ‘sell’ his policies; none of the propagandist literature of the reign emanates 
from a pen deliberately inspired by the king’.31  
Chris Given-Wilson stated that, in the mid-1390's, there was little contemporary 
evidence that Richard was receiving any widespread opposition to his rule.32 If this was the 
case then it would appear that Richard was ruling in accordance with the norms of accepted 
kingship by the majority of the population. Gwilym Dodd argued that Richard was successful 
‘in transforming parliament from an instrument of opposition to a tool of royal power’, 
although he conceded that this was based on ‘fear and compulsion’ as the result of ‘political 
insecurity’ and Richard’s weak personality.33 
The Peasants’ Revolt of 1381 was the first rebellion during the minority of Richard II 
by the commons. It was a direct response by the commons to the imposition of a third poll tax 
within four years and the objectionable behaviour of the collectors. The rebels were expressing 
their dissatisfaction with Richard’s advisers and in particular John of Gaunt rather than against 
the king per se. As a fourteen-year-old, Richard showed incredible bravery at Mile End and 
Smithfield by engaging directly with the rebels in person. Froissart provided a colourful 
account of Richard’s meeting with the rebels: ‘he found there a threescore thousand men of 
divers villages and divers villages and of sundry countries in England, so the king entered in 
among them and said to them sweetly: “Ah, ye good people, I am your King: what lack ye?”’34 
His physical presence was his greatest propagandist weapon against the rebels for who 
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would really want to harm the king and second, one who was only a boy? Initially Richard 
showed great diplomatic skills in dealing with the rebels and was very conciliatory towards 
them, however, his attitude towards them altered and according to Saul he began to support 
their repression.35 This was probably due to the influence of the chancellor, William Courtenay 
who was not in favour of conciliation and organised a royal visitation to Essex in order to 
intimidate the rebels through the physical majesty of the king and his retinue.36 At this stage 
there is little personal animosity directed at Richard, it is rather at those around him who were 
ostensibly in charge. 
Opposition came closer to Richard with the complaints that he was surrounded by 
traitors whom he failed to remove. The Appellants who made the claim were Gloucester, 
Arundel, Warwick, Derby and Nottingham. In 1387 Richard had at first agreed with the appeal 
of the lords to rid himself of those advisors giving him poor advice but then and not for the first 
time Richard changed his mind and remained resolutely stubborn: ‘at this the members of the 
council  ... worked very hard to moderate to some extent the animosity he entertained towards 
the lords, but their concern had no effect: he displayed persistent opposition to their purpose’.37 
This was an uprising by a privileged few but was a reflection of their perception that Richard’s 
governance was being ruined by poor counsel the same complaint that the rebels had used in 
1381.  
In his early years Richard appeared to have been generous in his gifts to people without 
any forethought as to the origins of the finance: ‘having thus handed out his own substance to 
others, he had perforce to come down on the commons, with the result that the poor are loud 
in their complaints’ so commented the Westminster Chronicler in 1386.38 The Peasants’ Revolt 
had highlighted only too clearly the problem of raising money without antagonising the 
population. Of the four parliaments that met between November 1381 and February 1383 only 
one had allowed a grant. The parliaments of 1384 did pass a grant but it was very limited.39 In 
the summer of 1384 the French moved the location of the war to Scotland with the arrival of 
1,600 men.40 The summons had resulted in a large turnout which saw Richard at the head of an 
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army of 14,000 at the end of July 1385.41 The army was composed of men who were being 
paid, those owing feudal service and some with indeterminate reasons.42 According to Lewis 
the fact that Richard was leading his first military expedition may well have had an impact on 
the call to arms. It also provided the opportunity to establish the reputation of Richard who had 
become regarded as being rather indolent.43 By the late 1380’s and with no success to show for 
in the war with France the population was losing interest in the campaign. Richard too realised 
that peace would be beneficial on many levels, especially in reducing the imposition of taxes 
that was proving so unpopular. In November 1396 a new thirty year truce with France was 
concluded which allowed Richard to focus on domestic events. 
However, by August 1399 respect for Richard was declining, in some quarters, as the 
English Chronicle revealed how Thomas Arundel told Richard how his behaviour had affected 
the realm: ‘thou haste not reuled þi reame and thi peple, but haste spoiled thayme with false 
reysyngez off taxes and tallagez, not to the profette of thi reame but forto fulfill and satisfie thi 
cursed covetise and pride’.44 Arundel’s utter condemnation of Richard’s reign was correct on 
many points but was obviously also a bitter outpouring of personal resentment at his own 
treatment by Richard. Steel noted that in fact Richard’s loans were not as ‘forced’ as believed 
and this was an impression created by the chroniclers who were writing with Lancastrian 
prejudice.45 Barron concurred with Steel that the refusals to pay were quite extensive and 
concluded that ‘the element of force must have been negligible’.46 Tout emphasised that the 
Irish expeditions of 1394-5 and 1399 were expensive and accounted for the rise in the wardrobe 
expenses together with Richard’s ‘indulgence in generous personal expenditure’.47 
The pro-Ricardian Traison et Mort summed up the mixed feelings towards Richard as 
he was led through London to the Tower: ‘it is true that some pitied him much, and others were 
exceedingly glad, cursing him loudly in their language, and saying, “Now we are well avenged 
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of this wicked bastard who has governed us so ill”’.48 As Barron stated Richard ‘did not attempt 
to conciliate but to intimidate’.49 The evidence would suggest that Barron was correct in her 
interpretation that it was fear that drove Richard’s behaviour and in fact his efforts at taxation 
were no more onerous than previous monarchs.50 What was different was that he was followed 
by an usurper who sought to find justifications for his actions and drew upon Arundel’s 
condemnation of Richard’s financial policy and lack of manhood rather than the facts. 
Richard’s failure to establish his kingship in the eyes of his realm was a two-fold problem. 
First, the influence of those around him in the form of the continual council, whose own 
interests were paramount and whose lack of confidence in Richard’s ability to rule made the 
situation a self-perpetuating circle of failure. Second, Richard’s personality and artistic 
interests were regarded with suspicion and have formed a major part of traditional view of him 
being less than chivalric.51 There was much complaint about the expenditure of his court as 
Froissart described: ‘No King of England before had come within a hundred thousand florins 
a year of spending as much as he did on the mere upkeep of his court and the pomp that went 
with it’.52  
Richard tried to adopt his own version of kingship, based on a continental style, in an 
attempt to assert his character but this too failed to impress a more traditional English audience 
who felt that he was too aloof and distant. 
Henry IV. 
Henry IV became king in controversial circumstances although apparently with popular 
support. Capgrave described Henry in the following glowing colours: 
For I have known in my time that men of great literary attainments, who used to enjoy 
intercourse with him, have said that he was a man of very great ability, and of so 
tenacious a memory that he used to spend a great part of the day in solving and 
unravelling hard questions.53 
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As Henry Bolingbroke he had epitomised the chivalric tradition as a knight of honour 
at home and in both France and Prussia and also had a keen interest in the Crusades and had 
visited Jerusalem. J. L. Kirby described Henry as charming and friendly as well as 
accomplished in the arts.54 Henry's usurpation in 1399 had largely been heralded as a blessing 
as allegedly the nation could no longer tolerate Richard's supposed tyranny.55 In defence of 
Henry's usurpation, especially when judged against his previous exemplary behaviour as a 
knight and his great popularity, can we believe that it was out of his love for his country that 
he sought to rid England of Richard II or was it unabashed careerism? McFarlane asserted that 
Henry was an opportunist who acted out of self-interest and not constitutional principle.56 
Henry had initially only wished to re-claim his inheritance and to rid the court of Richard's 
favourites, so when he seized the throne it was a surprise even to some of his closest supporters, 
such as the earls of Northumberland and Westmorland who had made him swear at Doncaster 
that he would not take the crown.  
The St. Alban’s Chronicle related how Henry dealt with the disagreement between Lord 
Aumale and other lords that appeared to be descending into a fight at the trial of John Hall in 
1399: ‘he therefore rose to his feet, and restrained the lords, begging, admonishing, even 
commanding, that nothing should be undertaken that was contrary to the law’.57 Henry’s 
methods of quieting the lords showed a mixture of uncertainty in his position as well as the 
ability to assess the seriousness of the situation. During the early months of his reign Henry 
was notable for his magnanimity towards Richard’s former supporters and their families. In 
February 1400 Henry issued a general pardon to those who had been involved in the recent 
uprising.58  
And also the king hath ordeyned and graunted to alle his lieges generall pardon off alle 
maner ffelonyes, trespasses, escapes, and alle other except murder, rape off Wymen, 
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and notorye theffes’.59 
Whether this was astute integrational propaganda or natural clemency is not known. A. 
L. Brown believed that Henry’s actions were a mixture of necessity, insecurity and his liberality 
rather than a coherent policy of engendering support.60 In other words it would suggest that he 
was being reactive rather than proactive. Henry’s attitude towards his kingship, at the start of 
his reign, was in stark contrast to that of Richard, ‘his approach was collegial, and he accepted 
debate and criticism in parliament’.61 Henry’s conciliar approach to his kingship was revealed 
early in his reign by the St. Albans Chronicle: ‘in order to ascertain more clearly the whole 
truth of the matter in the information laid before him, so that he might arrive at the best and 
most equitable judgement’.62 
The pivotal moment in Henry’s reign was the series of rebellions 1403-5 connected 
with the machinations of the Percy family.  Henry appeared to lose his measured approach to 
his rule, the culmination of which was manifested in his use of physical propaganda, with the 
execution of Archbishop Scrope in 1405.63 From this point on Henry suffered from ill health 
that continued throughout the rest of his reign which had a serious impact on his ability to rule 
during the second half of his reign, particularly during the Long Parliament of 1406.64 Bennett 
emphasised the impact that his illness had on the public’s perception of him ‘that his sickness 
was seen as a reflection on the moral legitimacy of his rule’.65  
Henry’s early popularity was reflected in the response to a proclamation in June 1400 
to the sheriff of York and other counties and the palatine of Lancaster, to raise troops: 
To the sheriff of York. Order under pain of forfeiture upon sight etc. to cause 
proclamation to be made on the king's behalf, that all knights, esquires and yeomen ... 
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shall under pain of losing their fees etc. make haste and draw to the king's presence at 
York or elsewhere, ... furnished and arrayed for war with armour, horses and 
otherwise, every man as his estate requires, to march with the king on his service to 
Scotland for defence of the realm.66 
The Scottish campaign of August 1400 saw Henry raise an army of 13,085 soldiers, 
one of the largest raised in the period suggesting that the above proclamation had been 
successful.67 Henry’s financial restrictions meant that the majority of this army was recruited 
from both royal retainers and the duchy of Lancaster and a single payment rather than indenture 
was given to the retinue leaders.68 A. L. Brown believed that Henry’s inability to find a 
compromise between prudent fiscal policy and financial reward was a major cause of 
discontent.69  
In 1401 Usk reported on the unpopularity of Henry's new taxation: ‘in this parliament 
and convocation the clergy granted the king a tenth and a half, and the people granted him a 
fifteenth of all their goods, as well as two shillings from each tun of wine and eight pence from 
twenty shillings’ worth of other merchandise, albeit with much ill will and dark mutterings by 
both clergy and people’.70 This was blatantly a reversal of Henry’s promise at the start of his 
reign not to tax the nation and thus a perceived failure of good kingship. The condition that 
Henry had to accept, to amend his administration, was a strong indication that his choice of 
ministers was not approved of by the commons.71 A case heard before King's Bench in 1402 
highlighted the growing dissatisfaction with Henry's reign and his perceived misuse of 
finance.72 
However, in 1403 Henry managed to extract a grant of a tenth and a half tax from the 
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clergy, a fifteenth from the commons and a tenth from the townsmen without opposition.73 
Henry used much of this revenue for his household and by 1404 the commons were 
complaining vociferously:  
And because of these unneccessary expenses and several others, and because of the 
many gifts of castles, lands and lordships, and of annuities, which have been made and 
given unduly and unwisely, and especially because of the great costs and expenses of 
the king's household.74 
The aftermath of Shrewsbury and now this opposition from the Commons show how 
Henry’s initial popularity soon waned. The Commons were not giving Henry any leeway and 
there was acrimony between them.75 By agreeing to examine royal grants the king was able to 
persuade the parliament of October 1404 to grant two full tenths and fifteenths for war 
expenditure as well as tonnage and poundage and the wool subsidy.76 This was the result of 
Henry’s acquiescence in the face of a severe financial  crisis that revealed a lack of persuasive 
charm on his part. 
The ongoing disturbances in Wales were absorbing large amounts of revenue and man 
power during the reign. Helen Watt demonstrated that the issues facing Henry with regard to 
raising taxation to defend the Welsh borders from Glyn Dŵr’s rebellion posed a double 
financial problem to Henry.77 In order to defend the border he needed to raise taxes but due to 
the economic devastation caused by Glyn Dŵr the local population was unable to meet the 
requests for these taxes. The main counties affected were Cheshire, Shropshire and 
Herefordshire who had also provided troops to support both Henry Percy and the Prince of 
Wales and therefore had few men to defend their home border or to pay their taxes.78 Watt 
emphasised that although a large number of taxes were granted there was a concurrent rise in 
exemptions, the emphasis being placed on the economic impact caused by the Welsh 
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incursions.79 As a result of the above problems Henry IV appears to have been unsuccessful in 
raising much needed taxes in this region. Henry’s early years were beset by financial 
insolvency which he personally failed to remedy through either effective propaganda or 
personal charm. Although he had extensively cited Richard’s financial shortcomings in the 
‘Record and Process’ he had failed to remedy the very same complaints in the early part of his 
reign. 
Upon his death Usk described Henry’s rule thus: ‘after fourteen years of powerful rule 
during which he had crushed all those who rebelled against him’.80 Henry’s securing of the 
throne for the following two generations was an indication of his ability to exercise good 
kingship despite his weak genealogical claim and periods of ill health. This may have been due 
to his personality or perhaps, as Pollard stated, it was the men who served him who ‘were 
remarkable, in their capacity ultimately to put the collective interest of the new dynasty, the 
crown and the realm before their personal interests or ambitions’.81 Implicit in Pollard’s 
statement is the suggestion that these men around Henry respected him enough not only to 
support the new dynasty but also not to remove him. This probably says much for his 
personality at the start of his reign, combined with his adherence to traditional kingship, which 
carried him through his later years.  
Henry V.  
‘The posthumous Henry, the medieval hero-king, must obviously be distinguished 
from the Henry of strictly contemporary record’.82 
The above caution from E. F. Jacob deserves serious consideration. Perhaps more than 
any other English king, Henry V has been portrayed as the epitome of kingship. In order that 
Henry could pursue his French aims it was going to be necessary for him to restore domestic 
harmony. As the victor at Agincourt he restored English pride and became a legend in his own 
lifetime and even more so afterwards. Henry more fully fitted the medieval ideal of a good king 
by defending the realm and church, upholding justice and providing good governance and 
financial management. At last with Henry V the nation had a king who could fulfil their 
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aspirations and who appeared both eager and capable of doing so. The enduring popular image 
created by Shakespeare, via Holinshed, has tended to romanticize Henry's life. The author of 
the Gesta Henrici Quinti described Henry as ‘young in years but old in experience’, and 
although not that young, being in his mid-twenties, the author was emphasising Henry’s 
experience in Wales and his fitness to rule.83 After his death Walsingham described him as the 
epitome of medieval kingship: ‘he was a man of sincere piety, sparing and discreet in word, 
wise in judgement, modest in his looks but magnificent in action’.84  
His reign was not without its problems in the early years as seen in the abortive  
Southampton Plot of 1415, and indeed by the time of his death, whisperings of discontent were 
being voiced in 1421: ‘the unbearable impositions being demanded from the people to this end 
are accompanied by dark-though- private-mutterings and curses, and by hatred of such 
extortions’. Usk was referring to the high level of taxation required for the French campaign.85 
Pugh described Henry as ‘cold and singularly lacking in generosity’ and although he was 
recognised for his upholding of justice Pugh claimed he was also capable of less than equitable 
behaviour.86 Upon becoming king Henry's behaviour apparently changed not inconsiderably 
from youthful exuberance: ‘and before he was king, when he was Prince of Wales, he fell and 
inclined greatly to riot, and drew to wild company’, to the maturity required to be king.87 Anne 
Curry questioned whether he would always remain an enigma in terms of his real personality.88  
In order to determine whether Henry's hero-image was the result of conscious 
propaganda, either produced by himself or his contemporaries, or a true reflection of his actions 
it is necessary to briefly examine some of the available sources. Antonia Gransden said that 
‘no other medieval king of England was honoured with such an abundance of literature’.89 Even 
the earliest sources appear to provide only a complimentary picture of Henry. It appeared that 
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even from early on in his reign everyone hoped that Henry would be a ‘great’ king and the 
literature reflected this by portraying him as the ideal monarch. Poets such as John Page and 
the author of the Agincourt Carol glorified Henry's achievements in France. Henry was astute 
enough to realise that he needed the support of the nation if he was to fulfil his dream of 
obtaining the French crown and to this end he was prepared to use a variety of propagandist 
methods including the Gesta Henrici Quinti which will be discussed in a case study below.90 
As mentioned above Henry’s reign was not without its challenges as seen in 1415. The 
Southampton Plot, on the eve of his departure to France, was a potentially serious threat and 
this was reflected in the charges brought against the main conspirators, Richard, earl of 
Cambridge, Henry, Lord Scrope of Masham and Sir Thomas Gray of Heaton.91  
They were undeniably guilty of conspiring to make Edmund, earl of March defect from 
Henry by launching him from a Welsh base in order to take the throne for himself. However, 
the accusation below sought to condemn them to death: 
…falsely and treasonably proposing and plotting finally to destroy and kill the same 
present lord king and Thomas duke of Clarence, John duke of Bedford, and Humphrey 
duke of Gloucester, his brothers, as well as other lords, magnates and faithful lieges of 
the said present lord king, contrary to their oath of allegiance.92  
This second charge, that they intended to murder Henry and members of his family, 
was according to T. B. Pugh carefully devised to ensure that there could be no acquittal.93 This 
use of propaganda by Henry was an astute political move to rid himself of any opposition 
before he embarked for France.  
The revolt by the Lollard, Sir John Oldcastle, posed a political and religious dilemma 
for Henry as he was a personal friend and had up to 1413 been a loyal Lancastrian. Oldcastle’s 
plan to kidnap Henry and his brothers was discovered and although he was convicted he 
subsequently escaped. Henry appeared to waiver in his treatment of the rebels, vacillating 
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between executing or pardoning them.94 In October Henry issued a proclamation forbidding 
anyone to assist Oldcastle: ‘Writ to the Sheriffs to make proclamation forbidding all intercourse 
with, or help to be given to, John Oldecastell, Knt., who had been committed to the Tower as 
a heretic, but who had broken prison’.95  
This had little effect as did Arundel’s sending copies of Oldcastle’s conviction for 
heresy to the bishops to read out in English at church and his public excommunication of 
Oldcastle at St. Paul’s Cross. In fact Jurkowski believed that these actions were counter- 
productive as support for Oldcastle apparently increased.96 It was not until December 1417 that 
he was finally caught and executed and Lollardy retreated from the public consciousness. In 
dealing with Oldcastle Jurkowski felt that Henry manipulated the common law for his own 
benefit and revealed ‘even less respect for his subjects; it is not what we would expect from an 
“exemplar of justice”’.97 This suggests that had Henry spent more time at home he may have 
come into conflict with the judiciary, as he exerted his personality over the legal system. In this 
example his personality was not enough to deal with Oldcastle, neither was the propaganda 
issued by Arundel, but of course Henry was already in France and had a much bigger and more 
successful propaganda campaign to deal with. Henry’s raising of both taxes and manpower will 
be looked at in a case study below.98 
It appeared that Henry’s determination to fulfil the ideal of medieval kingship and this 
almost professional attitude to the role, allowed his own personality to recede into the 
background although it could be argued that he had exactly the right personality for being a 
king. Katherine Lewis argued that Henry’s careful construction of his ‘manhood’ was a 
political response to the situation he found himself in.99 It is possible that Henry may have seen 
how Richard II’s image, in terms of his lack of masculinity, had been manipulated and sought 
to avoid the same outcome. As a result, this has left scant evidence with which to discern the 
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man behind the myth that both contemporary and near-contemporary propaganda sought to 
represent. As has been shown by the end of Henry V’s illustrious, but short reign there were 
murmurings of discontent which had to be addressed by the next generation of Lancastrian 
kings.  
Henry VI. 
Henry VI has been portrayed variously from the ineffectual to the vindictive during his 
lifetime, the reason for the outbreak of the Wars of the Roses and posthumously as a saint. 
Griffiths contended that ‘Henry VI had been transformed, by a remarkable exercise in 
posthumous propaganda, from an incompetent innocent into a guileless saint’.100 This is 
suggestive of a highly complex character or maybe a misunderstood monarch?  
Henry, of all the kings, had the hardest act to follow and his long regency failed to 
prepare him for kingship. His personality lacked the robustness of his father and he appeared 
to be overpowered by either his uncles in his early reign and by his queen at the end. Despite 
this the general populace tolerated him and rather placed any blame for any misgovernance on 
his advisors. The main opposition to Henry came from within his extended family, rather than 
the general population. The Commons resentment of his imprudent patronage resulted in their 
refusal to grant taxes for much of his reign. This was a clear reflection of Henry’s weak 
personality and his regime’s inability to employ effective propaganda in order to overcome the 
Common’s opposition. Trying to determine the personality of Henry VI and his popularity in 
the eyes of the nation is more complex than the previous monarchs examined mainly due to the 
sheer length of his reign. Recent historians such as Watts and Gross have led the way in the 
discussion about Henry’s kingship.101  
One of the few sources that appeared to give any insight into the personality of Henry 
VI was Blacman.102 He described Henry as ‘a simple man, without any crook of craft or 
untruth’ and ‘he was both upright and just’.103 As a political source it was weak and was 
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intended to focus on the religiosity of the king and as Roger Lovatt said ‘Blacman does not tell 
us what we want to know, but what he wants us to know’.104 Looking at contemporary sources, 
direct criticism of Henry VI was rare, rather it was those around him who were regarded 
suspiciously. Warkworth commented how the actions of those around Henry made ‘the peple 
to gruge ageyns hym, and alle bycause of his fals lords, and nevere of hym’.105 
The young Henry VI unfortunately had few of his father’s attributes and little interest 
in his kingly duties. Katherine Lewis regarded Henry’s lack of masculinity as having adversely 
affected his kingship.106 His continuing lack of interest prolonged the rule of the council and 
the increasing influence of characters such as Suffolk. It was a difficult situation as the 
members of the council could not publicly declare that the young king showed no aptitude to 
rule and yet they were regarded as perpetuating their own self- interest at the expense of the 
crown. Henry’s accession was therefore welcomed in the belief that court interests would be 
diminished with the king in control. Wolffe regarded Henry’s failure to uphold justice and his 
partisan approach to dealing with quarrels as the reason for much of the unrest among the 
nobility. Wolffe also stated the qualities required by a king to fulfil these duties included 
‘charisma, as well as energetic, strategic personal intervention’, attributes that Henry failed 
either to possess or certainly to display.107 
Henry VI’s inheritance at first glance looked impressive following the success in France 
by his father, however, to maintain this position was to be a costly exercise, one that the public 
were on occasion less than happy to sustain. England during the minority of Henry VI 
experienced an economic downturn that led to a financial crisis resulting in the imposition of 
special taxation three times during the period 1428 and 1436 for defence. It was under this 
financial cloud and popular opposition that Henry came to the throne whilst maintaining the 
commitment to France.108 Ormrod stated that the financial backing was too onerous for 
parliament to continue to support.109 The ongoing crises in France provided a constant need for 
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the crown to justify their expenditure and to raise morale and thus the possibility of further 
funding. On 3 July 1436 Henry VI used a proclamation to stir up the commons against the 
threat of the duke of Burgundy taking Calais:  
as he who calls himself duke of Burgundy, the king's enemy and rebel,… making 
disposition to take the town of Calais and all fortresses in the marches,…and should 
this happen it would tend not only to scandal and reproach of the king, but also to the 
hurt and disgrace of both his realms of France and England, and his will is to resist the 
malice of the so called duke.110  
Henry by referring to the duke as ‘he who calls himself duke of Burgundy’ further 
creating the impression of illegality and immorality of the duke’s actions and implying the 
legal justification for English action, just as his father had. This resulted in the largest army of 
the decade under the duke of York setting sail from England.111 The Patent Rolls record: ‘the 
muster of Richard, duke of York, and of 500 men at arms and 2200 archers who are about to 
proceed to France’.112 
Although the parliament of 1437 granted a tenth and a fifteenth, little was forthcoming 
as economic factors meant that many exemptions were requested on the grounds of poverty.113 
Griffiths speculated that Henry’s extravagance may have contributed to more exemptions from 
both the lay and clerical communities.114 The 1440’s saw little improvement in the relationship 
between Henry and the Commons with the 1445 parliament granting only a half-tenth and 
fifteenth and in 1447 no financial grant was passed. It would appear that the Londoners and the 
merchants in particular were being exceedingly obdurate and with this in mind Henry 
adjourned parliament to Winchester.115 This resulted in the granting of a further half tenth and 
fifteenth along with the imposition of taxation on aliens and unbeneficed clergy. These two 
groups highlighted the parlous state of both Henry’s finances and public perception in as much 
as it revealed he had to tax these two minority groups who were less likely to oppose the 
taxation. Harriss stated ‘the commissioners who met local worthies in the Chapter House at 
York in 1446 managed to secure only four loans from those present, and in Southampton in the 
same year, although fifteen appeared of the twenty summoned, again only four contributed. 
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We must conclude, then, that lending was unpopular and often evaded’.116  
At the Leicester parliament in April 1450 the Commons determined that Henry should 
cancel all grants made since the start of his reign as Henry’s ill-judged patronage was a 
reflection of his inability to fulfil the perception of good kingship. Henry accepted the bill of 
resumption in May and although there were a number of exemptions a second bill was passed 
in 1451. The loss of Normandy in 1449 highlighted the urgent need for financial support to 
avoid the same fate happening to Calais, although parliament did not meet again until March 
1453. However, the aid came too late and although the Reading parliament of 1453 was willing 
to make substantial grants the situation in France was beyond recovery. The rapidly 
deteriorating situation in Lancastrian France in 1453 led parliament to a large-scale 
commission of array in order to raise 20,000 archers to defend the country. Unlike previous 
commissions whereby the motivation was the traditional obligation to defend the kingdom, this 
was based on the payment of wages. It appeared that Henry had been planning to tour around 
the country, suggesting that his appearance as a manifestation of physical propaganda was still 
considered beneficial in maintaining law and order: 
that it had been arranged for him himself to travel to various parts of the realm to the 
intention and end that maintenance, extortion, oppression, riots and other misdeeds 
accustomed in his realm of England for so long a time might be destroyed and the doers 
or perpetrators of the same be punished.117 
Despite the scale of the French losses there was a revival of patriotic spirit which 
resulted in the Commons granting a full tenth and fifteenth and further grants in 1454.118 It was 
also at this point that Henry descended into a state of mental breakdown and ostensibly was no 
longer in charge. 
As John Watts stated above despite the grumblings and the apparent support of other 
rival players Henry VI still managed to remain on the throne - it is perhaps indicative that 
because he was so distant from affairs that he was indeed regarded as blameless. The influence 
and control of Henry by the French Margaret of Anjou fuelled his unpopularity and his poor 
mental health left him in a vulnerable position. Henry’s feeble appearance in his old blue gown 
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on Maundy Thursday in 1471 confirmed in the eyes of the audience his unsuitability to rule, 
he did not look or behave as a medieval king was expected to.119 His weak personality left him 
open to the influence of those around him which resulted in the misguided policies that dogged 
his reign and his apparent failure to engage in propaganda successfully led him being deposed 
twice.  A case study below will survey various uprisings during Henry’s reign.120 
Edward IV. 
Polydore Vergil described the first Yorkist in glowing terms: 
for Edwarde was much desired of the Londoners, in favor with the common 
people, in the mouth and speeche of every man, of highest and lowest he had 
the good willes. He was, for his liberalitie, clemencie, integritie, and fortitude, 
praysed generally of all men above the skyes.121 
Commines was less effusive when he declared that: ‘King Edward was not an 
outstanding man but a very handsome prince..., and he was very courageous’.122 From the 
above it appears that Edward IV was the antithesis of his predecessor, Henry VI. He was 
physically vigorous and handsome, charming, an able administrator with a prodigious memory 
and not overly pious. Did these qualities enable him to fulfil the criteria for a successful 
medieval king? That question has long divided historians in their assessment of Edward IV. 
Certainly, he used his attractiveness to the opposite sex to great political effect in 1471 as 
Commines recorded: ‘several noblewomen and wives of rich citizens with whom he had been 
closely and secretly acquainted won over their husbands and relatives to his cause’ which 
allowed Edward to enter London and escape Warwick.123 
Late nineteenth century historians such as Gairdner, Stubbs and Oman and later 
Scofield, all concurred in their condemnation of Edward as an inadequate and immoral king, a 
judgement based very much on the morals of their age. Later historians have taken a less 
judgemental approach to their study of both the king and the times in which he lived. Historians 
that include Ross, Carpenter, Lander, Hicks, Pollard and Horrox have all brought their own 
interpretation to the period. Christine Carpenter has revived Edward’s image in a favourable 
light whilst Colin Richmond has been more critical, like the earlier historians. Ralph Griffiths, 
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Keith Dockray and Anthony Pollard have taken a more neutral attitude towards the reign.124 
Charles Ross described Edward’s style of kingship as pragmatic and conservative.125 
Edward began his reign with a policy of magnanimity towards many Lancastrians that was 
later to prove costly.126 This may have been due to his generous nature but perhaps he realised 
that as the Lancastrian lords far outnumbered the Yorkists, integration propaganda was 
required to enlist their support as the Yorkist régime was based on very slender foundations.127 
As an usurper he needed to appear in contrast to Henry VI, whose weak kingship had allowed 
the House of York to seize the throne. 
Edward was a complex character as described by Mancini: ‘Edward was of a gentle 
nature and cheerful aspect: nevertheless should he assume an angry countenance he could 
appear very terrible to beholders’.128 A Milanese merchant reported on the popularity of 
Edward: ‘I am unable to declare how well the commons love and adore him, as if he were their 
God’ and in April 1461 Francesco Coppini wrote that: ‘this new king is young, prudent and 
magnanimous’129 Later in August 1461 another Italian, Giovanni Pietro Cagnolla wrote of the 
importance of Warwick in securing Edward’s success and the fact that the majority of the 
people, certainly in the North, were probably more disposed towards Henry VI: ‘seeing at their 
backs the Earl of Warwick, …,those people would have joined King Henry…, but Warwick 
has prevented this’.130 Although Edward had seized the throne in an apparently ‘popular’ move 
this quotation reveals that his support was not universal. 
Edward’s popularity was waning towards the end of his first reign in the summer of 
1469 as the Coventry Leet Book noted: ‘Kyng Edward laye at Notynham and sende for lordes 
and all other men, but ther com so lytell pepull to hym that he was not abyll to make a fylde a-
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gaynes hem [Warwick and Clarence]’. 131 Carpenter argued that it was not a personal failure 
by Edward that he lost support and ultimately the throne, rather a ‘structural problem’ in the 
survival by Henry VI.132 Once Henry VI and Warwick were dead Edward’s position was more 
secure and he could continue his reign with confidence. His use of literary propaganda as seen 
in the ‘Official Histories’ of the Arrivall and the Rebellion helped to discredit Warwick and 
legitimise his position.133 
Edward’s first reign had made him realise that his easy-going attitude and magnanimity 
had only resulted in rebellion and as a result his kingship evolved into a more imperious style. 
After the death of Clarence the Crowland Chronicle described Edward as having changed as 
he: ‘exercised his office so haughtily thereafter that he seemed to be feared by all his subjects 
while he himself feared no man’.134 This was also reflected in his adoption of the Burgundian 
style of appearance, as seen at Christmas 1482, ‘very often dressed in a variety of the costliest 
clothes very different in style from what used to be seen hitherto in our time’.135 The removal 
of Lancastrian and familial unrest left him determined to be in control of the realm on his own 
terms and he had no apparent need to acquiesce to anyone else.  
Taxation and support for war during Edward’s reign will be the subject of a case study 
below.136 
Richard III.  
As one of England’s most infamous kings, Richard III’s career and life has been forever shaped 
by Shakespeare’s portrayal of him as a hunchback and monster has for centuries obscured his 
natural capabilities as an extremely able administrator, a courageous soldier and a loyal lord.  
However, in the light of the recent discovery of Richard’s skeleton in Leicester and the 
post-mortem confirmation of scoliosis, a curvature of the spine, it would appear that the 
depiction of a hunchback was closer to the truth than previously thought but would this also 
confirm his black character as well?  
The fact that he was king for just over two years means that to gain an impression of 
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his personality, his earlier years need to be examined. In his article on Richard as duke of 
Gloucester, Hicks identified the problem of trying to discover Richard’s personality.137 As duke 
of Gloucester he exhibited formidable skill in establishing his vast estates which Hicks stated 
that he achieved through ‘careful preparation, opportunism, flexibility in tactics, and utter 
unscrupulousness and ruthlessness in execution’.138 He was forgiving of the past misdeeds of 
rivals and regarded as a good lord and patron.139 To this end Richard appeared to be no different 
to many of his contemporaries in being desirous of enlarging and protecting his land holdings 
whilst upholding the notion of good lordship. Hicks took the premise that Richard would not 
have expected to have ever become king.140 Nothing in his career as duke suggested that he 
was entertaining the notion of one day seizing the throne; the empire that he had constructed 
was firmly rooted in the North. Interestingly Hicks said that Richard ‘was independent rather 
than subservient in politics’, suggesting that he was very much his own man.141 If he did adopt 
such an attitude of separateness from the political hub then he was at a great disadvantage from 
being able to call on the support of those at the centre which made his decision to seize the 
throne all the more curious. 
Ross regarded Richard’s piety as genuine and not just for public show but also stated 
that this did not mean that he was incapable of political chicanery or violent behaviour.142 
Although undeniably courageous and at times generous he did not have the charm that his 
brother Edward IV had had. Richard lacked the skill to ‘work’ the larger audience possessed 
by his brother. Rosemary Horrox said of Richard III:  
it would be ... unrealistic to ignore Richard's unpopularity altogether. The fact that he 
generated opposition among men with little material reason for dissent, and that the 
disaffection then continued to spread among his own associates, says something about 
what contemporaries regarded as the acceptable parameters of political behaviour.143 
Whilst Edward had been alive Richard lived in the North free from the intriguing of the 
Woodvilles but his fear that they could potentially take away what he had spent years building 
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up, combined with his isolation from the political world of London, acted as a catalyst for him 
to make the disastrous move of seizing the throne. Mancini wrote of Richard as duke of 
Gloucester:  
The good reputation of his private life and public activities powerfully attracted the 
esteem of strangers. Such was his renown in warfare, that whenever a difficult and 
dangerous policy had to be undertaken, it would be entrusted to his discretion and 
generalship. By these arts Richard acquired the favour of the people…144 
Mancini here portrayed a man greatly respected both militarily and morally. Later 
Mancini cited that in Richard’s attempt to persuade the young king Edward that he, his uncle, 
was best placed to be in charge of the country, Richard refers to both his: ‘experience of affairs, 
but also his popularity’.145 When the rumours of the deaths of his nephews began to circulate 
it was ‘for whiche cause he lost the hertes of the people. And therupon many Gentilmen 
entendid his distruccion’, including the duke of Buckingham.146  
In the autumn of 1483 less than four months into his reign Richard encountered a 
significant rebellion apparently led by the duke of Buckingham, his once staunch ally. In fact 
there were a series of rebellions across the south of England that were independent of the 
influence of Henry Stafford, duke of Buckingham.147 The common thread between the rebels 
was their allegiance to Edward IV and by implication, his heirs. Richard’s failure to disprove 
the rumours that the princes were dead meant that the rationale for rebellion in October had 
changed from the desire to restore Edward V to the removal of Richard by Henry Tudor. 
From the attainders it would appear that the duke found little support from Wales and 
the Marches.148 Buckingham had failed to raise any support in his opposition to Richard. 
Richard’s response was to issue a proclamation that stated that anyone amongst the yeoman 
and commoners who put down their arms would receive a free pardon. The leaders, however, 
were meted out a harsher treatment as they had prices put upon their heads.149 This appeared 
to have the desired effect and Buckingham was captured in Shropshire. The Crowland 
Chronicle described his reaction upon the news of Buckingham’s rebellion: ‘This whole 
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conspiracy was known well enough, through spies, to King Richard who never acted sleepily 
but incisively and with the utmost vigilance’.150 The use of spies reveals both Richard’s 
political acumen and the realisation of his precarious position. 
Was this success by Richard a result of his speedy political propaganda or was it merely 
the promise of money that proved to be Buckingham’s downfall. From the lack of support for 
Buckingham it appears that he was not a very popular leader. At this juncture Richard appeared 
to engender more support amongst the population than the rebels and combined with his 
propaganda it proved successful in defeating Buckingham. 
On hearing of the earl of Richmond’s landing in Pembrokeshire Richard III had a less 
subtle approach to agitation propaganda as the Crowland Chronicle described: 
Meanwhile he sent out terrifying orders in manifold letters to the counties of the 
kingdom: none of their men... should withdraw themselves from the coming battle ... 
anyone who might be found ... not to have been present ... could hope for nothing but 
the loss of all his goods, his possessions and his life.151  
In 1485 the Crowland Chronicle recorded that: ‘on the king’s side there was a greater 
number of fighting men than there had been seen before, on one side, in England’.152 Outwardly 
it would appear that Richard’s agitation had worked however, it was unfortunate that a large 
proportion of these men failed to fight, notably the affinities of Stanley and Northumberland 
which left Richard in a weakened position. The examples above reveal two different reactions 
taken by Richard to threats to his position and show his ability to judge a situation with a sharp 
political eye. With Buckingham’s rebellion he adopted a conciliatory approach in his to the 
mass of the population whilst the leaders were dealt more ruthlessly, quite an astute approach. 
His reaction to Richmond’s arrival is altogether more aggressive and threatening in agitating 
for support suggesting that he realised the greater danger from Richmond. 
There has been a general consensus that Richard, having inherited much wealth from 
Edward IV, squandered it.153 However, Horrox stated that in fact Edward had spent large 
amounts in his final years on military campaigns – in part as a result of his failed propaganda 
to raise money – and Richard inherited little actual cash to use.154 Ross highlighted the fact that 
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Richard was actually well provided for financially through his extensive land revenues.155  
In 1484 the House Commons granted Richard tonnage and poundage for life but he did 
not request a lay subsidy as he was only too aware of the unpopularity that Edward’s demands 
for direct taxation had aroused. In terms of outward war Richard’s reign was quiet. There was 
no actual war in France and a truce was negotiated with the Scots in September 1484.  
In early 1485 as Richard’s financial position deteriorated there was a campaign to raise 
loans. The defence of the realm, against both the Scots and the French was the primary 
motivating factor and the commissioners were directed to flatter any potential donors.156 The 
Crowland Chronicle suggests that the approach was rather more direct: ‘selected men were 
sent out…who extorted great sums of money from the coffers of persons of almost every rank 
in the kingdom, by prayers or threats, by fair means or foul’.157 
Horrox pointed out that the majority of these letters failed to raise the amount initially 
requested. However, Horrox does not regard this as significant as there were others who did 
not lend at all.158 From this it would appear that Richard’s propaganda failed to attract sufficient 
loans and in some instances his rhetoric definitely fell upon deaf ears. Horrox suggested that 
his use of royal retainers rather than local individuals of note could have led to this poor 
response.159 This rather confirms the shortcomings of firstly, his propaganda and secondly, his 
personality. In this situation it is unlikely that the use of local individuals would have made 
much difference to the outcome due to the lack of support for Richard. 
Richard was a capable administrator, loyal to his friends and employees as well as a 
courageous soldier but his character flaws often lost him support. Richard’s usurpation was not 
necessarily a barrier to a successful reign, as witnessed by Henry IV and his own brother 
Edward IV, however, the charge of murdering his nephews was an event that no amount of 
propaganda or personality could overcome. 
Uprisings. 
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This next section will survey the evidence to reveal how the presence of uprisings 
during a reign was a reflection of a monarch’s effective leadership and whether propaganda or 
personality was used to counteract potential discontent. Domestic unrest was an indicator that 
a particular group within society was aggrieved. During the period under discussion these 
groups ranged from the elite to the humble peasant. As will be seen in the section on taxation, 
financial hardship was often a major contributory factor to an uprising, but not exclusively. 
The causes of the grievances, rather than an in-depth analysis of the actual events, and the 
subsequent reaction of the monarch will seek to reveal whether personality or propaganda were 
responsible for the cause or affected the outcome of the uprising. 
Case Study: Henry VI – A selection.     
A long minority did not provide for a smooth transition to the throne for Henry and like 
Richard II he found much unrest on his accession. Watts suspected that Henry’s ‘personal rule’ 
was a chimera and that Suffolk was essentially in control of the realm up to his death in May 
1450.160 The first major uprising of Henry’s reign was Cade’s Rebellion in the summer of 1450, 
although local in nature, was the result of many other factors including the loss of Normandy, 
the influence of the royal household and the feeling that the common weal had not been 
protected as it ought to be by the crown.161 Complaint was being voiced quite openly at the 
time about the ‘traitors’ and their role in France and how they should be dealt with ‘yif suche 
thraitours may be founde gilty, theyme to have execucion of lawe withoute any pardone’.162 
But despite the grumblings of the populace about the running of the country Henry 
remained in himself relatively popular as may be seen from the reaction to Cade’s rebellion in 
1450: ‘and all the nyght and on the morn cam moche peple to strength the king at Grenewich 
of lancastr and Chesshir and other shires’.163 One may speculate that the death of the unpopular 
Suffolk had reignited the hopes of the realm that at last Henry was able to reign personally and 
may explain the above support. However, the numbers of the rebels were far greater than the 
royal army and the loyalty of the royal retainers was questionable.164 Despite the death of Cade 
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in the July Henry’s government failed to cease the unrest which was a direct reflection of 
Henry’s inability to control those around him who were continuing to be the focus of popular 
dissent. In early 1451 Henry’s behaviour as recorded by Vitellius A XVI was suggestive of a 
king who was taking his duties seriously as Henry: ‘wt certeyn of his Justices Rode in to Kent, 
and there abode vpon a moneth’, and continues to describe how Henry rides regally through 
the city of London, physically asserting his authority: ‘he came ageyn to London, and Rood 
Roially through the Cite’.165 
During 1453 Henry became unwell and did not recover until after Christmas 1454 
during which time the protectorate was in control with York at its head. It is thus difficult to 
ascribe any influence, in terms of propaganda, by Henry over the events at St. Albans in 1455 
despite him being nominally in charge.166  
The early autumn of 1459 saw further skirmishes between Henry and the Yorkists. The 
first of these was the battle of Blore Heath on 23rd September. York’s agitation propaganda to 
raise rebellion against Henry VI was recorded in the Parliament Rolls’: 
he wrote to many cities, boroughs and towns of this your noble realm, and to many 
individuals of one estate or another, to raise a general insurrection on the pretext of 
the common weal, planning to give battle to you, sovereign lord, beside Dartford in 
the county of Kent, and so destroy your most noble person.167 
Henry’s army was far larger than that raised by York despite the above attempt to raise 
support. There were very heavy casualties on both sides but the outcome was inconclusive and 
the next few weeks were spent with both sides regrouping before the next battle. However, in 
1459 Vitellius A XVI commented upon an occasion when Henry failed to take the opportunity 
of positive visual propaganda: ‘And where as men demed the king shuld have goon crowned 
upon seynt Edwardes day wt the procession he died not, nor no one of the lordes’.168 Henry’s 
masculinity was once more called into question when the chronicler described how it was the 
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queen who was waging war against York whilst Henry remained impotent in London.169 
In October 1459, despite the apparent support for Warwick before the Battle of Ludford, 
it appeared that Henry was still able to engender popular support as the Crowland Chronicle 
related: 
However, with the gathering of great numbers, consisting of both nobles and 
commons, the king’s side was getting stronger every day especially after Andrew 
Trollop and his regulars from Calais had deserted the duke[York]; these troops called 
from overseas by their captain, the earl of Warwick, as though for the service of the 
king, found themselves committed unwillingly against him and so they gave their 
support to the king who had provided their keep and their wages.170 
Henry’s offer of a pardon meant that the troops defected from Warwick and their 
continued payment by the crown ensured their loyalty, not through any use of specific 
propaganda, but just the necessity of being paid. The fact that Henry’s army was twice the size 
of the Yorkists’ suggested that Yorkist propaganda had failed to raise support against Henry.171 
The Yorkists had spread rumours that Henry had died in order to gain support for their claim 
however, Henry’s appearance made a mockery of this propaganda.172  
The presence of Henry at the battle was of great importance and had a positive impact 
on the outcome, the more so as he had not been seen to any degree publicly that summer: 
After making a speech to all the lords, knights and nobles in your host in so witty, so 
knightly, so manly and so cheering a style, with such a princely bearing and assured 
manner, in which the lords and people took such joy and comfort.173 
The Parliament Rolls were effusive in their description of the role that Henry played in 
Lancastrian success: 
Henry VI's presence with his troops proved decisive, and the Yorkist forces dissolved 
overnight rather than confront the king in battle. By the time parliament assembled on 
20 November the Yorkist leaders had fled abroad: York himself to Ireland, while 
Salisbury, Warwick and York's eldest son Edward ended up in Calais.174 
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The success of the Lancastrians, led by their king, reflected the importance of the king’s 
physical presence at times of crisis, as Wolffe stated ‘the mid fifteenth-century king could 
himself do no wrong’.175 Unfortunately Henry was unable to maintain this burst of activity and 
only two years later the situation was favouring the Yorkists once more.  
Ingulph’s Chronicle related for the year 1461 how support for Henry waned in the 
Midlands: 
seeing that they were despised and abandoned by king Henry, who, at the instigation 
of the queen, had taken himself to the north, utterly forsook him, after he had 
completed a reign of 39 years, and their hearts were now no longer with him, nor 
would they any longer admit of his being king.176 
This gives a very clear indication of the low esteem in which Henry was held in this 
particular region and yet only two years earlier we can see from the Calais garrison that he had 
been able to raise popular support. The chronicle gives the strong impression that the polity felt 
let down by Henry VI and his inability to perform his kingly duties; however, the author was 
careful to place the blame with Margaret. 
Henry did not appear particularly unpopular with the commons but it was his 
relationship with the magnates and their influence that affected his standing and therefore the 
perception of his ability to rule. By the late 1450’s his authority was no longer recognised, not 
even by his subjects, his lack of a personality highlighted how critical it was to medieval 
kingship especially when his opponent Edward IV had an abundance of personal attributes. His 
failure to actively employ propaganda suggests an inability by Henry to engage with politics, 
whether through personal choice or ill health. However, those around Henry and especially 
Margaret were only too aware of the importance of political communication but apparently had 
little success in urging Henry to become involved. 
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Taxation and war support. 
 
 ‘taxation was granted for the benefit of the realm, not merely that of the king’.177 
This according to Mark Ormrod was the developing view of the polity during the late 
fourteenth century. This attitude was a reaction to the Poll tax of 1380 and reflected the fact 
that the population wanted their money to be used to benefit the whole realm and not just the 
royal coffers.178 G. L Harriss stated that the king’s need for financial support ‘brought the 
Crown into a direct relationship with a wide range of its subjects and imposed a specific test 
upon its authority and good faith’.179 
The two established types of taxation available to the medieval monarch were direct or 
indirect. The former was usually raised to fund the cost of foreign war, usually in France or 
Scotland, and was granted by parliament upon request from the king. The latter was a more 
regular income, such as the customs duties, collected permanently, and tonnage and poundage, 
which was authorised by parliament. It was the direct taxation that caused the most problems 
and its granting, or not, by parliament was very much a reflection of the support of and belief 
in, the monarch and as such it could be influenced by either personality or propaganda. 
Taxation became problematic area of policy of late medieval kings as the Hundred Years War 
drained the nation’s resources. Kings had increasingly to muster both propaganda and charm 
in order to maintain support from both the commons and population. An examination of the 
response to calls for taxation will attempt to reveal whether parliament and the rest of the realm 
were generally influenced more by personality or by propaganda. 
Closely allied with taxation was support for war as they were both inextricably linked 
in times of foreign war. Harriss concluded that ‘the service of men, equipment and victuals 
might thus be demanded in the same breath and in the same terms as loans of money’.180 The 
success of Edward III and the Black Prince in France had created an environment in which 
the country was ready to support their king financially and physically. However, once the 
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situation in France began to stagnate in the 1370’s some of the enthusiasm for war began to 
wane, particularly under Richard II. His desire for peace, however, was not universally 
popular.181 Henry V re-ignited English pride and enthusiasm with his success at Agincourt in 
1415 but even then it was becoming apparent that the nation was struggling with the financial 
burden of war.  
The rationale behind war propaganda may be two-fold as P. S. Lewis identified both a 
political and moral background to medieval war propaganda.182 Foreign war could also be used 
as a diversion from domestic unrest and this could be the case for Henry V’s French campaign. 
It also had to be very persuasive if it was to succeed in its three main aims. Firstly, to raise 
finance for a costly foreign campaign. Secondly, it needed to agitate men to defend their home. 
Finally, it had also to justify itself in order to raise supplies, ships, armoury and victuals. Thus 
one needs to assess whether it was the rhetoric or the wages or even another motive that 
provided men with the incentive to go to war.  
Anthony Tuck argued that ‘the profit motive was of even greater importance than 
propaganda and patriotism in persuading men to serve’.183 In 1417 Usk reported that ‘the booty 
taken in Normandy was auctioned throughout England’.184 War also provided employment for 
a large number of young men who then could use their acquired skills for administrative careers 
back at home.185 The profit motive operated only at a personal level and financially the crown 
still needed to use propaganda to raise funds via taxation for supplies, equipment and wages 
from the rest of the population who often had little to gain financially from the continuation of 
the war.186 Simon Payling’s investigation into military service during the reign of Henry VI 
emphasised the fact that many youngest sons saw military service as their only option to earn 
a living. Conversely some gentry had little financial incentive to abandon their comfortable life 
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at home for the dangers of foreign war.187 Payling stated that often service was a ‘product of 
their lord’s martial inclinations’.188 Payling’s article reinforces Tuck’s assertion that profit was 
indeed a greater motivator than political allegiance. However, in the case of those in the affinity 
of a lord they may not have had the opportunity to decide for themselves between profit or 
politics at a personal level but were at the behest of their lord’s allegiance. 
Overall, there were a number of reasons, personal and national, that drew men into 
battle. However, assessing the level of support for a foreign war was a good indicator of the 
public's attitude towards their sovereign and the effectiveness of any agitational propaganda. 
The call to the war was justified on both a patriotic and moral level but even this was not always 
enough to gain support with financial reward often being the deciding factor. The use of 
agitation propaganda would be the dominant style of propaganda most likely to be effective. 
The subsequent case studies for the reigns of Henry V and Edward IV will attempt to show 
whether it was personality or propaganda that was more effective in raising taxation and 
support for war. 
Taxation and War Support Case Study 1: Henry V. 
No other reign of the fifteenth century was so synonymous with martial success in 
France. Henry’s French campaign drew the whole nation into a short-lived era of national 
glory and pride. Before Agincourt, Henry had not really achieved anything particularly 
outstanding militarily. It was rather his embodiment of the hopes of a nation that carried him 
along rather than any tangible actions 
Henry had the advantage over his father of having had some financial experience as 
the nominal head of the council in 1406 that took over control of royal finances. Henry was 
determined to control expenditure and put the royal finances on a more secure footing than 
had previously been the case. In order to pay for his French campaign Henry had been 
granted the tonnage and poundage in 1414 in addition to the wool subsidy of 1413. As the 
campaign approached, Parliament granted two more full subsidies with the first due in 
February 1415.189 This was in part due to the confidence that the Commons had in Henry to 
use the money wisely. Despite Henry’s excellent preparation, both financial and practical, he 
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still found himself short of money to pay the soldiers’ wages in spring 1415.190 In March 
1414 in an attempt to restore peace he issued a general pardon to all miscreants apart from 
murderers and rapists:  
Writ to the Sheriffs to proclaim a general pardon granted by the King to all rebels, 
felons, &c., who severally sue for charters of pardon before Michaelmas Day next.191 
This pardon was intended to have a double benefit of not only securing peace at home 
before embarking on a foreign war but also those pardoned were to serve in the war. It was an 
act of integration and was part of an extensive series of law enforcements designed to ensure 
domestic harmony during his potentially lengthy absences in France. W. M. Ormrod saw 
these legal measures as an important part in Henry's construction of his public image.192 
Initially the country had been cautious about embarking on a war with France. T. B. 
Pugh said that the nobility was not so interested in going to war but ‘the young Henry V went 
to war with France because he chose to do so and, in view of his personal character and 
temperament, we can be sure that it was no hasty or ill-considered decision’.193 Henry’s 
propaganda to justify his campaign in Normandy was based on the ancient connection 
between England and Normandy .194 The Gesta Henrici Quinti declared that Henry was ‘to 
recover his duchy of Normandy, which belongs to him…dating from the time of William the 
first’.195 
The English Chronicle stated that Henry: ‘spoken off the titull þat he hadde to 
Normandy, Gascoyn, and Gyen, þat were his enheritaunce’ and if the dauphin would do not 
so peacefully then Henry: ‘wolde, be the grace of Godde, wynne and gete yt be the sworde in 
shorte tyme’.196 Tuck believed that Henry’s motivation was to use Normandy as a strategic 
base in order to conquer the rest of France.197 Allmand claimed that the support for the 
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French war was due ‘to the personality of one man able to stir up national sentiment in favour 
of himself and his cause’.198  
The victory at Agincourt, however, gave rise to perhaps an overenthusiastic response 
to his achievements. Anne Curry hinted at Henry’s potential for manipulating his financial 
support by suggesting that Henry made it ‘appear’ that he intended to continue his campaign 
in France immediately after his success at Agincourt. By giving this impression the Commons 
brought forward the payment of the next instalment but then Henry returned to England.199 
Curry argued that this showed another side of Henry’s character, that is, a man not as confident 
as history had portrayed as he was nervous about a French counter attack when his troops were 
depleted and exhausted.200 In actuality, although an interesting postulation, this decision 
suggested that he was probably taking the pragmatic option rather than using propaganda to 
deceive the Commons. In 1416 Henry had to face open opposition to his demands for taxation 
from the palatinate of Chester. Michael Bennett revealed the irony of the situation, whereby 
the previous earl of Chester was facing resistance from his own Lancastrian supporters.201 Did 
this event reveal some failing in the persuasiveness of Henry? Bennett emphasised that 
Cheshire was very different to the rest of the country and ‘it had a reputation for lawlessness 
and political restiveness’.202 Although Cheshire appeared reluctant to aid the French war 
financially, it had supported the war with large numbers of men. Bennett identified the main 
protagonists as belonging to the yeoman class who felt that they were meant to carry the 
financial burden. He regarded this issue as more about social inequalities rather than personal 
antipathy towards the king.203 Henry personally intervened and travelled northwards to try to 
resolve the situation but acknowledged that ‘he was looking to Cheshire more for manpower 
than money’.204 This episode revealed Henry’s political skill in realising that men as well as 
money were required to win a war and that he would have been committing political suicide to 
have started a major revolt in such an important region. 
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Harriss stated that Henry was capable of exerting money through threats as he did in 
1415 with the foreign merchants of London.205 He probably realised that he could be harsher 
on the merchants than on his own population without incurring as much opposition. 
Interestingly, a loan of 1419 authorised whilst Henry was in France raised nothing, which 
strongly supports the premise that his personal presence was necessary in securing financial 
support.  
In the face of growing opposition to his demands for financial support Henry produced 
the Gesta Henrici Quinti, probably in 1417, and although a narrative of Henry’s deeds it still 
sought to justify his foreign policy through persuasive propaganda, appealing to the dual 
demands of finance and manpower.206 A great deal of emphasis was placed on the intervention 
of God in securing English victory thus justifying the invasion: ‘let it be ascribed to God alone, 
from Whom is every victory’.207  
Henry introduced an innovative approach to his financial shortcomings by producing 
loans raised on the security of the crown jewels.208  
Indenture between Richard Courtenay, Bishop of Norwich, and Treasurer of the King's 
Chamber, of the one part, and Thomas Fauconer, the Mayor, and Commonalty of the 
City, of the other part, witnessing the delivery of a great collar of gold, composed of 
crowns and antelopes richly enamelled and bejewelled, to the Mayor as security for the 
repayment of a loan of 10,000 marks made by the City to the King.209 
His personal journey around the country as discussed in the previous chapter was highly 
successful in agitating the polity to fund the French campaign.210 His personality and powers 
of persuasion obviously had a favourable impact upon his subjects. The Coventry Leet Book 
provided evidence that in 1421 the city gave Henry £100 and a cup worth £10 together with 
£100 and another gold cup for the queen on their visit to Coventry.211 
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Henry V apparently navigated the treacherous waters of taxation with success. He 
managed to raise adequate money for his campaigns although not always enough to maintain 
the costs involved in maintaining a presence in France. The money was spent on the war in 
France and not on extravagant household expenditure and thus he kept the commons satisfied. 
His financial acumen, personal involvement and charisma ensured that finances were not a 
source of popular grievance. Henry’s blend of personality and propaganda ensured that the 
controversial issue of taxation was not a problem during his reign. However, had he lived 
longer there was the real possibility that the price of success in France may have been too great 
even for Henry V to have overcome the financial reality of the dual monarchy. By the end of 
his reign Allmand concedes that enthusiasm for war was beginning to wane as revealed by the 
refusal of the Norfolk gentry to go to France.212 
Henry’s short reign combined historic chivalric kingship, political propaganda, when 
expedient, with a charismatic personality. It is perhaps his reign that fully epitomised successful 
late medieval kingship combined with a growing awareness of the need for propaganda. Henry 
had already showed himself as a competent commander whilst prince and thus there were few 
questions over his ability to discharge his duties as king.  
The French campaign had roused a nationalistic sentiment that resulted in the granting 
of taxes for the war but nevertheless he still had to make a propaganda tour of the country in 
1421 to raise more funds. This tour highlighted his personal qualities that drew admiration, 
money and support from a war weary nation. His French ambitions fulfilled the adage that 
foreign war would ensure domestic harmony. Henry appeared to direct the force of his 
personality into agitation propaganda, to raise support for his French ambitions and resorted to 
integration propaganda often through the legal system to impose his authority on domestic 
unrest. It could be said that Henry used charm and propaganda to great effect during his brief 
but successful reign. 
Taxation and War Support Case Study 2: Edward IV. 
One of Richard, duke of York’s, legacies to his son Edward IV was that he had 
supported the demands from the Commons that the king ‘should live of his own’.213 This rather 
restricted Edward’s options in his early years when he was short of cash and needed to oppose 
                                                 
212 Allmand, Henry V, p. 439. 
213 J. R. Lander, Government and Community England 1450-1509 (Sevenoaks: Edward 
Arnold, 1980), p. 69. 
147 
 
the threat from Henry VI which meant that he had to employ persuasive agitation propaganda 
to raise support rather than asking for taxes. 
Edward’s letter to the aldermen of the city of London in March 1462 was an astute 
piece of agitation propaganda as he emphasised the threat from not only Henry VI but the fact 
that the Lancastrians may be joining forces with both the Scots and the French: ‘to distroye 
utterly the people, the name, the tongue and all the blood Englisshe of this oure saide 
reaume’.214 By proposing that both the French and the Scots may be involved he was implying 
that the nation would be attacked from both the north and the south. He further suggested 
national humiliation might occur by intimating that Henry VI had offered to renounce English 
claims to the French crown; whether this was true or not it would certainly have worried the 
London mercantile community in particular. The text of a letter to Thomas Cook in March 
1462 made it clear that Edward was asking for voluntary contributions ‘wee desire no thing of 
thayme by waye of imposicion, compulcion or of precedent’.215 By November 1462 it was said 
that: ‘the king went Northward wt a grete people’, suggesting that his agitation propaganda 
had been successful which resulted in Margaret of Anjou departing upon the news of Edward’s 
support.216 
Mancini hinted at Edward’s adroit use of propaganda in order to gain financial support: 
‘thus by appealing to causes, either true or at least with some semblance of truth, he did not 
appear to exhort but almost to beg for subsidies’.217 Mancini was clear that people knew that 
Edward was economical with the truth and that his avarice was at the root of many of his calls 
for financial assistance.218  
Edward’s second reign was marked by a greater awareness of the importance of fiscal 
probity and popular support. As Parliament had refused to grant enough taxes for war, a 
reflection perhaps of a failure of Edward’s propaganda he had therefore, to be imaginative in 
his approach to raising money which led to the new tax or ‘benevolence’, as it was known, 
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being introduced in 1472.219 The benevolence was basically Edward trying to ‘dress up’ 
taxation to make it appear less onerous. Edward offered the opportunity for men to exchange 
their duty to defend the country against the Scots or Welsh, to a payment appropriate to their 
means. The advantage to this tax was that it did not affect the poor but only applied to those 
with wealth of over 20 marks which meant that Edward was seen not to be harming those in 
society who were less fortunate. 
The imposition of the new tax was not popular and indeed people stood fast and did not 
pay it as the Crowland Chronicle recorded ‘a new and unheard of imposition of a gift was 
introduced whereby everyone was to give out of his good will what he wished or more 
accurately, what he did not wish’.220 The citizens of Coventry were not eager to pay taxes as 
Edward complained to the authorities in 1472: ‘or denyd or denyen to pay suche taxes, tallagez, 
Imposicions & other chargez’.221 In 1474 Edward wrote again to Coventry agitating for 
financial support for the war for the ‘restitucion of this land to his old fame & prosperite’.222 
He further urged the commissioners to ‘moue the people by all the goodly means that thei can’, 
to pay the benevolence.223 Despite Edward’s good relationship with the mayoralty of Coventry 
he still appeared to struggle to gain the support of many of the citizens. The Crowland 
Chronicle recorded how Edward did not just rely on his own persuasive powers to raise taxes 
for the war but enlisted the support of others: ‘many eloquent speeches were addressed to 
Parliament by speakers both from home and abroad’.224 This approach by Edward reveals an 
element of sophistication in his approach to agitation propaganda and an awareness that after 
the initial unpopularity of the benevolence he needed to appear to have the support of those 
around him. This method apparently worked as Virgoe stated that Edward’s benevolence of 
1474-5 was actually very ‘lucrative’ and raised £21,000.225 
This was confirmed by the Crowland Chronicle who reported that ‘these large grants 
amounted to sums the like of which were never seen before’.226 Edward decided to take a 
personal lead in raising money by travelling around the country and personally agitating for 
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funds for the French campaign. His attractiveness playing a role in gaining funds, especially 
from the ladies, as the Great Chronicle of London famously recorded:  
[Edward)] called before him ... a rich widow ... and she liberally had granted to him 
£10, he thanked her ... and kissed her ... that for that great bounty and kind deed, he 
should have £20 for his £10.227  
Edward realised that his personal presence could have a more successful outcome as ‘it 
deployed the king’s best talent: his persuasive charm’.228 Thus it appeared that traditional 
rhetoric from the government was not enough to elicit the support required for such an 
ambitious plan and Edward resorted to using the power of his personal image as a propagandist 
tool. 
Many of the arguments were old stalwarts, such as the king’s claim to his right 
inheritance in France and that domestic unrest would be avoided by the channeling of energies 
into external war. Edward IV also argued that the conquest of Gascony and Normandy would 
reduce the cost of keeping the seas against a formerly hostile coast. Charles Ross argued that 
these arguments were not truly representative of Edward's real motives.229 The relatively low 
key way in which this agitation propaganda appeared to have been conducted suggested to J. 
R. Lander that the emphasis for this campaign was ‘squarely and firmly placed upon defense 
rather than upon aggression’.230 Lander regarded Edward's campaign as a reaction to the long-
term effects of two decades of Anglo-Burgundian-French relationships.231 Thus there appeared 
to be a variety of reasons why Edward IV used propaganda to gain support for his invasion of 
France. He was appealing to his own supposed hereditary rights, internal peace and economic 
prudence but what his true motives were was not clear. It may simply have been intended as 
an act of retaliation against Louis XI after his support for Warwick and Margaret of Anjou. 
Edward's French campaign in 1475 was pro-active in attempting to create a crisis by 
highlighting the enmity between England and France. It in part showed that Edward felt 
sufficiently confident of his position, both in terms of personal popularity and the demise of a 
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Lancastrian threat. Despite apparent problems Edward raised one of the largest armies ever to 
invade France which is a testament to his skill as both a king and an astute propagandist, 
particularly at agitation.232 In comparing Edward with Henry V, Lander conceded that Edward 
had raised a similar amount of money in the same time period but ‘with infinitely more trouble 
than Henry…and against far greater resistance to payment’.233 Although Edward’s propaganda 
was evidently successful the resistance demonstrated that first, the country was very tired of 
foreign conflict and second, that his personality was perhaps not as attractive as Henry’s. 
However, when war was avoided, as Edward succumbed to the financial benefits 
offered at the Treaty of Picquigny in August 1475, such was the public outcry upon his return 
that he was obliged to remit three quarters of the next fifteenth and tenth that were due.234 The 
Crowland Chronicle commented that after this date Edward realised that it was unwise to try 
and ask for more subsidies and turned his attention to other means of increasing his income, 
such as the appointment of customs surveyors.235 
In 1481 the situation in the Scottish borders was deteriorating and Edward understood 
that he would need to embark on a costly campaign. He therefore instigated the collection of 
the second benevolence. Naturally Edward used his most eloquent propaganda in his signet 
letters asking for aid, emphasising the threat from the Scots: ‘to the confusion & vtter 
disheritaunce of vs & of our lieges, yf grete & mighty resistence be not spedely had, agaynest 
his vntrue & long purpensed malice’.236 Virgoe concluded that this benevolence was a 
testimony to the efficiency of Edward’s government and authority as it may have raised 
approximately £30,000.237 
 
Overall, Edward’s reign was characterised by the public complaint of the perceived 
avarice of himself and his court together with the reality that he had insufficient resources for 
defence and that despite his sophisticated propaganda it was his ‘personal’ intervention that 
yielded the greater results. Edward benefitted from an engaging personality, intelligence and 
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physical strength. Despite having usurped Henry VI, it was these personal qualities that made 
him initially popular, particularly with the city of London. However, Lancastrian and familial 
opposition to his rule was a constant theme during his first reign. After 1471 he was more 
secure, in his style of kingship, and in his finances as Steel stated ‘the ingenious Edward is 
secure, and so the powerful assistance of magnate treasurers, staplers, Londoners and Italian 
finance houses…falls right away’.238 Through his vigorous re-organisation of the royal 
finances he freed himself from one of the major political restraints and causes of unrest that 
afflicted the late medieval monarchy.  
 
When dealing with taxation Edward used a combination of propaganda and personality 
to raise funds. His propaganda was relatively traditional in that he played upon the fears of the 
populace, particularly the Londoners, and successfully agitated the population into paying their 
taxes. His use of physical propaganda combined with his charismatic personality on the tours 
around the country as seen in 1472 were successful in raising both support and money. In short 
Edward used propaganda when necessary, with mixed results, and his personality informed his 
policies, which were in the most part relatively successful. 
Conclusion. 
 
The case studies above demonstrate how important personal charisma was, especially when 
dealing with taxes. When the population were beginning to tire of the burden of taxation and 
other methods of propaganda had not been successful, it was often the physical appearance of 
both Henry V and Edward IV that persuaded people to pay. 
This highlights the degree to which even the most effective propaganda was limited in 
its ability to persuade the English polity to part willingly with their money. The many examples 
of mishandled policy and unfortunate expressions of royal personalities were the dominant 
factors here. The increasing mutual understanding of the purpose and value of parliamentary 
taxation should have provided opportunities to these monarchs but their inability to exploit the 
inherited indirect and direct systems to the full, and even more to innovate as Edward III had 
before them and Henry VIII was afterward, was in part down to the limited power of 
propaganda in these interactions between ruler and ruled. 
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 If one applies the differentiation between agitation and integration propaganda then 
integration propaganda, by its definition, could be used during quieter periods as a method of 
consolidation. An overview of the contemporary sources available revealed that the most 
striking feature was that events of major importance were reported or matters pertaining to the 
author's locality or personal affiliations. Therefore, to say that propaganda was used only during 
crises becomes misleading. The nature of writing, to inform or entertain, meant that the 
sensational made better reading. Thus, during quieter periods some contemporary sources 
failed to report on the mundane issues but this does not mean that propaganda was not being 
used. Integration propaganda was not always used in conjunction with a crisis in political 
affairs but was employed in a more subtle way, such as visual propaganda.  
So what was it that differentiated these kings between being successful or not? They all had 
the same institutional framework available to use to their advantage along with similar 
resources, although royal finance was subject to periods of ebb and flow. The methods of 
propaganda did not substantially vary from one reign to another and were relatively constant 
from the use of proclamations to processions. The primary difference lay with the personality 
of the king, propaganda on its own was not enough to influence, it needed to be projected 
through a charismatic persona. Agitation war propaganda in particular benefitted greatly from 
the personal intervention and involvement of outgoing and robust characters such as Henry V 
and Edward IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The North as a Producer and Receiver of Propaganda. 
 
‘The influence of the North was disproportionate to its wealth and population.’1 
 
R. L. Storey was expressing the view that the North of England, during the fifteenth 
century, wielded not inconsiderable political sway. Storey was basing this opinion on the role 
of the private affinities of the Lancastrian dynasty that came from this part of the kingdom and 
the importance of the Anglo-Scottish border in influencing the politics of the region.  
Was the North only actively involved when it was directly affected by political issues? 
Was the North just an appendage of national magnate ambition and politics? This chapter will 
be a case study for exploring the issues in the whole thesis in relation to one region, particularly 
in respect to the importance of the integration of the political community that is necessary, 
according to Ellul, for propaganda to be effective.2 The areas under discussion are Yorkshire 
and Northumberland and will include the differences between the rural and urban communities 
in their attitudes to politics and political propaganda, the main city under discussion being 
York. The emphasis will be to confirm the presence of propaganda within the region, whether 
it was being used consciously and to establish whether or not it was successful. The North will 
be examined as the subject of propaganda by others, that is, contemporary views of the region, 
and second as both a producer of and as an audience for, propaganda. 
This period was synonymous with the rivalry of the Percy and the Neville families and 
the exceptional power that they held in the North. These aristocratic families with their regional 
estates meant that politics extended out into the provinces and was not just centred around 
London. Simon Walker wrote that although policy came from Westminster, it was either 
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‘implemented or thwarted in the provinces’.3 A. J. Pollard argued that the Lancastrian 
usurpation of 1399 ushered in a period of increased Northern influence through the royal 
affinity based in the region which was only dissipated by the weak rule of Henry VI.4 This 
implied that politics in the North could have an impact on Westminster and thus played a part 
in the potential success or failure of a monarch. Christine Carpenter stated that despite the 
expansion of royal administration into the regions, it was still the nobility that held the real 
power in local government and that the nobility played a vital role linking central government 
to the locality.5 However, M. J. Bennett in his study of Cheshire regarded the gentry as holding 
the real power but it is worth remembering that the county had no notable nobility and thus its 
social structure differed from many counties.6 In her article on Clarence and the Midlands, 
Carpenter emphasized the importance of the tenure of land and property, in the politics of a 
region, by both magnate and monarch.7 Mark Arvanigian, writing about the Durham gentry, 
saw the study of regional politics as vital if the overall picture of national politics was to 
become transparent.8 Christian Liddy stated that the counties of Northumberland, Yorkshire 
and Durham ‘were characterised by a high concentration of noble landed power’ and perhaps 
were more feudal in their structure than other regions.9 The interaction between lordship and 
the local community, according to Liddy, revealed more about how society operated rather than 
the differences between the groups. High profile magnates like the Percies and Nevilles, tended 
to dominate the records, especially concerning national politics, often at the expense of local 
politics where different issues informed the decisions and lives of the lesser gentry and 
commons. The decline in regular Marcher activity meant that the political aspirations of the 
magnates in the far North changed focus from warfare to the acquisition of land and political 
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pre-eminence. This change in emphasis led to political unrest at a local level which drew the 
attention of London as the region was now a scene for potentially disruptive activity that could 
affect domestic politics. 
It would be pertinent as this point to establish where, in terms of geographical location, 
the chroniclers and other sources meant when they referred to the North.  Andy King has 
recently discussed the implications of the contemporary identification of the North as being the 
territory above the Trent, irrespective of the various and varied different counties within the 
region, suggesting ‘this southern tendency to lump together the whole of the North had 
consequences for the way that it was perceived’.10 Matt Holford has also commented on this 
use of the Trent as the geographical border between North and South: ‘the area north of the 
river Trent became increasingly associated with defence against the Scots, and the North in 
turn became associated with the area beyond the Trent’, such that ‘the North was a region 
created by outsiders’.11 The Cheshiremen, often regarded as wild and lawless, were very 
different from the men of Yorkshire and neither would have wanted to be associated with each 
other but, in the eyes of the contemporary commentators they were all from the North. The 
North-South divide is a term that may be traced back to the medieval period but was very much 
influenced by Tudor propaganda. Helen Jewell discussed this idea of the North-South divide 
and saw fear of the North by the southerners as a major factor in any hostility.12 Much of this 
antipathy was associated with the war against the Scots and the perception that the men of the 
North were aggressive, although they were usually on the defensive rather than offensive. 
Storey stated that when there was a Scottish threat it was the men of Yorkshire, Derbyshire and 
Nottinghamshire who were mustered to defend the border.13  
The geographical proximity to Scotland made the North important politically as a locus 
for a legitimate administrative and military presence in the region. This led to the establishment 
of organized and well-armed retinues by the local landed families. It was these retinues that 
not only helped to secure the border but were also employed to support their lord in other 
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disputes whether local or national. Tuck stated that the geographical position of 
Northumberland gave ‘a higher degree of cohesion and self-consciousness amongst its gentry 
families’.14 This probably also gave the borders population a greater awareness of the impact 
that political decisions, often made remotely, could have on their region and wellbeing. 
Inevitably this led to the gentry directly involving themselves in politics which was rare in most 
areas, excepting perhaps the Welsh marches and the south coast close to France.  
The skirmishes of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century on the Anglo-Scottish 
border further enforced an impression of a lawless and warlike North. The constant warring 
between England and the Scots had provided a military purpose for many men, not just 
Northerners. The opportunity for success in the borders attracted sons of the southern nobility 
with the promise of booty and social betterment. This meant that there was a coterie of men 
who had experience and knowledge of the North in terms of both geography and culture – it 
was not an unknown or alien region. After 1400 royal expeditions into Scotland became less 
frequent and thus issues of border security became very much focussed on the Northern 
magnates and their affinities.15 Inevitably this produced a new generation in the south who 
were not accustomed to border skirmishes and thus not familiar with the population of that area 
and indeed had no domestic knowledge of warfare.16 Thus there developed the belief that the 
region was filled with a population who enjoyed nothing better than a fight, leading to the 
misapprehension that Northerners were barbaric. King also cited the presence of various 
English knights at Parliament who witnessed the unruly behaviour of the Marcher lords 
associated with the many petitions and complaints made by them, and who would have returned 
home under the impression that the North was an area beset by violence and dispute.17 It is no 
surprise then to find such negative comments against the North by contemporary 
commentators, the majority of whom were southern in origin. 
Thus far the regions that comprised the North have been identified but just how 
coherent an entity was such a large area? Like many regions it had its own internal divisions, 
for example, Richmondshire was the hub of the Neville power whereas Northumberland was 
Percy territory. A. J. Pollard referred to the population of Richmondshire as having ‘an 
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importance in national politics out of all proportion to their wealth and location’.18 Helen Jewell 
highlighted the fact that the North itself was not politically homogenous citing the divisions 
between the Lancastrians of Northumberland and the Yorkists of Middleham.19 A. J. Pollard’s 
comprehensive study of the North-east of England during the Wars of the Roses emphasized 
the similarities between the North-east and other counties to the south – it was not different 
either geographically, economically or politically.20 However, internally there was a contrast 
between the countryside and the urban centres such as York that were predominantly 
mercantile in nature. The cities of York and Durham were significant ecclesiastical centres 
where the church wielded considerable influence over their inhabitants. Economically there 
were great differences between the wealth of the York area and poverty of the far North-east. 
The sheer geographical size of the region meant that there was a diversity of political allegiance 
that often crossed over into national politics. This provided the region with a political vibrancy 
that was reflected in the active participation in politics by the population. 
In attempting to assess the production and use of propaganda the presence of an 
integrated communications network would have been essential in such a vast region. 
Communication links between the North and South were quite good and regularly used and 
there was a frequent movement of people between the regions aided by an extensive road 
network that linked London to the rest of the nation, including the North of the country.21 
Stenton cited a journey from London to York that took only 6 days with the return journey 
taking only 5 days.22 Many of the large landowners of the North also had estates in the South 
and vice versa, for example the Lords Beauchamp and Lovell had estates at Barnard Castle and 
Bedale respectively.23 This naturally led to a flow between London and the north of both 
landowners and their servants. William Musgrave rode from Westmorland to Knole in Kent 
three times during one accounting year to deliver revenue from the Neville of Latimer estates.24 
There was a group of Northerners, lawyers and gentry, who regularly commuted between the 
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north and south and likewise southerners who took the reverse journey. In May 1481, a member 
of the Cely family, Richard junior, went to York to see his uncle’s executors and received ‘great 
cheer’ from among his old northern acquaintances.25 The evidence confirms the established 
transport network that ran between the north and south, enabling political interaction and 
communication. 
In 1398 a proclamation requesting that the duke of Norfolk should appear before the 
king was received and read in eighteen towns in Yorkshire within five days.26 In 1448 a 
proclamation, regarding a settlement between England and Spain, was read out at several places 
in York revealing how news of national importance was transmitted to the provinces.27 Civic 
contact with London was also regular as the citizens of York travelled to the capital to 
experience at first hand the intrigues of Westminster and the latest propaganda. It was agreed 
in April 1480:  
alderman Thomas Wrangwish will ride to London to the king’s council…and that 
Nicholas Pereson will ride with him…with various letters written…to Richard duke of 
Gloucester, to the lord chancellor, the lord chamberlain…Thomas Davyson will ride to 
the duke of Gloucester for recorder Miles Metcalff.28 
A town like York relied on its own observers for important political news and in 1485 
despatched the serjeant at mace to Bosworth, specifically for the purpose of procuring news of 
the outcome of the battle.29  
As well as civic officials, lawyers and merchants there were other travellers on the road, 
such as pilgrims and players. There were pilgrims from Yorkshire who travelled to shrines in 
other regions as recorded by the York Mercers and Merchant Adventurers in 1457: ‘item, payd 
to Thomas Robynson for pylgramage to owr lady of Walsyngham, xijs’.30 There were expenses 
for another pilgrimage to Doncaster in the same year which indicated that the merchants were 
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able to mix, not only with other merchants, but also with members of religious communities 
and the public not involved in trade.31 Nicholas Orme cited an example of travel by boys around 
the region for the celebration of Innocents Day in York when they travelled as far as 
Northallerton and Doncaster over a period of days.32 In 1392 a John Berwald from Cottingham 
was charged with the composition of a rhyme which he had proclaimed in Beverley and Hull 
in a week as well as other places in the region.33 This demonstrated that travel was not 
uncommon and that there were few barriers to mobility, including age, within the region. 
The image of the uncivilised and isolated North appears to be largely inaccurate as 
people seemed to travel the length of the country quite regularly providing an opportunity for 
communication, including political propaganda, to be disseminated. Communication networks, 
both economic and social, were established and the region was regularly informed about 
matters both domestic and foreign.34  
A great deal has been written on Northern politics solely in terms of the rivalries 
between the great affinities of Neville and Percy, often to the detriment of the study of other 
political activity at a more local level. Under the ‘shadow of four of England’s greatest 
landowners’ was how Ralph Griffiths described Yorkshire during the mid-fifteenth century.35 
He saw the intimate rivalry and personal family issues as impacting upon the politics of the 
region and the nation. The ownership of large estates together with the control of the marches, 
gave the owner certain responsibilities, such as the ability to keep an affinity, and to control 
events for their own gain.36 Thus it would be fair to say that whoever owned the land also 
controlled the local politics. A. J. Pollard stated that ‘because of the innate might of its 
magnates the north-east possessed a potential to disrupt the whole of the kingdom’.37 Local 
feuds had developed into monstrous proportions and it was the failure of the government to 
intercede in these quarrels between families, such as the Courtenay and Bonvilles of the west 
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country, and specifically to the North, Neville and Percy, that often led to the breakdown of 
social order at both a local and national level. 
The disturbances in Knaresborough between 1438 and 1461 were an example of the 
machinations of the Percy and Neville families and an instance where local groups were 
producing and receiving propaganda. Ruth Wilcock’s examination of the events revealed that 
even local grievances could not be free from the interference of the Percies and Nevilles.38 The 
honour of Knaresborough lay within the Duchy of Lancaster and the steward was Sir William 
Plumpton, a loyal Percy retainer. However, there were manors within the area, such as Scotton 
and Brearton that were in the ownership of the earl of Somerset and thus anti-Lancastrian in 
sentiment. Added to the magnate involvement was the role of the Archbishop of York, John 
Kemp, who held the manor and liberty of Ripon. Kemp was closely associated with Henry VI 
and was chancellor between 1426 and 1443 and again 1450-54. He was, however, most 
unpopular in the North as Wilcock discussed.39 The increasing tension between the men of 
Knaresborough and Ripon due to the payment of tolls and the role of Kemp led to a serious 
breakdown of the status quo between Sir William Plumpton and the Archbishop.40 Evidence 
of physical propaganda aimed at intimidation by both sides is telling on several occasions.41   
In May 1443 a proclamation was sent to the sheriff of York to stop the enemies of Kemp 
‘going about to sow dissension among the people…to stir up…the hearts and minds of the 
hearers against him’.42 However, as events continued to spiral out of control it became apparent 
that further intervention by Westminster was necessary and in February 1444 an order was 
passed that a proclamation banning any gatherings should be read in the lordship of 
Knaresborough.43 What had begun as a local disagreement with locally produced propaganda 
for a local audience developed into a national issue that attracted the attention of Westminster. 
Although parochial in origin this was a further example of the Neville/Percy fight for Northern 
supremacy producing physical propaganda and causing unrest which was allowed to go 
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unchecked due to the weak kingship of Henry VI.  
However, Northern politics were more complex than just the Neville/Percy 
relationship. Although they both had extensive affinities, there was a large proportion of the 
population who in general supported the monarch rather than their local magnate. Andy King 
stated that although the Percies could count on the support of the gentry in attacking the Scots 
it was not the case when it came to opposing the king.44 King revealed that Hotspur had little 
faith in his own Northumbrian supporters and had to rely on the support of disaffected 
Cheshiremen.45 In 1408 when Henry Percy together with Lord Bardolf returned from Scotland 
in an attempt to remove Henry IV: ‘the shireve of Yorke reised peple and toke theym, & smote 
off their hedes, and the hede off þe erle and a quarter of the lorde were sette on London 
Brigge’.46 This suggests that Northumberland was not popular in Yorkshire and interestingly 
his head was not put up in York like that of his son Hotspur in 1403 but sent to London. This 
could be interpreted as sending a message to both London and Henry IV that the city of York 
had no affiliations with Percy, and that his head was in fact an offering of their allegiance. 
According to Mark Arvanigian the reigns of both Henry IV and Henry V were vital in 
strengthening royal influence in the region whilst the Percies were absent.47 Henry IV sought 
greater control through placing Lancastrian supporters in strategic positions, with particular 
emphasis on the Beaufort-Neville family. However, Henry V broadened his patronage through 
local connections and thus ensured that what had been a troublesome region was under control 
so he could focus on his French aspirations. This was successful for a time but inevitably Percy 
animosity to the Neville ascendency developed into inter-regional conflict again. As the above 
has shown allegiances were flexible and not straightforward which in such a large region could 
lead to internal divisions which naturally made communication all the more important to the 
parties involved to ensure that their message was the loudest and most persuasive. 
The opening quotation by Storey implied that the North was politically influential at a 
national level, an impression that was further enhanced by its later association with Richard 
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III.48 Ralph Griffiths writing about the Wars of the Roses highlighted that many of the strategic 
battles were fought in the North.49 These battles were fought on the basis of national or dynastic 
disputes rather than on specifically Northern concerns. The defining battle that ended 
Lancastrian rule and saw Yorkist success was the battle of Towton, fought in Yorkshire. It was 
certainly true that although there was a Northern locus for the battle the causes were national 
rather than Northern. The Yorkist victory did provide the opportunity for visual propaganda 
aimed specifically at a Lancastrian audience based in the North as the earl of Devon was 
executed at York the next day and the earl of Wiltshire at Newcastle.50 The North in this 
instance was an incredibly powerful tool for Yorkist propaganda, in terms of its position, in 
demoralising Lancastrian resistance and asserting Yorkist hegemony. The subsequent 
confiscation and transfer of Percy property into the hands of Warwick sought to consolidate 
the Neville dominance in the region and thus adulterate Lancastrian support as the region 
became an audience for the subjugation of the Lancastrians.51 This was an integral part of 
Yorkist propaganda to establish their new regime in a politically important and challenging 
region. 
There is no doubt that the region was of great strategic and thus political importance to 
the kingdom and this was further strengthened by the presence of the Percy and Neville estates. 
These two politically influential families not only controlled the local polity but were also at 
the forefront of national events and therefore much propaganda stemmed from their interests 
and ambitions.  
If the Percy and Neville families were the most significant individuals in the region, 
then York was the most important city. This section will outline the relevance of the city in 
terms of communication that provided opportunities for propaganda to circulate amongst its 
own inhabitants and the region as a whole. As the capital of the region York during the 
fourteenth century had been the second city only to London. Writing in 1461 the Milanese 
ambassador, Prospero de Camulio, described York as ‘a fine city’.52 Barrie Dobson regarded 
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the concept of the North as a geographical expression with York as the central pivot.53 Dobson 
observed that the establishment in the late thirteenth century of an English parliament 
minimized the possibility of a Northern assembly being created, the inference being that the 
most powerful and politically minded Northerners would be attracted to London.54 It was the 
seat of county administration, provided sessions of Royal justices and during the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries operated two mints.55  
Griffiths believed that York was highly coveted by both Percy and Neville families for 
a variety of reasons including social, political and economic.56 Griffiths stated that the city of 
York actually found it prudent to befriend a variety of their powerful magnate neighbours 
through gifts in order to protect their own interests.57 The Percies and Nevilles both owned inns 
on Walmgate, and William Latimer had an inn on Coney Street.58 These inns would not only 
have provided accommodation for the family and their retainers but also an opportunity for 
political dialogue and the chance for the mercantile community to seek influence with these 
potentially powerful patrons. 
York was geographically well placed, standing at a major junction of roads and rivers, 
for much of the economic activity for a region. It was the largest town north of the Humber in 
the mid-fifteenth century. The extensive river network connected the city to the Pennines in 
the west and the Scottish borders via either Newcastle in the east or Carlisle to the west.59 York 
served as a major centre for the distribution of imported goods such as spices, dyestuffs, wine 
and copper that came in through the port of Hull and also the domestic produce of the area such 
as lead from Swaledale and wool from the Dales.60 The variety of goods exchanged ranged 
from agricultural produce to Dales stockings and Kendal cloth which necessitated the meeting 
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of people from different geographical and social backgrounds.61 Markets were regularly held 
twice a week within York and there were separate markets for the foreign traders, that is, those 
living outside the city.62 Trade flourished through these fairs, markets and shops which 
inevitably provided suitable conditions for the exchange of news as well as goods. These 
gatherings provided the opportunity for the proclamation of official news as well as local 
gossip. In May 1383 the sheriff of York received notice from the king: ‘to cause proclamation 
to be made divers times on fair days and market days of the king’s will’.63 The markets and 
fairs would have provided Ellul's isolated farmer with the opportunity to come into contact 
with news including propaganda.64  
The coastal trade that existed, particularly from Hull up the Ouse to York, was also 
important. Wendy Childs showed that London ships were recorded in the Hull customs records, 
admittedly not many, but the opportunity to receive news from the south was there.65 The 
reverse trip with Northern ships sailing to London would likewise have provided suitable 
opportunities along with the presence of foreign shipping. The merchants of York had an 
increasing number of debts with London merchants which J. Kermode saw as a reflection of 
the growing interest of Londoners in Northern trade.66 The increase in the woollen industry of 
the West Riding led to the export of cloth via London which adversely affected the trade in 
York. In fact there was evidence of a growing tension between the northern wool merchants 
and those of London as described in the accounts of 1478 from the York Merchant Adventurers: 
‘thai ar compelled to have the places for the utterance of the clothe in stretes joynyng nyghe 
the marchandise of London, to thentent that the clothe of the north parties sall apere wers, and 
their clothe to apere the better’.67 The York textile trade also had to face the increasing 
competition from the West Riding which led to an economic decline. Pollard emphasized the 
problems that the economic and agrarian downturns had on both the population and the 
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magnates in both rural and urban settings.68  
As well as a political and economic centre for Yorkshire, York was an important 
ecclesiastical centre. Barrie Dobson perceived that the archbishops of York, as servants of the 
monarchy, were more connected to Westminster than the city of York particularly as the 
position was often a ‘reward for chancellors or ex-chancellors’.69 This strong bond between 
Westminster and the archbishop meant that they were unable to exert much independent 
political will in the region and if they did try it could end in disaster as the execution of Scrope 
proved.70 York Minster was not only an important religious space but it also provided a 
significant visual space for dynastic propaganda that was intended to communicate to a 
Northern audience. York Minster as the regional church was appropriated for dynastic 
propaganda for an urban audience. This time it was at the initiation of Thomas Langley, who 
commissioned a window in the south-east transept which reinforced the Lancastrian dynasty 
whilst confirming Langley’s connection with the régime. The window was an example of the 
Minster providing the surroundings for an audience to witness the apparent legitimacy of the 
Lancastrians and to commit this visual history to memory.71 During the tenure of Archbishop 
Kemp this Lancastrian propaganda was further enforced with the construction of the choir 
screen. It shows a series of representations of the kings of England, including Edward III 
through to Henry VI, further acknowledging the place of the Lancastrian dynasty in the 
chronology of English history.72 This was during a time of upheaval and unrest within the realm 
and Kemp was probably hoping to emphasise the legitimacy of the Lancastrian dynasty whilst 
securing his own legacy. 
As stated in the opening chapter, education was necessary for propaganda to be 
successful.73 Education was well provided for in York with St Peter’s school and the nearby 
Acaster College. Robert Stillington recognised the need for education and established at 
Acaster, York a school employing three masters to teach respectively grammar, music and ‘the 
third to teche to Write and all such things as belonged to Scrivener Craft to all manner of 
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persons within the realm of England’.74 Due to poor documentation it is hard to establish 
exactly the level of educational provision within the city of York but J. Moran stated that it 
continued to be a centre for grammar school level education for the North of England.75 As has 
been discussed York had a large mercantile community who were increasingly well educated 
in order to conduct their business.76  
At the end of the fourteenth century the merchants of York were the political force 
behind civic affairs and free from Percy or Neville influence unlike the later events at 
Knaresborough.77 In 1380 there was an uprising which was the result of urban disquiet. 
Christian Liddy concurred with Mark Ormrod that the issues of royal and civic finance together 
with the city’s complicated internal politics led to the 1380 uprising.78 The increasing burden 
of royal demands for war expenditure combined with internal urban financial disquiet led to 
the mayor, John de Gysburn, being hounded out of the city on 26 November 1380 by a group 
of rebels. The same rebels then besieged York’s guildhall, the centre of civic government, and 
appointed their choice of mayor, Simon de Quixlay. This appeared to be a well-orchestrated 
event, and the rebels declared that whenever they had new proclamations to be read the bells 
on Ouse Bridge would be rung ‘aukeward’.79 This was the method chosen by the rebels to 
disseminate their propaganda to the mostly urban audience. The motivation behind the 
rebellion was that the commons felt that the civic government was not representing or 
governing well for the common good. This event indicated that the York urban population 
assumed that they could and indeed did influence local politics to the betterment of their 
position.  
The disturbances at York were noted at Westminster as recorded on the Parliament 
Rolls: ‘they continue to perform their evil and terrible deeds ... to the destruction of the said 
city’.80 The roll then asked that the earl of Northumberland should gather a party to investigate 
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the events at York and that the leaders of the rebellion should be rounded up immediately.81 
The matter had by now reached an external audience and the king called for a proclamation to 
be read in the city calling for the citizens to be obedient to the mayor ‘so that none can excuse 
himself on the grounds of ignorance’.82 This was an occasion when the local audience became 
national when it came to the attention of parliament. The propaganda, although produced 
internally had arisen out of a mixture of both local disputes and the burden of national taxation. 
This was, for the period, a rare occasion when the influence of either Neville or Percy does not 
appear to have been involved – it was very much an internal political response by the citizens 
of York. Significantly, these events in York preceded the Peasants’ Revolt by six months and 
suggest that Northern politics led the way in expressing popular opposition to taxation.83  
The success of the York merchants inevitably led to their increased political power and 
their taking over the lead from the older landed families in the urban centres. Barrie Dobson 
said ‘this was a city which had no need to treat Yorkshire gentry or even Yorkshire magnates 
with excessive awe’.84 Mark Ormrod considered that the urban uprisings of York, Scarborough 
and Beverley in 1381 were the result of local problems and that towns were ‘primarily 
preoccupied with their own often tumultuous internal affairs’.85 During the risings of 1380-
1381 Richard II regarded these towns as potential hot spots of unrest.86 The city of York, with 
its powerful mercantile class, was very much independent in thought and deed when it came to 
politics and safeguarding its own interests. 
Christian Liddy regarded the involvement of the craft guilds and the commons in the 
politics of the city as a vital component in its unique independence of spirit and ability and 
infrastructure to organise successful political opposition to the established hierarchy of class 
structure.87 Its confidence and independence derived from a successful and thriving economy 
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based on the wool trade of the early fourteenth century. This economic success story however, 
started to decline by the end of the fourteenth century and during the next century York was 
gradually superceded in the textile industry by the West Riding. The city although 
economically impoverished still held its political prominence due to its strategic position and 
later through its patronage by Richard III. 
It may be pertinent at this stage to consider York’s political influence as reflected 
through its relationship with the crown and in particular to focus on political communication 
during the reigns of Richard II and Richard III. 
A great deal has been written about the relationship between Richard II and the city of 
York.88 Richard’s moving of government to York in May 1392 has been cited as evidence of 
his fondness for the city however, it probably had more to do with the breakdown of his 
relationship, both political and financial, with London.89 This event could be regarded as pitting 
the North against the South with Richard regarding London as an audience for his propaganda 
to show them his displeasure with their behaviour. York could be viewed as having been used 
unwittingly in this process to bring the Londoners back in line. Perhaps this may be too cynical 
a view but nevertheless it worked and showed that York was regarded seriously as a potential 
threat to the pre-eminence of London. There was an implicit suggestion that the North could 
compete politically for the king and court. Given-Wilson cited the increased number of 
Richard’s knights that were drawn from the North as a sign that he was trying to court favour 
with the region. Nigel Saul argued that Richard favoured York no more than other cities but it 
fitted into his plan to create various regional centres.90 However, his patronage of the minster 
was significant and genuine and probably led to the employment of so many Northern clerks 
in his household. Both Thomas Arundel and Richard Scrope served as chancellor and diplomat 
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respectively.91 His donations to the rebuilding resulted in his badge of a white hart being carved 
on a capital for all to see and to remind York of his patronage.92 Richard’s reign proved 
noteworthy for the city of York through his presence and patronage. However, by 1399 York 
was lending money to Henry Bolingbroke probably due to Richard’s excessive financial 
demands.93 This was repaid by Henry, when king, to the city of York in July 1400: ‘repayment 
of 500 marks lent by them to the king in his necessity before he undertook the governance of 
the realm and received by him in person’.94 The citizens of York were perceptive enough to 
realise that Richard’s regime was in decline and they needed to look to their future welfare. 
The granting of a royal charter to York in 1396 by Richard II provided the city with the 
privilege of self-government.95 The granting of the charter in itself revealed the self-
determination of the citizens in obtaining the charter through petitioning the king.96 York 
provided a base for diplomatic discussions between the king and Scotland but Ormrod 
suggested that the Hundred Years War drew the political focus away from the North and York, 
to London and its proximity to France. He further speculated that by the end of the fourteenth 
century Calais had become the second city to London rather than York.97  
Towards the end of the fifteenth century the city was still of major political importance 
to the crown. Richard’s re-coronation that took place in York in August 1483 was indicative 
of his relationship with the city itself and his strong connection with his Northern affinity, and 
as such was a strategic audience for this visual propaganda at the beginning of his reign.98 York 
was a vital audience for Richard III and in an appeal to the citizens of York on 15 June 1483, 
he requested their help against the queen, Elizabeth Woodville: ‘assiste us ayanst the Quiene 
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...which entended and daly doith intend, to murder and utterly distroy us and our cosyn, the duc 
of Bukkyngham’.99 The city responded ‘with cc horsmen, defensably arayd,’ to travel to 
London.100 Only a few weeks later it was Buckingham who was seen as a traitor and from the 
York House Books it was possible to see an example of Richard III's propagandist appeal to the 
citizens of York in his fight against Buckingham in 1483.101 On 13 October 1483 John Oter 
returned from the king in London with a letter declaring that the duke of Buckingham was a 
traitor: ‘the deuce of Bukyngham traitoursly contrary to hys legiaunce is turnyd ayanst our said 
lord the kyng’.102 Richard III was asking the mayor to gather a number of men together and 
come to him at Leicester, he was agitating them into action. The mayor and council agreed to 
this and sent Thomas Wrangwish as the captain. 
In response to this plea to meet Richard in one week’s time at Leicester, the mayor and 
councillors agreed to send as many people as possible under the leadership of Thomas 
Wrangwish. A letter of October 1483 from Edward Plumpton to Sir Robert Plumpton reported 
that ‘messengers commyth dayly, both from the king’s grace and the Duke into this county’.103 
This letter is particularly significant as it was written on the day that the Duke of Buckingham 
openly appeared in arms against Richard III at Brecknock. It is interesting to note that both 
sides obviously realised the importance of trying to influence a Northern audience. At 
Bosworth, however, the failure of Stanley and Northumberland to fight ultimately cost Richard 
the throne and his life thus ‘it was the north that betrayed Richard at Bosworth’.104 In the end, 
it could be said that, it was the North that caused the downfall of the Yorkist dynasty.  
Thus, it is apparent that York’s position, both economically and politically, was to have 
a two-fold effect on the region. First, the established communication system ensured that the 
North was in touch with events at Westminster and second, it could be seen as a broadcaster of 
news via the flow of people passing through the city. It was effectively a centre for information 
gathering and dissemination for the North as London was for the south. The mix of magnate 
and mercantile interests meant that the city was in many ways a Northern microcosm of its 
larger cousin, London. Added together with the power of its ecclesiastical establishment, York 
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was in many ways exceptionally positioned to express its power, within the North itself, and 
also over domestic politics.  
The other major city in the region was Durham ruled over by the Bishop of Durham. 
Its geographical position made it strategically important as a buffer should the rest of 
Northumberland fall to the Scots. The east of the palatinate provided rich farmlands and the 
majority of the wealthy families were to be found in this area. Liddy regarded this area as being 
essentially the same as many areas in southern and central England in terms of its manorialised 
regime.105 Whilst the barren west was the source of what was to become the lucrative coal 
fields of the region. The palatinate had its own Chancery, Exchequer, court system and mint 
and perhaps more importantly was not represented at Westminster, unlike York. This meant 
that the city remained independent of Westminster dictats and more importantly, taxes. 
Although the bishop was appointed by the monarch, and often had been a chancellor, and was 
in many ways the king’s representative in the region, the bishops were fiercely loyal to the 
palatinate and their ‘flock’. The king had less influence in Durham than in the palatinate of 
Chester where the earl was a member of the royal family. The bishop was the main landowner 
in the palatinate which strengthened his position against the encroachment of powerful 
landowning families such as the Nevilles, at least until the fifteenth century. Although Durham 
was an important city the emphasis in this thesis will be placed on an examination of York and 
its role in the politics of the North in the late medieval period. 
In order to find examples of political propaganda at a regional level two Northern 
sources will be examined; the York House Books and the Plumpton Letters. First, through the 
examination of documents contained in the York House Books a picture of urban politics at 
both a local and national level emerges.106 These documents identified the flow of 
communication that existed between not only the city and the capital but also leading nobles. 
Covering the later period of the Wars of the Roses, the York House Books of the period 1461-
1490 provide a selection of letters and although not representative still provide evidence of 
communication, not only between York and London but also between York and other regional 
magnates.107 Sarah Rees Jones regarded these civic texts, like the Coventry Leet Book, as an 
indication of the ‘expanding culture of civic literacy…but also enabled new forms of political 
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activity’.108 Rees Jones emphasised the need for ‘good conversation’ which was a reflection of 
the increased political awareness and the need for social engagement within the polity.109 
In the period 1476-1479 a mere 1% of the extant documents from either the king or 
magnates related to issues of national importance but 6% of their correspondence was of a local 
or civic nature. Between 1480 and 1486 the percentages are 2% and 5% respectively, the slight 
increase in national letters may be a reflection of the political unrest that existed in the mid-
1480’s. Although these percentages are small it is important to remember that letters relating 
to civic matters would be more numerous. The appendices, with fewer documents, reveal a 
higher percentage of letters relating to national matters, for example, in appendix II, of the 15 
documents 47% are national in tone relating mostly to the raising of troops to fight the Scots, 
confirming that Yorkshire, and York in particular was an important audience for 
propaganda.110 In June 1476 John Eglesfelde, esquire, rode to the earl of Northumberland with 
a letter from the mayor in response to one received from the earl.111 This letter was dealing 
with the issue of a clerk, Thomas Yotten who had been accused of dishonesty and the House 
Books reveal that a considerable number of letters were generated and circulated concerning 
this matter. These letters were read out and debated, a part of the increasing aurality that Rees 
Jones saw as an attempt by the civic administrators to engage in the formation of public opinion 
outside the council chamber.112 In July 1476 letters to be sent to the king, duke of Gloucester 
and lords Hastings and Stanley regarding Thomas Yotten: ‘were read aloud and declared 
true’.113 
From these examples it is possible to see just how an efficient communications network 
between the North and south allowed York to play an integral part in national politics. The 
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mayor and council of York sought advice and in turn received it, whether from Westminster or 
from magnates such as the earls of Northumberland. It appeared to be a mature and reciprocal 
relationship that ensured that both parties knew what was going on at Westminster and at a 
local level.  
In April 1485 Richard III wrote to the city complaining ‘that diverse sedicious and evil 
disposed personnes ... sowe sede of noise and disclaundre agaynest our persone’.114 Richard 
then detailed the methods of propaganda being used by his adversaries before calling on the 
mayor to arrest anyone caught speaking ill of the king or posting up sedicious bills and finally 
warning that if they fail it will be ‘at your extremme perill’.115 From this it may be concluded 
that this propaganda being produced was quite comprehensive and the city council was unable 
to control it. It also revealed that Richard had excellent communication sources within the city 
who reported not only the propaganda but the exact methods being employed. Finally, Richard 
who appeared to feel let down by a city that he had close relations with openly threatened the 
mayor that if it was not contained then there would be serious repercussions. Richard sounded 
like he had been betrayed in a region where his major supporters were suggesting that his 
popularity was waning within his own power base. 
Despite the limitations of the York House Books, in terms of time period and mercantile 
bias, they still provide valuable evidence of the flow of news between York and London and 
other areas. They reveal the relationship of Richard duke of Gloucester as lieutenant of the 
North and as king and his role in the civic affairs of the city. In March 1482 the city prepared 
to welcome the duke of Gloucester to give him ‘a laudable thanke for his gude and benevolent 
lordship that he at all tymez have had unto this cite’.116 The letters that related to national 
matters tended to be concerned with raising troops for the war with the Scots and the declaration 
of the duke of Buckingham as a traitor, all from the early 1480’s. Rees Jones regarded the York 
House Books as part of a ‘new Yorkist political culture founded upon a heightened awareness 
of the political importance of good conversation’.117 The books confirm the importance of 
York, both as a political audience and as a geographically strategically important city in the 
region. 
                                                 
114 Ibid., pp. 359-360. 
115 Ibid., pp. 359-360. He cites ‘setting up of billes, messages, bold opne spech’ as three of 
the methods used.  
116 Ibid., pp. 250-1. 
117 Rees Jones, ‘Emotions, speech and the art of politics’, pp. 602-6. 
174 
 
In contrast to the civic correspondence of the York House Books the Plumptons of 
Knaresborough provide the historian with an insight into the importance of national affairs to 
a Northern gentry family and the role of magnate allegiance. Due to their Percy connections, 
involvement in local politics and their litigious nature, the correspondence is broad with both 
familial and official letters recorded. The Plumptons were an ancient family with modest 
estates in Knaresborough, Grassington, Idle, Steeton and Studley. Their prospects improved 
considerably with the marriage of Sir Robert to Alice Foljambe who brought with her 
considerable estates in Derbyshire, Nottinghamshire and Staffordshire. The family came to the 
attention of the nation and thus the chroniclers when Sir William was executed in York for his 
involvement in Scrope’s rebellion of 1405 and his head was displayed on Micklegate Bar. 
Despite their support for the Percies the king was lenient with them and they continued with 
their rise up the social ladder through strategic marriages which increased their estates and their 
reputation for litigation. Their political affinity to the Percies caused Sir William to be removed 
from the commission of the peace in August 1460. However, undaunted and with a true skill 
for self- preservation he agreed to pay Edward IV a sum of £2,000 as a sign of good behaviour. 
Unfortunately, despite his connections he failed to raise the sum and spent almost eight months 
in the Tower as a result. He was later accused of treason and again was pardoned.118 Sir William 
continued to display political pragmatism by supporting the earl of Warwick when strategically 
expedient whilst remaining a Lancastrian at heart. When he was replaced as steward of the 
honor of Knaresborough by Sir William Gascoigne on the orders of Henry Percy in the early 
1470’s this must have tested his loyalty.  A letter from circa 1470 from Henry Percy to Sir 
William reveals the mutuality of their relationship, when Percy is asking for the bailship of 
Sessay for Edmund Cape: ‘My trust is in you that, the rather for this mine instance & 
contemplation, ye will fulfil this my desire, and I will be as well-willed to doe thinge for your 
pleasure’.119 
Sir William’s son Robert supported the Percies and was rewarded with a knighthood in 
1481 from the earl of Northumberland after a Scottish campaign. Over the period 1433-1485 
of Sir Edward Plumpton’s Letter Book, 20% of the letters related to national events rather than 
just the familial or legal.120 The letters reveal that communication between Knaresborough and 
London and other parts of the country was extensive.  
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The Plumptons’ lawyers would have regularly travelled to London and their other 
estates around the country and would have heard the latest local and national news which was 
then reported back to the Plumptons. In December 1468 Godfrey Greene, lawyer, wrote from 
London to Sir William Plumpton of recent events ‘my Lord of Oxford is comitt to the tower, 
and it is said kept in irons, and that he has confessed myche thinge’.121 Thomas Middleton, 
another lawyer and son-in-law of Sir William, in a letter of 1466 to Sir William when talking 
about the whereabouts of certain magnates said ‘the king, my lord chauncler, and the earle of 
Warwick ar at London; he came to the towne with 3 horse and more’.122 An example of the 
Plumptons as an audience for propaganda may be found in a letter from Henry VI, written at 
York in March 1460/1 to Sir William urging or agitating him to defend the king against the 
following of the late Earl of March by coming to his assistance wherever he may be: ‘the late 
earle of Mearch hath made great assemblies of riotouse and mischeously disposed people; and 
to stirr and prouocke them to draw vnto him he hath cried in his proclamations hauok vpon all 
our trew liege people and subiects, theire wiues, children & goods’.123 This of course was 
written only a couple of weeks before the decisive battle of Towton, where William junior lost 
his life fighting for the Lancastrians, which resulted in Yorkist victory. The proximity to 
Scotland meant that the Plumptons were called on to support their king in defence of the border 
on numerous occasions. In December 1480 Northumberland wrote to Robert Plumpton asking 
for his support: ‘therfore on the king owr soueraigne lords behalf I charg you, and also on myne 
as wardeyn,…be with me at Topcliffe vppon Munday’.124 Buckingham’s rebellion in 1483 was 
of great concern to the Plumptons, as recorded in a letter from Edward Plumpton to Sir Robert 
in October of that year: ‘I trust that he shalbe right withstanded & all his mallice. Messingers 
comyth dayly both from the kings grace & the duke into this county’.125 Although the county 
here was Lancashire it demonstrates the activity by both parties in attempting to influence a 
Northern audience. 
Due to their prominent position in the North and the vicissitudes of the politics of the 
Wars of the Roses the Plumptons provided a picture of a Northern society that was very much 
at the heart of politics if not at the centre of Westminster. The letters confirm that 
communication between the North and the rest of the country was efficient and thus news was 
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easily obtained. Their political connections and aspirations meant that they were often an 
audience for propaganda, whether local or national, as their involvement was often called upon. 
Likewise, the York House Books exhibit the relationship between the city, local magnate 
influence and Westminster and the regular communication that existed between all the parties. 
The York House Books and the Plumpton letters provide evidence from both a Northern civic 
and, family perspective that reveal the North as an active political audience during the period 
of the Wars of the Roses. They also contrast the interests between an urban mercantile and rural 
land orientated gentry standpoint. Both sources demonstrate political awareness and 
involvement at a regional and national level indicating that late fifteenth-century politics were 
being discussed, acted upon and recorded in the regions and that there was the development of 
a mutually reciprocal relationship between crown, magnate, gentry and merchant. 
Now that it has been established that the region was well served in terms of 
communication networks it will be examined first, as the subject of propaganda by others, 
that is, contemporary views of the region, second, as a producer of propaganda and as an 
audience for propaganda through the use of two case studies. 
The North as a subject of propaganda. 
Over the centuries, a conventional view of the North as uneducated, socially inferior 
and warlike became accepted. It is therefore important to consider how the region was regarded 
by its southern contemporaries during the later medieval period. In other words how was the 
North treated as a subject of propaganda? In 1378 the St. Albans Chronicle wrote of the 
‘stupidity and arrogance of the Northumbrians’ when they were attacked by the Scots.126 
Polydore Vergil apparently thought that Northerners were less civilised, although he was 
heavily influenced by anti-Yorkist Tudor propaganda rather than fact.127 Richard II’s fondness 
for his Cheshire affinity was ill-regarded by the rest of the country, writing in 1397 the St. 
Albans Chronicle referred to them as ‘criminals brought together from the county of Cheshire  
... who were bestial by nature, and ready to perpetrate any wicked act’.128 By the mid-fifteenth 
century however, under the guidance of Henry VI and Margaret of Anjou, it was the men of 
Durham, Northumberland and Yorkshire who were regarded as lawless and violent. After the 
battle of Wakefield the English Chronicle complained of the behaviour of the Northerners 
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referring to them as: ‘paynemes or Sarracenes, and no Crysten men’.129 In 1460 prince Edward 
wrote to the city of London to allay their fears about the Northerners: ‘ye nor noon of you 
shalbe robbed, despoiled nor wronged by any personne that shall at that tyme come with us’.130 
In January 1461 Clement Paston wrote to his brother John warning him of the army being led 
by Margaret of Anjou ‘for the pepill in the northe robbe and styll, and ben apoynted to pill all 
thys cuntre’.131 Prior to the battle of Towton in March 1461 Ingulph’s Chronicle refered to ‘the 
wretched northmen…were compelled, much against their will, to leave behind them the booty 
which they had collected in various places’.132 The bishop of Salisbury, Richard Beauchamp 
echoed the comments by the author of Ingulph’s Chronicle when writing to Francesco Coppini: 
‘We, however, were harassed by fear of utter destruction until the northerners with their captive 
king returned straggling northwards’.133 
After the second battle of St. Albans Gregory’s Chronicle recorded that even King 
Henry VI and Margaret realized that their Northern army would have wreaked havoc on 
London and kept them at York: ‘for they demyde that the Northeryn men wolde have ben to 
cruelle in robbyng yf they hadde come to London’.134 This suggests that the army was not well 
organized or disciplined despite being a traditional affinity, and that the king had little control 
over it. All of these examples cast the North in an unfavourable light and unfortunately any 
positive references are negligible. As the subject of propaganda the North was portrayed in 
such a fashion as to often agitate the south against it. King argued that much of this fear was 
constructed by and contained in Yorkist agitation propaganda ‘it struck a chord amongst its 
southern audience, suggesting that the idea of the northerners as a potential threat to the south 
was already well established by the 1460’s’.135 
The paucity of Northern chronicles leaves us rather in the dark as to the attitude of the 
North to the south. The contemporary and near contemporary views cited above created an 
image of the North that was largely inaccurate but was perpetuated for several centuries. King 
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concluded that the negative portrayal of the North during the Wars of the Roses was due to the 
influence of Yorkist propaganda conveyed by the predominantly southern chroniclers.136  
The North as a producer of and as an audience for propaganda. 
 
 In order to examine the North as both producer of and audience for propaganda 
these two criteria will be examined in conjunction as they were often integrated. In this section 
examples of propaganda specific to the North will be examined and from this the intention will 
be to show that the North was familiar with using a variety of propaganda which was employed 
with varying degrees of success. The region was both a producer and was itself perceived as 
politically important enough to be an audience for propaganda. It was an audience both 
externally, that is for official propaganda, and internally, in the case of local disputes. Two of 
the main conspirators of the Southampton Plot of 1415 were from the Northern nobility and 
gentry, Henry, Lord Scrope of Masham and Sir Thomas Grey of Heaton in Northumberland. 
Their Northern connection was emphasised by Scrope’s head being displayed on Micklegate 
Bar in York, whilst Grey’s head was sent to Newcastle.137 
the heads of Henry Lescrope of Masham and Thomas Gray of Heton, who for treason 
against the king and their allegiance were by judgment against them rendered 
condemned to death and beheaded, and to the sheriffs of the city of York to set the 
said Henry's head upon a spear until further order in the place within that city 
appointed, and to the sheriff of Newcastle to set the head of the said Thomas likewise 
within that town.138 
 Despite the event occurring in the south Henry made sure that it was their home 
region that were the audience for his displeasure. Through the use of visual propaganda Henry 
sent out a firm message that despite his imminent departure for France he was very much in 
control of domestic affairs.  
In contrast Richard III’s entry into York on 29th August 1483 was the culmination of a 
progress which had begun in July taking Richard through towns such as Tewkesbury, Warwick, 
Leicester and Coventry. The Crowland Chronicle revealed Richard’s desire for visual 
                                                 
136 Ibid., pp. 38, 49. King stated that Southern prejudice against the North was unheard of 
prior to the fifteenth century. 
137 Allmand, Henry V, p. 77. 
138 'Close Rolls, Henry V: August 1415', in Calendar of Close Rolls, Henry V: Volume 1, 
1413-1419, ed. A. E. Stamp (London, 1929), pp. 226-227. British History Online 
http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-close-rolls/hen5/vol1/pp226-227 [accessed 4 June 2016]. 
179 
 
approbation in his Northern homeland: 
Wishing therefore to display in the North, where he had spent most of his time 
previously, the superior royal rank, which he had acquired for himself in this manner, 
as diligently as possible, he left the royal city of London and passing through 
Windsor, Oxford and Coventry came at length to York. There, on a day appointed for 
the repetition of his crowning in the metropolitan church ... he arranged splendid and 
highly expensive feasts and entertainments to attract to himself the affection of many 
people.139 
Richard’s crowning in the North concluded an extensive programme of integration 
propaganda that had taken him through the heart of the country. Richard realised, as a usurper, 
the necessity and value of appearing before his people and physically emphasising his kingship 
and legitimacy even within his own power-base. This event was probably meant to 
communicate his loyalty to the North and that in many respects he regarded York as important 
as a city as London. In 1484 York was an audience once more for Richard’s visual propaganda 
when he wore his crown again.140 This act was designed to visually enforce his strong 
connection with the region and showed the rest of the kingdom that he was not going to forget 
his Northern roots. This would have further incensed the south who he had already irked with 
his distribution of southern estates to Northern favourites: ‘to the shame of all the southern 
people who murmured ceaselessly and longed … for the return of their old lords in place of the 
tyranny of the present ones’.141 
 It was particularly in its role as an audience, both positively and negatively, that 
the political significance of the North was crucial, with certain events critically affecting the 
course of late medieval English history. 
Case Study 1: Henry IV and the North of England. 
In 1403 Henry Percy famously wrote to Henry IV: 
Thou spoileste yerly the reame with taxes and talleges. Thou payeste no man, þou 
holdeste no house. Thou arte not heire off the reame, and þerfor as I haue hurte þe 
reame in bryngynge in off the, I woll helpe to refourme yt yff I may.142 
This quotation revealed the dissatisfaction that the Percies felt with Henry IV after they 
had allowed him to travel through their region and ultimately to take the throne. This case study 
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will contribute to an understanding of how propaganda was received and produced in the region 
during a key period of dynastic upheaval. 
Henry’s Northern connections were rooted in his father’s Lancastrian palatinate where 
Henry was appointed warden during John of Gaunt’s foreign forays.143 The Lancastrian affinity 
of John of Gaunt had strong regional affiliations within Yorkshire and had established 
relationships with leading families such as the Scropes and Fitzhughs.144 The influence of the 
affinity on the region could be seen in its representation in the Commons with Lancastrian 
servants returned to 21 seats in Yorkshire between 1369 and 1397.145  
 Henry’s landing in Yorkshire could have been down to serendipity or strategic 
planning as Castor referred to Yorkshire as ‘one of the greatest centres of Duchy territorial 
interest outside the palatinate’.146 Henry had travelled up the coast, checking out various 
possible landing areas but carried on northwards where perhaps he hoped to find a more 
favourable welcome. Given-Wilson suggested that the choice of landing could have been 
influenced by its proximity to Bridlington, location of the shrine of Henry’s favourite saint, 
John, providing the opportunity for spiritual assistance for his campaign.147 Given-Wilson 
argued that the choice of the region was ‘doubtless the confidence he placed in his father’s 
affinity that persuaded Henry to land in Yorkshire’.148 
Usk recorded that first to assist him was: ‘Robert Waterton, chief forester of his forest 
of Knaresborough, bringing two hundred foresters with him, and after him came the earls of 
Westmorland and Northumberland’.149 The Kirkstall Abbey Chronicle related how the castle 
at Pickering was handed over to Henry, although it was not meant to be, and how 
Knaresborough castle ‘was handed over in the same fashion, though with greater difficulty’.150 
What these difficulties were is not revealed but it showed that the initial response by the region, 
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despite these being duchy castles, was less than enthusiastic. However, Walsingham hints at 
the possible retribution that could be exercised by Richard if he defeated Henry: ‘no one dared 
yet to negotiate with the duke openly, for it was not known what the outcome of such action 
would be’ and that any of the duke’s supporters: ‘would be very severely dealt with’.151  
Henry must have felt vulnerable as he realised that the duchy support he had depended 
on was not immediately forthcoming. It is perhaps at this point that he astutely decided that in 
order to rally support he needed to adopt a different approach, in his case the swearing of an 
oath. There has been a certain amount of debate concerning Henry’s swearing of an oath 
declaring that he would not take the throne when he alighted at Ravenspur in July 1399.152 
However, the event raises the subject of how he regarded Yorkshire as an audience. This 
suggested that the oath was a pivotal piece of integration propaganda employed by Henry on a 
Yorkshire audience.  
Hicks quoted from the Brief Treatise that the Percies were planning on arresting Henry 
but were swayed by his oath. In this oath he declared, according to the Dieulacres Chronicle: 
‘that he would never try to seize the crown, and then said that if anyone might be found who 
was more worthy of the crown than he was, he would willingly stand down for him’.153 Those 
who heard this oath, including the Percies, obviously took him at his word and let him continue 
on his journey. Enigmatically, Bolingbroke stated that he was not interested in the crown but 
could be – was he trying to hint at his real motivation? Was this oath just propaganda to 
integrate the population into supporting his attempt to reclaim the duchy of Lancaster as the 
true inheritor? He apparently swore this oath at several other places in Yorkshire, including 
Beverley and Doncaster. If they were sincere in origin then they had the same impact on the 
audience in raising sympathy and creating the impression that he was the victim. Hicks 
highlighted the fact that many of the sources that recounted the event were written in Latin.154 
Henry required the support mainly of the nobles but if he was intent on seizing the throne he 
would also have needed to court popular opinion as well. Henry assessed the situation and 
produced the necessary rhetoric to assuage the apparent antipathy, if not hostility, to his return 
from a Northern audience. It is debatable whether the oath was reactive rather than pre-planned 
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but considering the evidence from above it is extremely likely that Henry had various 
propaganda plans in mind which may have included the oath.155 
However, with no definitive contemporaneous evidence there is the problem that the 
story is related after 1403 so may well have been Percy propaganda constructed to blacken 
Henry’s reputation. What may be drawn from the event is that the Yorkshire audience’s 
approval of his motives was crucial to ensuring his passage through the realm, without a 
successful reception in Yorkshire Henry may not have become king. Jewell regarded the 
involvement of the North in Henry IV’s successful accession as leading to ‘a century of more 
marked north-south awareness’.156 
Henry IV, although initially heralded as a saviour from the alleged tyranny of Richard 
II soon faced opposition to his own rule in the form of a series of rebellions whose origins were 
Northern. Simon Walker regarded the uprisings although with shared grievances, as separate 
events that were not all directed by the Percies.157  
The most notable of these uprisings was the one led by Archbishop Scrope, Lord 
Mowbray and Sir William Plumpton in 1405. The traditional view has held that 
Northumberland was behind them all, however Walker suggested that the Yorkshire rebels, in 
particular those of the city of York, had different grievances to those of Northumberland.158 
Northumberland’s rationale was essentially a dynastic one of vested interests. The other rebels, 
including Scrope, were complaining about the poor governance of the country including the 
ever increasing tax burden: 
The archbisshoppe commynde of this with wise men of counsell, and afterwarde he 
made a sermon in þe churche off York and exhorted and stured the peple to be 
assistente & helpynge off the correccion and amendmente of the myscheues & 
mysgouernaunce off the realme.159 
There has been much debate about the authorship of Scrope’s manifesto as discussed 
by Douglas Biggs.160 Scrope not only preached in York but ensured that his complaint was 
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communicated to a larger audience: ‘these articules & mony other þe archebisshoppe made to 
be writon yn Englessh, and were sette on þe yates of Yorke, and sende to curatez off the tounes 
abovte forto be preched openly’.161  
Significantly Walsingham translated the manifesto from English into Latin and it is 
interesting to note that the chronicler makes the specific point of recording the fact that these 
articles were published in English suggesting that this was unusual whilst hinting that Scrope 
was addressing the masses with the intention to provoke a response or agitating them to support 
him.162 Walsingham also cited the personality of Scrope as being instrumental in agitating 
people: ‘of particular importance also in stirring the people was the well-known godliness of 
the archbishop…and the gentleness and purity of his character’.163 This manifesto at once 
identified Scrope as a producer and agitator whilst the city of York may be defined as both 
receiver and audience but of course the ultimate audience was really Henry IV and his court. 
Giles’ Chronicle, which itself can  be seen as a piece of propaganda produced by a pro-Scrope 
source in the North, described Henry’s oppression as unbearable importabiles extortiones and 
recorded how Henry heard of the complaints of the citizens of York through the agitation of 
the archbishop: ‘murmuratio, ventilate in populo per praefatum archiepiscopum’.164  
The English Chronicle suggested that it was Lord Mowbray’s inheritance grievances 
that impelled Scrope to take action: ‘his heire the Lorde Moubrey, compleyned vnto the 
Archebisshoppe of Yorke and seide that his auncestreez were euer wonte off right to be 
marshalles of Engelonde’.165 However, the manifesto listed the grievances perceived by the 
rebels against Henry IV and his government rather than matters of inheritance. These included 
the excessive taxation of both the lay and clerical population; the placement of Henry IV’s 
friends in important positions who appeared to profit whilst failing to do their job and the 
changes in the election process for knights of the shire. Mark Ormrod regarded the hesitancy 
of the judges to ascribe the plan for the deposition of Henry IV to the authorship of Scrope, and 
thus make his actions treasonable, as indicative that the idea was inserted deliberately to 
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associate Scrope with Percy.166 Ormrod saw Scrope’s complaints as essentially a loyal criticism 
aimed at restoring the peace within the country to the benefit of all. This was not the first time 
that Scrope had expressed his discomfort with the governance of the realm. The year before in 
1404 he supported the archbishop of Canterbury in his complaints against the knights who he 
felt were becoming rich at the expense of both the king and country.167 Scrope may well have 
been sympathetic to the charges and experienced at first hand the effects of the burden of 
taxation on his own parishioners in York. Walker cited the York articles as being specific in 
listing the grievances of all those potentially who could be drawn into the debate, that was, the 
clergy, nobility and commons.168 This identified the social make-up of the polity within the 
York area. The manifesto showed that the Northerners were able to express and communicate 
complaint, that is, they were politically aware of the interdependent relationship between king 
and the commons. 
In terms of propaganda the manifesto merits serious consideration for a number of 
reasons. First, it was posted up in public places and was therefore meant to be read by the public 
and second, and perhaps most importantly, it was written in English. Peter McNiven dismissed 
Scrope’s potential audience as not particularly politically astute which may explain why it was 
written in English.169 However, the use of English suggested that these bills were meant for a 
larger audience than the elite and in fact the use of the vernacular was not uncommon in York 
itself and Scrope would have been conscious of this. There was also the possibility that in fact 
the bills were written by clerical adherents of Scrope, possibly without his direct 
involvement.170 In a city like York the audience would have been diverse, in class, education 
and occupation. The composition of the rebels revealed the majority being clerics or 
townsmen.171 Familial support from Richmondshire was minimal revealing that it was very 
much a York complaint specific to Scrope’s role as Archbishop and may be seen in the context 
of loyal complaint. In terms of propaganda for his cause Scrope’s manifesto did successfully 
agitate several thousand followers to his cause and from the lists of pardons for the period 
June-July 1405 it was apparent that the rebels came from not only the city of York but as far 
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as Malton in the North Riding. There were also pardons for rebels from Warkworth, Newcastle, 
Berwick and Darlington in the north east, although the latter towns were most probably 
connected to the earlier Percy uprising rather than Scrope’s.172  
This rebellion was without doubt Northern based and in this case the North was the 
producer of the propaganda against Henry IV. The audience was intended to be mostly the 
citizens of York at one level, and possibly Percy supporters at another. Was Scrope used as a 
vehicle of respectability to gain the support of the influential York merchants to further 
legitimize what could be regarded as a personal crusade by Percy? The evidence suggested that 
the uprising was very much grounded in the concerns of the York clergy together with the 
mercantile community of the city. Any Percy connection was probably peripheral and Scrope’s 
uprising was tainted by geographical proximity and timing rather than any genuine common 
complaint. The rebellion was Northern in origin, centred on the city of York, but the malign 
influence of the Percies deflected the attention away from it being independent from magnate 
influence. 
There was no straightforward answer to the failure of the rebellion. It was quite well 
organised and successful in that Scrope managed to raise a considerable force. It could be said 
that timing was unfortunate with the fact that the Percies had been stirring up pro-Richard 
feeling for a number of years in the region and that Henry IV’s questionable claim to the throne 
had led him to the path of action rather than negotiation. Scrope was not looking for a battle 
rather he wanted to engage in legitimate discourse for the betterment of the country but 
unfortunately Henry IV was not of the same view.  
The region had been the arena for two of the most significant events in Henry’s reign. 
First, allowing his passage southwards and second, the controversial execution of Scrope which 
demonstrated his political will. At both times the North was an audience of political 
importance. The loss of their supremacy in the region meant that the Percy family receded 
temporarily into the background of Northern politics having been replaced by the Lancastrian 
Neville-Beaufort family who Henry entrusted to keep the peace in the region and thus provided 
stability for the rest of his reign.173 Henry’s arrival at Ravenspur resulted in the North being an 
audience for his integration propaganda which was central to his return and subsequent seizing 
the throne. However, after a series of uprisings in the region in 1405 he was no longer courting 
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the favour of a Northern audience, rather expressing his displeasure through the visual 
propaganda of Scrope’s execution.174 These events demonstrated how through the reception 
and production of propaganda the North was involved in the major political events at the start 
of the Lancastrian era.  
Case Study 2: Edward IV and his relationship with the North. 
This case study will develop the themes explored above but in the context of dynastic 
change Yorkist and the impact on the region. The North was of strategic importance to another 
usurper, Edward IV. Edward was regarded in the South as a saviour as attested by the author 
of the Rose of Rouen: 
 All the lordes of the northe thei wrought by oon assent 
 Ffor to stroy the sowthe cuntre thei did all hur entent 
 Had not the rose of Rone be, al englond had be shent.175 
 
However, Ross warned of ‘a distorted picture of England which was primarily Yorkist 
in the south and east and royalist in the north and west’ which was the creation of pro-Yorkist 
chroniclers.176 The Northern situation was as expected far more complicated than the 
chroniclers portrayed and dominated by the local rivalry of the Percy and Neville families, the 
former Lancastrian and latter Yorkist in sympathy.177 Thus within the region political 
allegiances were divided and divisive and although Edward had Neville support in the region, 
the Lancastrians were the source of much aggravation for the first part of his reign.  
In 1461 on the occasion of Edward’s first visit to York after Towton he removed his 
father’s head and those of other Yorkists from Micklegate Bar and replaced them with those of 
Lancastrians.178 This was a very clear example of visual propaganda by Edward, using York 
as an audience but with the knowledge that his message would reach the rest of the region. 
However, this visual propaganda apparently had a limited effect at integration, if any at all, 
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judging by a letter written in August 1461 to the Duke of Milan: 
The Earl of Warwick has gone towards Yorkshire, a province opposed to that King, 
and very friendly to King Henry. I believe it will submit to King Edward ... seeing at 
their backs the Earl of Warwick, who does them great mischief, and but for whom 
those people would have joined King Henry and taken the field again; but Warwick 
has prevented this.179 
This letter confirmed Edward’s lack of support in the region but emphasised the loyalty 
of the region to Warwick. Lancastrian defeat at the Battle of Towton saw the demise of many 
Northern magnates and as a result many of the forfeitures were granted to the Nevilles. The 
earl of Warwick in particular benefitted, gaining Percy and Clifford land in Cumberland and 
Craven whilst his brother became the earl of Northumberland. This led to a change in the 
political landscape of the North with a greater Yorkist and Neville influence. 
Not only did the Neville family gain land and property but also positions of power. In 
January 1466 George Neville was enthroned at York Minster and to celebrate the occasion a 
feast took place: 
 The usual feast took place ... and was made the occasion for impressing the king with 
the power and influence of the Nevilles and their connections. This, the most 
magnificent installation banquet ever held ... about 2,000 persons were present.180 
The audience here was the city of York and one may speculate that it was an opportunity 
to show the extent of Neville power and wealth to their rivals, the Percies. The Neville 
connection to Edward IV would have consolidated the Yorkist monarchy not only to this 
Northern audience but also to the whole country however as relations soured between Edward 
and Warwick this relationship was to impact dramatically on the realm and the North. 
The late 1460’s were a particularly turbulent time for Edward that resulted in his 
temporary loss of the throne and as Christine Carpenter argued ‘it was the north that brought 
Edward down’.181 There was a series of uprisings in Yorkshire that began in April 1469 with 
the first Robin of Redesdale’s rebellion which was followed with another in the summer. The 
rebels, led by Sir John Conyers, issued a series of complaints regarding Edward’s rule which 
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have been regarded as having the undeniable hand of Warwick attached to them.182 In July 
1469 Edward IV complained to the mayor of Coventry about the Northern rioters ‘makyng 
proclamacions contrary to ther legens, & our pece’.183 Yorkshire, with the aid of Warwick, 
were producing propaganda to agitate the polity against Edward and draw him northwards 
which gave Warwick and Clarence the opportunity to land in the south. The battle of Edgecote 
in July saw Edward captured by Warwick and taken north to the Neville stronghold of 
Middleham castle. After a series of nationwide uprisings Edward was released in early 1470 as 
Warwick appeared to be unable to deal with the situation which as Carpenter observed revealed 
how Warwick’s complaints against Edward had failed to engage ‘in the public 
consciousness’.184 The Crowland Chronicle confirms this conclusion: ‘while, the king was still 
manifestly a prisoner people were not ready to obey such commands, not until he had appeared 
in person at York in full possession of his freedom’.185 
There then followed the Lincolnshire rebellion which culminated in Edward’s victory 
at Lose-cote Field in March which revealed the involvement of Warwick and Clarence yet 
again. However, the final sequence in these uprisings was Fitzhugh’s rebellion in Yorkshire 
which had a disastrous outcome for Edward. As he headed North to deal with the rebels 
Montagu and his troops betrayed Edward and as his troops dispersed in fear, he fled to 
Burgundy.  
In the ‘official’ Chronicle of the Rebellion in Lincolnshire the involvement of 
Richmondshire was explicitly stated: ‘the commocion in meoving of people in Richemond 
shire by the stirring of Scrope and othere’.186 This confirms Pollard’s statement that ‘the people 
of Richmondshire had an importance in national politics put of all proportion to their wealth 
and location’ which was certainly true for the events of 1469-70.187 Thus it was these Yorkshire 
risings that were culpable for ending Edward’s first reign. 
The Historie of the Arrivall of King Edward IV chronicled his return from exile in 1471 
and although not written for a Northern audience it illustrated Edward’s reception in the region. 
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Edward’s arrival was reminiscent of Henry Bolingbroke’s in 1399 and once again the North 
proved a decisive audience in his readeption. Edward too, proclaimed that he was only 
interested in regaining his father’s inheritance: ‘but all they suffred hym to pas forthe by the 
contrye; eythar, for that he and all his felowshipe pretendyd by any manar langage none othar 
qwarell but for the right that was his fathars, the Duke of Yorke’.188 However, once he reached 
the city of York he found that not everyone was well disposed to receive him: 
Thomas Coniers, Recordar of the citie, whiche had not bene afore that named trwe to 
the Kyngs partie. He tolde hym that it was not good for hym to come to the citie, for 
eyther he shuld not be suffred to enter, or els, in caas he enteryd, he was lost, and 
undone, and all his.189  
On his closer approach he did receive a warmer welcome based on the belief that he 
was not returning to claim the throne: ‘owt of the citie, Robart Clifford and Richard Burghe, 
whiche gave hym and his felowshipe bettar comforte, affirmyng, that in the qwarell aforesayde 
of his father the Duke of Yorke, he shuld be receyvyd and sufferyd to passe’.190 Once inside 
the city Edward again used his propagandist skills to persuade the inhabitants and ‘shewed 
them th'entent and purpos of his comming, in suche forme, and with such maner langage, that 
the people contentyd them therwithe, and so receyvyd hym’.191 Edward had ‘played’ the York 
audience astutely and convincingly. 
Although there was apparently little regional support for Edward he was still allowed 
to pass through the city. It was not his propaganda alone that secured his safe passage but the 
support of the earl of Northumberland and his affinity: ‘for grete partye of [the] noble men and 
comons in thos parties were towards th'Erle of Northumbarland, and would not stire with any 
lorde or noble man other than with the sayde Earle’.192 This is a crucial example of where 
Edward’s propaganda was more influential than his personality as it was apparent that the 
North was more disposed to support Henry.  
If Edward had not convinced the Northern audience of his intentions (dishonest as they 
were), through the use of persuasive rhetoric, he would not have been able to travel south. The 
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role of the earl of Northumberland was also pivotal, by doing nothing, his supporters in this 
huge region tacitly took this to mean acceptance of Edward’s return: 
for his sittynge still caused the citie of Yorke to do as they dyd, and no werse, and 
every man in all thos northe partes to sit still also, and suffre the Kynge to passe as he 
dyd, nat with standynge many were right evill disposed of them selfe agaynes the 
Kynge. 193 
As has been noted Edward IV was not particularly popular in the region and this may 
be reflected in the devotion exhibited at York Minster before an image of Henry VI.194 The 
active participation of the citizens in the cult of Henry VI revealed that the windows and other 
visual decoration discussed had had a positive impact upon the memory of the local population, 
who perhaps regarded the Lancastrian dynasty as the true rulers of the realm. It would appear 
that as an audience the inhabitants of York had been successfully integrated by Lancastrian 
visual propaganda despite the fate of Archbishop Scrope at the hands of a Lancastrian king. 
The North, and Yorkshire in particular, played a pivotal role in Edward’s reign by 
causing his flight in 1470 and allowing his return in 1471. Edward’s uneasy relationship with 
the region was mitigated by his brother Richard’s development of a power-base that ensured 
Yorkist control. 
The region had been both a producer and an audience for propaganda albeit with the 
considerable magnate influence of the Nevilles and Percies particularly during the Wars of the 
Roses but with the city of York retaining its mercantile and ecclesiastical interests which 
informed their propaganda.  Propaganda played an integral part in Northern politics, at a 
regional and national level, due to the magnate power-bases that existed in the region and its 
geographical position.  
Conclusion.   
It has been possible to show that the North was not isolated and received regular news 
concerning national affairs. On the contrary, despite its distance from London, the North was 
well placed through its powerful magnates, communications network and importance of York 
to fulfil many of Ellul's criteria for propaganda to thrive. There were frequent opportunities 
for communication via letter or personal contact as evidence from both the York House Books 
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and Plumpton letters has shown. The Plumpton letters demonstrated that the Northern gentry 
were relatively prosperous and no different to their southern counterparts. They shared the 
same concerns about patronage, land and marriage and importantly these interests allowed 
them to gain information, sometimes propaganda, from various sources which then could 
influence the course of politics in the region. The York House Books presented an alternative 
view of mercantile and urban life. The interests of the merchants were naturally concerned 
with trade and connections to the continent. Together these sources establish an image of a 
thriving and politically active region suited to both the reception and production of 
propaganda. 
What has become apparent is that despite the alleged uncultured image of the North it 
had a pivotal role in the politics of late medieval England. This is apparent from the subsequent 
efforts that the Tudors took to regain control of the region. From the discussion above there is 
scant evidence to support the suggestion that the North was politically ill-informed during this 
period.  
As the subject of propaganda, the North provoked some very hostile comments, 
particularly during the late 1450’s due to the Lancastrian ‘hordes’ under the auspices of 
Margaret of Anjou. Some of their reputation was indeed justified but equally it was exploited 
and exaggerated for propaganda by the southern Yorkists and chroniclers. With few Northern 
sources to redress the balance the impression of a lawless region has survived the centuries, 
exacerbated by the prominence of the Neville/ Percy conflict. It would also be fair to say that 
it was not the only region that received contemporary opprobrium from the chroniclers, as the 
Welsh and Kentishmen were also portrayed as somewhat rebellious. The Tudor propaganda 
machine also sought to entrench any stereotyping of the North for their own political gain, 
particularly the wickedness of Richard III, which in turn was mythologised through the 
centuries as an accurate portrayal of the area and its inhabitants. 
As a producer of propaganda, the North was active, often a more local level, as seen in 
York in 1380, rather than at a national level. However, this local agitation often had national 
implications which drew in the king and government.  
The case studies demonstrated that Henry IV and Edward IV both had to influence a 
Northern audience to fulfil their regal ambitions. They both undoubtedly used the area for their 
propaganda and had they failed to convince their Northern audience then the course of 
fifteenth-century English history would have been very different. The region was strategically 
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important both politically and geographically. The established quarrels between the Percies 
and Nevilles filtered down through their affinities and into general society so the population of 
the region was aware of the importance of allegiances, patronage, speaking up about injustices 
– in short, they were politicised. Events in York revealed the independence of the citizens from 
the machinations of the local magnates, when it suited, and showed the relationship between 
commercial necessity and political pragmatism. 
In summary the North was politically significant throughout the late medieval period, 
for the personnel it provided and as a geographical location for major political events. It 
produced propaganda and was a crucial audience for the propaganda of key players at both a 
local and national level. The polity was diverse with major magnates as well as a strong 
mercantile element, all with their own interests, and combined with an established 
communications network ensured that the region was well informed and able to participate in 
the major political events of the period. The North fulfilled the criteria that Ellul outlined and 
that have formed the basis of this thesis to demonstrate the breadth and diversity of political 
communication within a region in late medieval England. 
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Conclusion. 
 
 
 
This thesis has examined over a century of diverse and complex material in order to 
gain an impression of the nature and extent of propaganda in late medieval England. It has 
encompassed the historiography of both political and art history with the intention of 
broadening the discussion on propaganda as a means of political communication. The study 
sought to challenge the established view that it was only with the Tudors that visual propaganda 
became so important. The adoption of its methodology enabled a new way of looking at 
political communication that removed the negative associations of ‘propaganda’, as associated 
with distortion and manipulation. The evidence showed that there was an established 
production of, and reception of, propaganda across England, including areas distant from the 
political ‘centre’, in particular, the North. This provided evidence to observe how the medieval 
polity operated at both a national and local level. The adopted methodology showed that 
propaganda, or political communication, played a significant role in the promotion of royal 
personality and policy. However, the evidence for the existence of and effectiveness of 
opposition propaganda revealed that the ability to communicate on a large scale was not 
confined to the court or nobility. The study has shown examples of propaganda that might be 
proactive, well planned and executed, and not just reactive. Further, approaching the sources 
from the last years of the fourteenth century has demonstrated that propaganda as a means of 
political communication was already well developed before the Wars of the Roses: this 
manifestation of political life was not a product of that sequence of political crises but as an 
aspect of the world from which they grew.  
Late medieval England was a period in which the nation experienced great changes, 
both internally and externally. The death of Edward III heralded an age of dynastic instability, 
most particularly by the accession of his infant grandson Richard. The resultant minority, 
failure to produce an heir and subsequent deposition led to decades of power struggles between 
various factions which eventually drew the country into the civil war known as the Wars of the 
Roses. Externally, the Hundred Years War left the country war weary and almost bankrupt. It 
was a time of moments of immense upheaval amongst periods of normal daily life.  
 
The main obstacle in dealing with the subject of political propaganda in the late 
medieval period is how to define it within a set of parameters that were relevant to the age. The 
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debate between publicity and propaganda has missed the essential point that they are both about 
communicating with an audience, and that any method used indicates that there is a need for a 
two-way conversation between the crown and the rest of the population: it is here that this 
thesis establishes a clearly alternative line of argument from that attempted by Colin Richmond 
some years ago.1 The promotion of kingship should not be treated as a separate issue: it was 
integral to medieval politics and it is evident, in the public appearances of a king and the 
reactions they elicited, that the polity did not differentiate between publicity and propaganda. 
 
The use of the categories of agitation and integration propaganda as outlined by Ellul, 
provides a framework, by which it is possible to ascertain the motives behind the use of various 
methods of communication.2 Previous historiography on the role of political communication 
in the period has tended not to use a explicit methodological and framework, and there is a 
definite benefit to analysing the evidence against one. The need to agitate the populace, by the 
king, was usually for war support whilst agitation by the nobility was linked to securing their 
own interests and with the case of the other groups it was usually a complaint about the 
governance of the kingdom. Integration propaganda meanwhile provides a more subtle form 
of persuasion, often with longer term objectives. The use of portraits and heraldic arms in 
public spaces created opportunities for dynastic legitimisation. The production of genealogies 
provides a justification for usurpers that is meant to remove opposition and provide historic 
‘evidence’ for accepting, or integrating, the new king. 
 
Socially there was an increase in the level of education and literacy, especially amongst 
the gentry and mercantile community. Historiography has concentrated on the effect that the 
increase in literacy had on political communication especially with the introduction of the 
printing press. This focus meant that ‘visual’ literacy, which was already established within the 
public psyche, was overlooked until the Tudors. There is no disputing the rise in literacy but it 
was still restricted to a relatively small proportion of the polity, therefore, when a large 
audience needed to be reached the visual genre was more effective. 
 
The major factor in enabling propaganda to succeed is a communications system that 
reaches the target audience. Communication networks were efficient, both at home and abroad. 
These factors all combined to create a more informed populace who were able to express their 
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complaint, whether through poetry, demonstrations or bills, especially with regard to good 
governance or the behaviour of the king’s advisors. These changes led to the need to counter 
any negative communication and thus the more explicit use of propaganda, particularly visual, 
became more prevalent, used by both the establishment and dissenters alike to either integrate 
or agitate respectively. The frequency of letters that appear in the correspondence of the 
Plumpton and Paston families which reveal the concerns, familial, political and economic that 
troubled the gentry of the time. They also revealed the extent of communication between 
England and the continent, in particular Calais. The road network was well established as seen 
from the evidence of the use of messengers by the cities of York and Coventry and other 
references to the movement of lawyers, merchants, government officials and pilgrims around 
the country recorded in various sources. 
 
The methods available to any potential propagandist were many and varied. The king 
and government had many means of official methods of communication particularly 
proclamations, that were used to inform and control the population. Proclamations were a rather 
more complex method of communication as there was the possibility that each sheriff could 
affect the outcome through the translation and reading of the preamble. Edward IV’s extensive 
use of them combined with his introduction of using English meant that their contents were 
under control and there was less chance of misinterpretation, an important factor in times of 
unrest or in the case of an usurper. Other written sources used by dissenters included 
newsletters, bills and poetry. The reaction to these sources reveals that they were often 
effective, for example the letters distributed during the Peasants’ Revolt. The pulpit was used 
for the use of government rhetoric but equally was used to express complaint by the clergy, as 
in the case of archbishop Scrope. 
 
 This thesis has placed an emphasis on the visual genre as a means of political 
communication. This is an area that had been studied by art historians but only received a 
cursory examination by political historians. The advantages of visual media was two-fold, it 
was an effective mechanism for both agitation and integration propaganda. The heraldic 
tradition was ubiquitous as a visual code that affected the style of the majority of ‘art’ in this 
period from dress to architecture. Its success as a means of communication resulted in 
legislation to control its abuse, particularly with regard to affinities. The production of large 
quantities of badges for distribution confirms their efficiency in influencing a large audience. 
The decoration on effigies sought to establish a dynastic presence or connection to a dynasty 
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within the historical space of a church. The embedding of a visual memory was a faster method 
of integration than other, literary, sources. 
 
The ‘physical’ section of visual propaganda revealed the human body, either dead or 
alive, to be an important resource, particularly in terms of integration. Executions provided the 
opportunity to communicate with a large audience, whether in London or the provinces, whilst 
the despatch of quarters was used as vehicle of political communication to other areas of the 
country. The destination of the quarters was chosen with a clear political message to quell 
further dissent in the counties. The use of executions to make a point was not restricted to the 
king as was seen by the rebel beheadings in 1381. Generally, it appeared that state executions 
were intended to control or integrate, they were an expression of the king’s will. When used 
by rebels they were blatant displays of agitation propaganda meant to boost the morale of their 
supporters. Joel Burden’s work on the burial of Richard II highlighted the role of ritual and 
communal memory and how visual events were an integral part of medieval communication.3 
 
Rumour, a constant threat to the stability of a dynasty, not only resulted in the use of 
proclamations as propaganda as discussed by Ross but was also dealt with visually. The 
announcement of the death of a prominent figure was hard to prove, especially when that person 
was an usurped monarch, such as Richard II. Henry IV had to deal with constant rumours of 
Richard’s survival and felt that his only recourse to dispel the story was to exhibit Richard’s 
body publicly. Although only partially successful in convincing everyone of Richard’s death, 
it is the very act of the displaying that signifies the importance of visual display as a recognised 
method of mass communication and the importance of witnessing such events by the polity. 
 
The late medieval population enjoyed and responded to the many occasions of visual 
spectacle at regular times of year. Many of these events were aimed at integration, showing 
who was in charge through their magnificence, much in the same way that martial displays 
intimidated opponents with their size and appearance. Richard II’s reconciliation with the city 
of London whilst exerting his authority and kingship was expressed visually in the form of a 
procession. This act of integration involved the whole community in a visual and participatory 
way. Humiliation is another area that has not been extensively reviewed. It was an effective 
visual form of propaganda, usually with the intention to integrate. The display of a king dressed 
inappropriately was a risky strategy – it could show that they were no longer fit to rule or it 
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could arouse sympathy for them whilst incurring antipathy towards the other party. The display 
of Richard II by Bolingbroke was in the main successful as Richard’s position as king was 
already severely undermined.  
 
All of these examples depended upon the visual literacy and knowledge of the audience 
for them to work as propaganda and for the most part they were understood and the reaction 
was what was hoped for. These events depended on the engagement of the public and sought 
their political support – it was a public conversation that everyone was invited to join in. The 
reaction of people, whether removing badges after a change of regime, or submitting to the 
king after multiple executions, confirms that visual propaganda was incredibly effective and 
was used with this knowledge in mind by diverse groups as well as the king. Despite the effect 
of the increase in literacy it was visual propaganda that was able to interact with the whole of 
society, whether it was to integrate or agitate. The ‘spaces’ where visual propaganda took place 
were not restricted but included the majority of the late medieval population. The large public 
arenas for executions drew in the whole polity whilst the shire courts reached another audience 
for the reading of proclamations. Sacred sites, such as York Minster, provided space for 
genealogical integrational propaganda whilst the Wilton Diptych was produced for a private 
audience. The use of livery and badges was to be found in the everyday surroundings of the 
populace, in other words, ‘spaces’ were abundant for the display of all genres of visual 
propaganda. 
 
The investigation of personality and propaganda involved concepts of charisma, 
kingship and policy. In order to assess whether personality or propaganda were the more 
dominant factor, parameters were employed to investigate the evidence available. First, the 
extent and nature of uprisings during a reign and secondly, the imposition of taxes combined 
with the raising of support for foreign war. It appeared that the kings with the apparent weakest 
personalities that is, Richard II and Henry VI, both struggled with uprisings throughout their 
reigns. Edward IV, despite losing the throne regained it through a combination of propaganda 
and having a more charismatic persona than his rival, Henry VI. Edward displayed better 
qualities of kingship and leadership which reduced the possibility of complaint from the 
commons. The issues of taxation and war support revealed how important the personality of 
the king was to the essential needs of the country. Henry V embodied all the qualities required 
by the country to agitate support for his campaign in France whilst imbuing the population 
with a communal sense of patriotism and pride. The use of propaganda could not compensate 
198 
 
for a lack of personality, however personality had to be combined with good kingship as the 
polity would complain if they felt that good governance was lacking. Henry IV, Henry V and 
Edward IV were all in control of the image that they projected – all coming to the throne as 
young adults and adapting the various methods of propaganda to suit their needs. Both Richard 
II and Henry VI suffered from not being allowed to assert themselves after long minorities, 
being dominated by family or powerful magnates whilst Richard III was the author of his own 
downfall, the image of a murderer was one that could not be erased through personality or 
propaganda. 
 
The Northern chapter provided evidence that drew together all the elements discussed 
in the thesis to corroborate Ellul’s methodology in a regional case study. The North, although 
geographically remote from Westminster, was a politically significant region and not just 
because of the historical Percy/Neville relationship. The composition of the region saw a mix 
of border defence, urban mercantile interests, ecclesiastical centres, such as York, together with 
magnate influence. This diversity resulted in a population that was politically dynamic and well 
integrated in terms of communication networks. Its reputation as lawless derived from its 
connection to border warfare, a reputation that was continued with Henry VI and Margaret of 
Anjou’s unruly Northern adherents. Richard III’s relationship with the North is well 
documented and his second ‘coronation’ that was held in York was a visual testament to the 
importance that he ascribed to the region. York was regarded as the second city to London for 
many years in terms of economic and political importance. The York House Books provided 
examples of communication between the North and Westminster and the strong mercantile 
influence of York whilst the Plumpton letters provided evidence of the interests of a gentry 
family living in the North. Both sources confirmed the existence of a politically aware audience 
together with evidence of an efficient communications network, which according to Ellul were 
necessary requisites for propaganda to flourish. 
 
The North as an audience for propaganda was shown to be of historical importance. It 
played a pivotal role in determining the outcome of dynastic change on more than one occasion. 
First, was the reception of Henry Bolingbroke and although he was not particularly popular in 
the region, his use of oral and visual propaganda for the Yorkshire audience was sufficiently 
persuasive to allow him to pass through the county and ultimately to seize the throne. Secondly, 
Edward IV was allowed to pass through the region and regain his throne using similar methods 
to Henry. The North was an instrumental audience in the succession and deposition of both the 
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Lancastrian and Yorkist dynasties. At the end of the period it was the withdrawal of Northern 
supporters at Bosworth that resulted in the death of Richard III and the end of the Yorkist era. 
 
  As a Northern producer of propaganda the most famous example was Scrope’s sermon 
and manifesto of 1405 which successfully agitated the local population to support him in his 
complaint about poor governance. Henry IV was notoriously very swift to put down the 
uprising and cause uproar with his execution of the prelate. Henry IV used integration 
propaganda through the visual display of Scrope’s execution to publicly display to the North 
the consequences of dissent. This event revealed the political concerns of the population, their 
role as both an audience for agitation and integration propaganda and as a producer of 
propaganda. Both Storey and Pollard were right in emphasising the political significance of the 
region even though their emphasis was dominated by the magnate influence. The use of the 
York House Books revealed how influential the new wealthy mercantile class was on the   
politics of the city.  
 
The thesis was built around Ellul’s definition of propaganda being used to either agitate 
or integrate an audience. The presence of a good communications network was shown to exist 
and thus the population was involved with various forms of propaganda as the political 
situation required. The range of media used by a medieval propagandist was varied and 
included the expected genre of the written source but also the visual genre played a more 
influential political role than has been previously suggested as the sources have revealed. The 
longer term aims of integration propaganda were well suited to the medium of both architecture 
and sculpture whilst the immediacy of agitation propaganda was seen in the massing of armed 
retinues and public executions.  
 
The primary works on political propaganda tended to focus on the period of the Wars 
of the Roses to the exclusion of the possibility of there being a political consciousness that 
existed before the mid-fifteenth century that inspired the use of propaganda with much of this 
research based on literary sources.4 The conditions that existed during the Wars of the Roses 
have been shown to be present during the reign of Richard II. Likewise, art historians such as 
Richard Marks have produced work on propaganda that have emphasised the more traditional, 
monumental works in public spaces, whereas the thesis has widened the discussion to include 
the physical element of visual propaganda. By drawing together evidence from throughout the 
                                                 
4 See above, Doig and Allan, p. 11.  
200 
 
late medieval period, including a broad selection of material relating to the visual genre, the 
thesis has produced an image of a political community where visual propaganda was present 
and influential within all social classes. Further, the sources cited have revealed that this was 
acknowledged by the various kings with their constant recourse to the use of the medium 
throughout the period. 
 
The main assertions from the thesis are threefold. First, visual propaganda played a 
larger and more influential role than has previously been acknowledged in political 
communication through agitation or integration. Monarchs such as Henry IV and Edward IV 
used the visual genre to great effect, not always successfully but in the full knowledge that it 
had a powerful impact on the perception of both their kingship and personality. Secondly, that 
the propaganda of a monarch could not compensate for a weak personality. Finally, the use of 
the various methods of propaganda described and employed, increasingly through the period, 
reveal the extent of the audience that, due to an increase in education, a late medieval monarch 
had to communicate with to ensure domestic harmony and success abroad. The thesis has 
demonstrated that despite the potential limitations of Ellul’s sociological methodology the 
definitions provided an invaluable and novel approach within a framework with which to 
identify the various methods of propaganda available and how they were used by the late 
medieval polity to communicate. From this it has emerged that political discourse took place 
between the crown and the polity and this ‘conversation’ took many forms which have 
previously not been considered in the political historiography of the period. 
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